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Abstract
Humans live in cooperative groups of varying scales and composition, from
families to nations and international communities. Segregating into groups can
provide benefits by alleviating individual costs. However, individuals also face
a dilemma between following their own interests and those of the group, which
can lead to a breakdown in cooperation. The evolutionary benefits and costs
of cooperation are well-understood theoretically, but the real-world dynamics
of cooperative behaviour remain unclear. This thesis investigates cooperation
in two populations, employing field experiments and social network methods
grounded in a human behavioural ecology framework.
Part I centres on Saami reindeer pastoralists, an indigenous minority who
live and work in cooperative herding groups around northern Norway. I col-
lected survey and experimental data, using gift games to test whether herders
acted cooperatively towards genetic relatives or to their herding group, or both.
I also played public goods games to understand how herders respond to and
solve social dilemmas. Cooperative behaviours were biased towards the herd-
ing group, although kinship also had a positive effect on gift-giving. Smaller
groups were more cooperative, although this pattern was not driven by relat-
edness.
Part II analyses demographic and experimental data collected by others
from a population of Mosuo farmers living in rural southwest China. The Mo-
suo are a minority whose social system traditionally revolved around matrilin-
eal households but which is changing in response to increased tourism. The
results show how affinal relationships encourage a real-word measure of co-
operation: labouring on farms. Some Mosuo people were considered witches.
I test whether witchcraft accusations act as a form of costless punishment, al-
Abstract 4
lowing people to withhold help from witches. Witches were somewhat isolated
within their villages but clustered together and did not suffer significantly low-
ered reproductive success.
These results underline the importance of studying cooperation in real-
world groups in addition to laboratories.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Cooperation is rife in nature. Trillions of cells forgo their own reproductive
interests to keep you alive; individual slime molds clump together into stalks,
producing a specialised fruiting body that releases only a handful of their num-
ber as spores to reproduce elsewhere; ants protect aphids in exchange for their
‘milk’.
Since Hamilton’s (1964) insight of widening the focus from an individual’s
genes to encompass relatives—other individuals containing copies of your
genes—evolutionary scientists have been able to account for the abundance of
social creatures backed by a theory of evolution incorporating ‘inclusive fitness’
– one’s personal genetic fitness combined with fitness derived through genes
shared with others. Since an organism’s strategies can be understood as hav-
ing been shaped by evolution to maximise its inclusive fitness (Grafen 2002),
cooperation can evolve as an optimal strategy. When coupled with theories ex-
plaining social interactions among non-kin (see section 1.4.2), the existence of
cooperation becomes less puzzling.
Humans have been called ‘super-cooperators’ (Nowak 2012b) for our ap-
parent willingness to go above and beyond the genetic duty of maximising
reproductive success in order to cooperate promiscuously. There are many
circumstances in which we cooperate despite self-interest conflicting with the
welfare of the wider group – known as a ‘social dilemma’ or ‘collective action
problem’ (Kollock 1998). When we cooperate, we cooperate in all manner of
ways on all manner of scales, investing time and energy into adopting and
raising other people’s children; debating, drafting and protesting laws on be-
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half of a wider populace; donating not only money to anonymous others in acts
of charity but also donating blood, kidneys and even slices of liver while still
alive. We run races to raise money for charities supporting carers supporting
those in need, we teach skills and share knowledge with others, and we strive
for PhDs and contribute to the public good known as science.
This thesis investigates cooperation in two human societies. The research
presented conducts an evolutionary investigation into cooperative behaviour
in real-world situations, testing predictions derived from an inclusive fitness
perspective of evolution. I will use a combination of experiments and survey
data in order to analyse the patterns and outcomes of meaningful social rela-
tionships. In doing so, I aim to further our understanding of how evolutionary
forces shape our cooperative interactions.
1.1 The diversity of human cooperation
In this section, I briefly discuss cooperative behaviours in the two types of so-
ciety studied in this thesis: pastoralists and small-scale farmers. I will out-
line their main forms of cooperation, the social institutions supporting such
behaviours, and the collective action problems they face.
Pastoralism (the focus of Part I) is a mode of subsistence in which wealth is
embodied in livestock and, thus, kept on the hoof. Pastoralists live in a range of
ecologies—from Arctic tundra to African savannah—and stock many different
animals, not least reindeer, cows, goats, yak, sheep, and arguably bees. Despite
pastoralist societies engaging in a wide range of kinship, marriage and inheri-
tance systems, many have in common the coalescence of households into coop-
erative groups. These household clusters aid in herding tasks, protect livestock
from predators or raiders, protect pastureland from encroachers, and pool re-
sources in order to spread risk (Dyson-Hudson & Dyson-Hudson 1980; Næss
2012).
Herding groups are typically formed of several families and households—
not all related, necessarily—working together in varying combinations and
to varying extents depending on the season, migration patterns, and yearly
trends of livestock needs. Pastoralists also have livestock-sharing partners
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(called ‘stock friends’) with whom they can gift animals according to need
(Cronk 2007). The Saami reindeer herders of Norway have a form of rela-
tionship known as verdde (roughly: guest-friend) which allows for recipro-
cal, needs-based cooperation with people who are not themselves pastoralists
(Paine 1994).
Farmers in small-scale societies (the focus of Part II) tend to live with a
greater number of relatives compared to more mobile groups (Dyble et al.
2015), which may more readily prompt explanation for their cooperation in
terms of kin selection (see Section 1.4.1). However, since trading goods and ser-
vices beyond the family, as well as dispersal upon marriage and links to other
families arising from marriage, tend to occur in these populations, researchers
cannot ignore the potential importance of other explanations, such as the var-
ious types of reciprocity (see Section 1.4.2). Indeed, living with kin can create
its own problems, namely competition among relatives for local resources and
mates (Platt & Bever 2009), or reproductive competition among communally
breeding sisters (Ji et al. 2013), all potentially having negative effects on coop-
erativeness (and reproductive success; see Appendix A). Resource competition
can also lead to a breakdown in reciprocal cooperation between unrelated peo-
ple (West et al. 2006).
Regardless of the extent or intensiveness, or whether growing edibles or
ornamentals, all farmers have in common the need to align interests over long
cycles of growing and harvesting; that is, people must cooperate in order to
solve collective action problems. Some of the most famous cases of success-
ful collective action—the management of common pool resources—have been
documented in farming populations, for example the scheduled use of water-
ways for irrigation organised around a ritualised system of water temples in
Bali (Lansing 1991) or on the terraces of western Nepal (Agrawal & Ostrom
2001).
The examples given above suggest that flexibility is a keystone of human
cooperation, especially when it comes to cooperating on a large scale with non-
kin. In order to understand this kind of cooperation, researchers have begun
to transplant laboratory experiments into their field sites. These quantitative
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studies of flexible and extensive cooperation as it exists in a range of societies
have shed light on the dynamics of social behaviour. However, much remains
to be done in order to fully understand how evolutionary forces shape patterns
of social behaviours within and between human groups at various levels of
organisation, from nuclear families to communities of households.
This thesis makes use of field experiments to investigate: (i) how coopera-
tive relationships are shaped by kin selection (see Section 1.4.1) and reciprocal
cooperation (see Section 1.4.2.1); (ii) how pastoralists balance individual and
collective interests to solve social dilemmas; (iii) whether behaviour in exper-
imental games corresponds to a real-world measure of cooperation; and (iv)
how cooperation based around reputations (see Section 1.4.2.2) can affect re-
productive success for people with poor standing in their community. In doing
so, I aim to further our empirical understanding of human cooperation in a
variety of salient contexts.
In the next two sections, I define the concepts that are central to this the-
sis and introduce the theoretical framework underpinning the research. The
remainder of this chapter goes on to review the evolutionary theories of coop-
eration. Finally, I present an overview of chapters to come.
1.2 Definitions of key terms
The scientific (and non-scientific) literature is swarming with definitions for
the key terms I employ in this thesis, namely cooperation and groups. These
words are also laden with intuitive folk definitions (and in the case of cooper-
ation, laden with value) that do not necessarily or fully reflect their academic
usages. In the following subsections, I will briefly cover how other researchers
use these terms, and settle on definitions pertinent to the work presented in
this thesis.
1.2.1 What is cooperation?
In evolutionary science, cooperation broadly refers to social behaviours that
have evolved for their beneficial effects beyond the individuals performing
those behaviours (Bergmu¨ller et al. 2007; West et al. 2007a). Many groups of
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researchers have produced hierarchical frameworks of cooperation focussing
on various factors, such as inclusive fitness (Lehmann & Rousset 2010; West
et al. 2007a), investment (Bergmu¨ller et al. 2007), and interdependence (Roberts
2005). This section will briefly review the evolutionary definitions of coopera-
tion.
Cooperation is a beneficial outcome of interactions between two or more
individuals, as distinct from ‘cooperative behaviours’, which are the actions
of an individual (Connor 2010; Cronk & Leech 2013). This distinction high-
lights the difference between an individual’s tendencies or characteristics and
their emergent consequences within dyads and beyond. Through focussing on
cooperation as multi-party interactions, we can begin to explore nuances that
may lead to a breakdown in cooperation, such as where individuals act solely
in their own interests or where it is difficult to align the interests of group mem-
bers.
The term ‘altruism’ is commonly confused for cooperation when it should
really be thought of more as a type of cooperation in which an actor suffers a fit-
ness cost in order to benefit others (Hamilton 1964; West et al. 2007a). Some re-
searchers emphasise the need for an actor to incur costs in order for behaviours
to count as cooperation (Bowles & Gintis 2003; Henrich & Henrich 2007; Nowak
2006); however, this view is not shared by all (e.g. Bergmu¨ller et al. 2007; Con-
nor 2010; West et al. 2007a) and will not be central to the definition of coopera-
tion used here.
The work presented in this thesis analyses the cooperative behaviours of
individuals (e.g. in the form of gift-giving, as presented in Chapters 4 and 7) as
well as the outcomes of cooperative interactions, including group productivity
(Chapter 5) and fitness (Chapter 8). I will investigate social behaviour through
proximate factors that theoretically mediate cooperation and will analyse fit-
ness through proxies such as fertility and wealth.
1.2.2 What is a group?
When looking at cooperation beyond the dyad, we enter the realm of groups.
As with ‘cooperation’, ‘group’ is an intuitive and flexible concept that, for the
1.2. Definitions of key terms 22
purposes of scientific enquiry, requires narrowing down in order to have any
explanatory power.
Groups may be bound by ancestry, descent, politics, inclusion and exclu-
sion (e.g. ethnicity might be covered by all five), by accidents of birth (e.g. age
cohorts within schools and universities), proximity (neighbours and commu-
nity groups – although proximity is not a prerequisite, e.g. ‘world’ religions or
internet hordes). In some societies, such groupings allowed partitioning into
sets of people you can marry (or, perhaps more importantly, people you abso-
lutely cannot). The social group may also be a nexus for encouraging normative
behaviours (“we do things this way”).
Group membership can be heritable (e.g. family, royalty, Judaism, feudal
lords) or non-heritable (e.g. football teams, universities, Hell’s Angels), and
membership might be permanent or changeable (e.g. football teams). In the
latter case, groups may be more or less easy to join – for example, some groups
might impose costly behaviours such as sanctions or signals in order to become
a member, e.g. paying fees, wearing tattoos or through hazing new initiates.
Families have shared interests in shared genes – indeed, in humans, pairs
of unrelated individuals often find their interests aligned in the form of off-
spring. Families and factions within families might also find themselves in
conflict, despite their common reproductive interests, for example when kin
come into competition due to limited resources and potential mates (West et al.
2006). Thus, I will use an “ultra-liberal definition” (Okasha 2006: 184) by count-
ing families as groups, contra Williams (1966: 93).
Groups are important loci for collective action and their structure matters.
Increasing membership can boost (Zhang & Zhu 2011) or diminish (Soetevent
2005) the amount of cooperation within a group. Favouring what we might call
an in-group can promote or bolster collective action through emphasising and
aligning shared interests or triggering motivations for helping the group (e.g.
through self-identification with other group members). In-group bias would
also allow longer-term association between members, which may allow trust
and reciprocity to flourish (Carpenter 2000) in the context of reputational sys-
tems (Yamagishi & Mifune 2009).
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1.3 Theoretical perspectives on understanding so-
cial evolution
The work presented in this thesis relies predominantly on human behavioural
ecology, a sub-discipline of evolutionary anthropology (EA). Like many other
social sciences, EA is concerned, in part, with analysing human decision-
making. Unlike many social sciences, EA takes an explicitly theory-driven ap-
proach, generating hypotheses from evolutionary theory, developing models
and testing them empirically. In the words of Cronk & Leech (2013: 11): “Evo-
lutionary theory can provide a theoretically grounded set of expectations about
what motivates humans to act.”
Human behaviour operates at a number of interlocking levels. Many be-
haviours can be affected by culture, and in turn culture can be shaped by be-
haviours. Human behavioural researchers often use an ‘ideational’ definition
of culture as, in the words of Barkow (1989: 140), “a system of socially transmit-
ted information,” (see also Boyd & Richerson 1988; Cronk 1995; Durham 1991).
This narrowed concept of culture—one that “includes less and reveals more”
(Keesing 1974: 73)—separates it from its manifestations in behaviour (Cronk
1995) and thus allows researchers to explain behaviour in terms of culture and
vice versa. I will employ this conceptual definition of culture in the analysis
chapters. Although culture per se is not the target of enquiry here, I will ex-
plore how facets of culture—such as reputation systems, taboos, perceptions of
wealth, and ideas of kinship outside of genealogical relatedness—affect coop-
eration.
1.3.1 Human behavioural ecology
Human behavioural ecology (HBE) emerged from the more animal-focussed
discipline of behavioural ecology (Davies et al. 2012) but extended to include
factors seemingly unique to humans such as marriage systems, as well as
mating systems; friendship, affinal kinship, and other fictive forms of kin-
ship (see Section 1.4.1.2); an extraordinary diversity in subsistence and home
range; unique aspects of life history such as childhood and extended post-
reproductive lifespan; extreme niche construction; and cumulative culture. As
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such, research in this area bridges between the natural and social sciences. HBE
has tended to focus on the classic topics of anthropology such as kinship, mar-
riage, inheritance, and subsistence. Today, the discipline reaches beyond its
original home within anthropology to engage with demography, economics,
epidemiology, political science, psychology, and public health, among others
(Borgerhoff Mulder 2013).
HBE provides a theoretical framework for explaining how and why be-
haviour becomes adapted to social and physical environments – and how be-
haviour can in turn shape environments (Bliege Bird 2015). The discipline’s
traditional focus on small-scale societies such as hunter-gatherer or horticultur-
alist populations has shifted somewhat, with many researchers now exploring
behaviour in industrialised and ‘post-industrial’ (e.g. service economy) soci-
eties, as well as attempting to understand societies in transition that combine
traditional ways of life with the encroaching demands of a globalising world
(such as the two populations studied in this thesis).
The core tenet of HBE is that natural selection has shaped (and continues
to shape) human behaviour, psychology and physiology in order to maximise
inclusive fitness. Through whittling down genetic variation in a population de-
pending on how well genotypes survive and reproduce relative to one another,
natural selection is the only evolutionary force that can produce complex adap-
tations, giving the appearance of design in organisms (Dawkins 1986). The
concept of adaptation refers to heritable traits that have been shaped by selec-
tion on variation within populations; an adaptive trait increases the fitness of
its bearer relative to the mean fitness in the population. For creatures capable
of cumulative culture, such as humans, the processes of cultural evolution can
also produce adaptations (Richerson & Boyd 2005).
Evolutionary dynamics—changes in gene frequencies—can be described
in terms of selection and transmission (Gardner et al. 2011). This partitioning is
captured by the Price equation (Price 1970), a theorem describing how the fre-
quency of a trait changes relative to the mean fitness within a population, given
the covariance between the trait and fitness, and the expected fitness given the
change. The equation accounts for genetic and non-genetic (or more generally,
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replicative and non-replicative) sources of change. Biases in the transmission
of genes affect evolutionary dynamics, e.g. through behaviours such as assor-
tative mating or genes with the ability to represent themselves in gametes at
a greater-than-average rate (e.g. meiotic drive). When transmission biases are
low or absent, selection become the key driver of evolutionary change (Pan-
chanathan 2011).
Selection can be further partitioned into two components: direct fitness
and indirect fitness (see Section 1.4.1). Inclusive fitness is the additive effect
of direct fitness (one’s own genes) and indirect fitness (copies of genes shared
by other individuals) (Hamilton 1964). HBE emphasises the role of natural
selection as an optimiser of traits and posits that selection shapes behaviours,
physiology and reaction norms to make individuals act as if maximising their
inclusive fitness (Grafen 2002).
HBE uses optimality models as a starting point for predicting which be-
haviours evolution should favour in particular environments. Optimality, in
the HBE sense, is based on the microeconomics framework of rational choice
theory, in which actors make decisions based on cost-benefit ratios and their
underlying preferences. When examining social behaviour through an evolu-
tionary lens, we must be careful not to conflate strategies produced through
the optimising nature of selection with an individual’s strategies, which are a
product of her psychology. Optimality models can give insight into the strate-
gies favoured by natural selection (all else equal), but it is not necessarily rea-
sonable to apply these models to predict what an individual ‘should’ do. As
Binmore (2010: 3) wrote, the latter is “the dogma that people actually do have
utility functions in their heads that they seek to optimize when interacting with
others.”
Life entails a balance of costs and benefits. Evolutionarily, both are de-
fined in terms of fitness: an individual’s long-term genetic contribution to fu-
ture generations. Fitness is difficult to measure in the real world (Orr 2009),
especially in long-lived species such as humans. Proxies of fitness—such as the
survival of offspring to reproductive age, completed fertility, number of chil-
dren or grandchildren (controlling for age)—give some insight into the survival
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and reproductive behaviours of individuals following particular strategies.
Given the strictures of ethics, it is difficult to marshal evidence for adapta-
tion by conducting controlled experiments on human marriage, reproduction
or subsistence systems. Instead, HBE relies on an explicitly promiscuous ap-
proach involving theoretical models and simulations, surveys, statistics, oppor-
tunism such as natural experiments, and ‘natural-field’ experiments in which
subjects are not aware they are taking part in an experiment. Through converg-
ing lines of evidence from various methods, human behavioural ecologists are
able to test their adaptive hypotheses. This thesis will use a variety of statistical
approaches to analyse behaviour in field-based quasi-experiments, survey data
collected for this thesis, data collected for a separate project, and governmental
data.
Behavioural ecologists tend to be unconcerned with the exact genetics or
psychological mechanisms underlying behaviour and assume that neither con-
strain the adaptation of behaviour (known, respectively, as the phenotypic and
behavioural gambits; Nettle et al. 2013). Following Tinbergen (1963), HBE cate-
gorises two kinds of explanation: proximate and ultimate. Proximate questions
ask about the mechanisms of a trait in terms of its development (e.g. how peo-
ple learn in which situations they should cooperate) and physiology (e.g. the
emotional glow of doing something nice). However, warm, fuzzy feelings are
not an answer to evolutionary questions, which ultimately ask why traits have
come to exist, in terms of their phylogenetic history (e.g. which other species
cooperate in similar situations) and their function (e.g. nice people have higher
inclusive fitness). When attempting to scrutinise the dynamics of cooperation
through the lens of evolution, we must bear in mind the type of question – i.e.
whether we are asking proximate or ultimate questions. Within the literature
on cooperation, as I shall discuss in the next section, these two types of question
often become conflated (see also e.g. West et al. 2010).
1.4 Evolutionary theories of cooperation
I will begin this section by examining the ultimate explanations for cooperation
alongside the proximate mechanisms, discussing general as well as human-
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centric frameworks. I will first introduce two seminal theories of cooperation—
kin selection and reciprocal altruism—before moving on to discuss more recent
attempts to extend and provide alternatives to these theories.
Evolutionary theories of cooperation require non-random interactions be-
tween potential cooperators. The idea of assortment among cooperators is be-
coming central to the field, encompassing kin selection and the various re-
ciprocities (discussed below) as well as mechanisms such as partner choice
(Barclay 2013), mobility (Aktipis 2004, 2011; Lewis et al. 2014) and demographic
factors such as population structure (Lion et al. 2011; Nowak & May 1992; see
Chapter 9 for further elaboration of these topics).
1.4.1 Kin selection
As with much in evolution, Darwin discussed the possibility of kin selection
first, pondering the sterile castes found in eusocial insects (Darwin 1859). The
idea that costly behaviours such as sterility had not evolved for the good of
the species gained traction in the 1930s with the work of Fisher and Haldane.
It was not until Hamilton’s formal model analysing the circumstances under
which social behaviours can evolve that the concept of inclusive fitness—an
approach based on a “gene’s-eye view” of evolution (Dawkins 1976; Williams
1966)—gained widespread acceptance among most evolutionary biologists.
Hamilton’s key insight was to extend Fisher’s genetical theorem of natural
selection—“which represents the mathematical foundation of Darwinian the-
ory itself” (Gardner et al. 2011: 18)—by partitioning selection into direct and
indirect fitness components. Under kin selection, a gene should increase in
frequency despite deleterious effects on its carrier’s fitness if it benefits others
carrying copies of the same gene(s); in all cases, the benefits to others, tem-
pered by the degree of relatedness, must outweigh the costs to the carrier. This
dynamic is summarised in the following inequality, known as Hamilton’s rule
(HR):
rB>C
Here, r is the degree of relatedness between the actor and the recipient (see
section 1.4.1.1 for definition of relatedness); B is the fitness benefit gained by
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the recipient; and C is the fitness cost suffered by the performer of the social
behaviour. Since evolution by natural selection is a population-level statisti-
cal process, fitness effects (the benefits and costs in HR) should properly be
understood in statistical terms (Gardner et al. 2011). It is important to remem-
ber that an inclusive fitness approach is as mechanism-free as natural selection;
regardless of the mechanisms at play, the outcome of natural selection can be
understood in terms of costs, benefits and relatedness (Gardner et al. 2011).
Since Hamilton’s original formalisation (Hamilton 1964), theoreticians
have increasingly generalised the concept of inclusive fitness. In essence, the
benefit and cost terms have remained the same, although confusion is still rife
regarding their exact definition and how best to measure them empirically;
the major shifts towards generalisation has been with regards to relatedness
(Fletcher & Zwick 2006).
1.4.1.1 Concepts of relatedness
The relatedness parameter, r, in Hamilton’s rule was originally defined by
Wright (1922) as the probability that alleles at any randomly chosen locus in
two individuals will be identical by descent. Thus, siblings will share, on aver-
age, 50% of their genomes (although the exact proportions shared will vary due
to random processes such as recombination), grandparents and grandchildren
will share 25% and so on, exponentially decreasing as the most recent common
ancestor of two individuals becomes more distant.
This consanguineal approach to relatedness is intuitive but theoreticians,
including Hamilton (1972), have generalised the concept to measure assort-
ment on genotype regardless of descent (Fletcher & Zwick 2006). Relatedness
was redefined as a statistical term to reflect the benefit and cost parameters
in Hamilton’s rule (which, as discussed above, are also statistical terms). This
new definition of relatedness measures the genetic similarity of any two indi-
viduals with respect to the average relatedness in each individual’s neighbour-
hood. Where Wright’s (1922) relatedness by descent is a coefficient bounded
between zero and one, relatedness as a statistical concept can take negative
values. Negative relatedness captures the possibility that two individuals can
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be less related to one another than each is to its local population, while positive
values of relatedness describe a situation in which an actor is more likely to
share alleles with a recipient than with the recipient’s neighbourhood (Krupp
& Taylor 2015).
Importantly, neighbourhood relatedness allows for genetic similarity be-
tween non-kin. While this approach, based on quantitative genetics, has value
in theoretical models, it is difficult to measure empirically, especially in hu-
mans, where the experimental setup needed to measure genotype-phenotype
covariance, given current methods, involves artificial selection and is thus eth-
ically dubious. As genome sequencing technology matures and becomes more
affordable, relatedness as identity by descent will likely be dropped in favour
of directly measuring genome similarity (Speed & Balding 2015).
For the time being, pedigree data are relatively straightforward for hu-
man behavioural ecologists to collect and analyse compared to genomic data.
Techniques for ensuring accuracy in pedigrees have been well-developed in
anthropology and will be employed in this thesis. In Chapter 9, I will outline
how evolutionary anthropologists might begin to test kin selection hypotheses
using the statistical concept of relatedness.
1.4.1.2 Unrelated relatives: fictive and affinal kin
Colloquially, we hear people (often youthful) talk of brothers from other moth-
ers, sisters from different misters, or refer to one another as ‘cuz’, ‘blood’ or
‘fam’. Political groups speak of motherlands and brotherhoods, organised
crime syndicates describe themselves as families, and some religions tell us
we are the children of their gods. These examples have in common the treat-
ing of people who are unrelated as family. Extending the status of ‘family’ to
friends and others expands social networks, forging deep ties of mutual obliga-
tion, ameliorating social isolation and perhaps substituting for absent biologi-
cal family (Chatters et al. 1994; Freed 1963; MacRae 1992; Norbeck & Befu 1958).
Fictive kinship can be important among pastoralists who herd in cooperative
groups (see Chapter 4). For example, khot ail—nomadic groups of Mongolian
herders—include not only family but also fictive kin (Conte 2013).
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Marriage ties create fictive kinship relations between families (e.g. sisters-
in-law); affinal kin are unlikely to be related, except in cases such as cousin
marriage. Humans appear to be unique in recognising not only a vast range
of distant relatives (e.g. the Saami pastoralists of Part I know who their third
cousins are) but also in how we extend our kinship systems to encompass the
family of our spouses. Language enables us to distinguish a wider circle of kin
compared to other animals, as well as giving us the tools to treat non-relatives
as fictive kin.
Cooperation among fictive kin would, on the surface, preclude an inclu-
sive fitness explanation; however, Hamilton’s rule is theoretically capable of
accounting for cooperative behaviour between individuals who might share
genes at particular loci without being genealogically related, as well as among
true non-kin (Queller 2011). Since shared genes are fundamental to an inclusive
fitness understanding of social evolution, this thesis will quantify the effects of
relatedness on cooperation in each of the research chapters.
1.4.2 The reciprocities
Practically all life in society includes and implies reciprocities, and reci-
procity has been seen as the basic glue that makes people constitute groups
or societies.
(Serge-Christophe Kolm, quoted in Frey & Meier (2004))
1.4.2.1 Reciprocal altruism
In his seminal paper, Trivers (1971) formalised how cooperation may be condi-
tioned upon long-term reciprocal interactions between individuals providing
benefits to one another, regardless of whether or not they are related. Trivers’s
model of reciprocal altruism (RA) shows how cooperation can be enforced
through actors and recipients promoting each other’s cooperation with coop-
eration of their own or, conversely, punishing betrayal with betrayal. As such,
RA explains how non-relatives can solve social dilemmas.
RA, on an ultimate level, should be more correctly thought of as reciprocal
cooperation since nobody is being altruistic when they ultimately receive long-
term fitness benefits despite paying short-term fitness costs. On a proximate
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level, however, cooperation can be altruistic if an individual helps another,
selflessly, without expectation of repayment (assuming no one else is around
to witness the event and the recipient will not spread word of the kindness);
altruistic psychologies might be shaped for genetically selfish reasons (Barclay
2012). Therefore a full evolutionary understanding of reciprocal altruism must
include both levels of analysis. Throughout this thesis, I will use ‘reciprocal al-
truism’ and ‘reciprocal cooperation’ interchangeably and will mention explic-
itly if I mean ‘true’ altruism from a fitness point of view.
The idea of reciprocity as an essential component of cooperation has a long
history within social anthropology, parallel to its history within the evolution-
ary sciences. Le´vi-Strauss (1969) understood human relations as being based
around norms of reciprocity and exchange in three realms: words (language);
women (kinship); and resources (economics). Mauss (1925) discussed three
obligations that come with cooperative, rewarding behaviours such as gifts: to
give, to receive, and to reciprocate. Exchanges, by this account, create obliga-
tion – the burden to repay and the risk of not being able to do so, which may
lead those reneging to lose face and prestige, thus potentially losing out on fu-
ture cooperative encounters. Not all gifts engender debt, however: some can
be free, e.g. urban passers-by giving change to beggars, tipping in a restaurant
you will never revisit, or ‘Indian gifts’ expressly given to not be repaid (Parry
1986).
Sahlins (1972) outlined a similar tripartite typology of reciprocity: gener-
alised, balanced, and negative. In his account, generalised reciprocity refers
to a seemingly altruistic giving of gifts without prescribing specific terms of
redress; balanced reciprocity is an immediate-return exchange; and negative
reciprocity can be thought of as barter, where each party seeks to increase its
own self-interest without creating or tending to social relationships (much like
the evolutionary idea of pseudo-reciprocity; see section 1.4.2.3). These social
theories correspond to proximate explanations in the evolutionary sciences, al-
beit particularly human-centric mechanisms: exchange relationships imbued
with meaning and poised on reputational concerns.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma became the canonical model of cooperation (Ax-
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elrod & Hamilton 1981), pitting self-interested actors against one another in an
artificial, inhospitable world. The abstractness of the basic model—two play-
ers, each with limited options (to either cooperate or defect), subjected to the
outcome of their own and their opponent’s decision—provides a rich ground
for exploring the dynamics of cooperation. Indeed, theoreticians are still dis-
covering hidden corners of this well-explored mathematical terrain, such as the
class of ‘zero determinant strategies’ which allow one player to determine her
opponent’s payoffs regardless of how the opponent plays (Press & Dyson 2012;
Stewart & Plotkin 2012).
Repeated interactions are the key to reciprocity. Although a single round of
the PD (a ‘one-shot game’) inexorably leads to a failure in cooperation for eco-
nomically rational actors, repeating the game with the same players can foster
cooperation. Cooperation can also emerge from a PD situation if players have
the ability to ‘parcel’ their investments into smaller, less costly acts – essen-
tially turning a one-shot interaction into a repeated, perhaps indefinite, game
(Raihani & Bshary 2015). However, despite the PD’s prominence in theoretical
work, it is less clear how often this form of social dilemma occurs in nature. For
humans, social norms and institutions might evolve in order to solve dilemmas
through changing or ameliorating individual incentives. Shifting payoff struc-
tures alter the terms of the game, potentially reorienting the dilemma into a
situation more conducive to cooperation (Archetti & Scheuring 2012).
‘Network reciprocity’ refers to a form of reciprocal altruism that accounts
for population structure (Nowak & May 1992). This form of reciprocity in-
volves situations where individuals interact in a biased, limited manner based
on patterns of social ties (Nowak 2006), in a similar manner to the assortment
discussed at the beginning of this section. The networks of farm labour pre-
sented in Chapter 7 are spatially structured within villages; I will analyse the
effect of geographical proximity alongside kinship and reciprocal relationships
hypothesised to predict cooperation.
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1.4.2.2 Indirect reciprocity and reputation-based cooperation
Reputation has been posited as a factor underlying cooperation, whereby indi-
viduals cooperate with those who have previously helped others, even if the
potential co-operator has no previous experience with the helper (Nowak &
Sigmund 1998, 2005). Indirect reciprocity—so called to contrast with the ‘direct
reciprocity’ of RA—is a form of reputation-based cooperation that is contingent
on an individual’s image score; some theoreticians also emphasise the need for
being seen to make appropriate, justified decisions (“standing”; Panchanathan
& Boyd 2003). The original models of indirect reciprocity (Nowak & Sigmund
1998) made the unrealistic assumption that individuals cannot interact with
the same partner more than once (Roberts 2008). Later work suggests that the
ability to choose partners for repeated interactions based on their reputation is
essential for reputation-based cooperation to evolve (Roberts 2015b).
Potential cooperative partners can distinguish themselves through their
reputations. Laboratory studies of public goods games in which participants
are able to build up good reputations show that players with a history of donat-
ing, or a willingness to sacrifice earnings, can increase their probability of being
chosen to join groups (Barclay & Willer 2007; Stiff & Van Vugt 2008; Wedekind
& Milinski 2000). Cooperation plummets or disappears altogether when rep-
utation systems are removed (Yamagishi & Mifune 2009) or when reputations
can be earned easily, e.g. by paying for a good reputation (Pfeiffer et al. 2012).
The ability to choose social partners based on their reputation can lead to a form
of ‘competitive’ cooperation whereby individuals cooperate to strategically in-
vest in building good reputations, increasing their chances of being chosen for
future cooperative interactions (Sylwester & Roberts 2013), including mating
(Raihani & Smith 2015).
Evidence from the field provides support for the importance of indirect
reciprocity in human societies. A study of Quechua agro-pastoralists living in
the highlands of Peru found that households helping with cooperative tasks
such as harvesting and husbandry had larger support networks as a result of
reputational boons (Lyle & Smith 2014). A good reputation was defined in
terms of being known as a reliable and hardworking person, who was also
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respected, influential and generous.
Better reputations can also translate into fitness benefits. Upper-body
strength was the strongest predictor of a good hunting reputation for Hadza
men, which also boosted their reproductive success (Apicella 2013); other, less
easily quantified ideals such as ‘heart’ and ‘intelligence’ were also cited as de-
sirable traits. Similarly for Meriam people in Australia, those who were known
as better turtle hunters also had greater reproductive success (Smith et al. 2003).
In Chapter 8, I look at reputation for witchcraft to analyse how poor stand-
ing in a community might lead to isolation and the withholding of cooperation,
and how these might negatively affect reproductive success. The definitions of
desirable and objectionable reputations will be valued differently in particular
societies at particular times. This potentially makes truly comparative studies
of reputation systems difficult if researchers must rely on emic understand-
ings of reputation that might be hard to translate to different places. Further
elaboration of this point is beyond what is possible in this thesis, although it is
something researchers should bear in mind when designing field-based studies
in future.
1.4.2.3 Other reciprocities
There are three other ‘kinds’ of reciprocity that will not be covered further in
this thesis, but I mention them here for completeness. ‘Pseudo-reciprocity’ de-
scribes a situation in which one individual invests in another, at a cost to them-
selves, boosting the fitness of the recipient who continues to follow their own
self-interest rather than directly reciprocating the investment, e.g. honeyguide
birds leading humans to beehives and eating the leftovers (Bergmu¨ller et al.
2007; Connor 2010; Leimar & Connor 2003; Raihani et al. 2012; Sachs et al. 2004).
‘Generalised reciprocity’, in an evolutionary sense, means to help someone if
you have previously been helped by anyone (Barta et al. 2011), and thus is not
really reciprocity at all (Cronk & Leech 2013).
‘Strong reciprocity’ is the idea that cooperation evolves through biological
or cultural group selection. Strong reciprocators are individuals who favour
other cooperators and are willing to bear a cost in punishing transgressors and
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violators of social norms (Gintis 2000). Although strong reciprocity appears to
be important in theory and laboratory experiments, evidence of its importance
in the real world is equivocal (Balafoutas & Nikiforakis 2012; Guala 2012; Wink-
ing & Mizer 2013). Experimental evidence suggests that individuals will not
pay a cost to punish norm violators (Bone et al. 2014) and third-party punish-
ment is more prevalent in larger-scale societies (Marlowe et al. 2008), although
coordinated collective punishment (e.g. mobs) might be present in many soci-
eties, regardless of scale (Moya, pers. comm.). In addition, reputation systems
might function as a means of cheap collective punishment (see Chapter 8).
Of the reciprocities, the work presented in this thesis focusses mainly on
reciprocal altruism (direct reciprocity) and indirect reciprocity (reputation). I
will not, therefore, concentrate further on generalised, pseudo or strong coop-
eration.
1.4.3 Kin selection versus reciprocal altruism?
On occasion, researchers have sought to show the primacy of kin selection over
reciprocal altruism (or vice versa), unnecessarily opposing the two theories.
Such attempts at finding ‘silver bullet’ explanations for cooperation ignore the
fact that these theories are not mutually exclusive and can operate in concert
(Carter 2014; Rothstein 1980; Schino & Aureli 2010). A simple thought experi-
ment shows how this can be the case: if there is any genetic proclivity for recip-
rocal cooperation, reciprocators are likely to share these genes and thus within-
species reciprocity cannot be distinct from kin selection (Rothstein 1980).
According to Schino & Aureli (2010: 562), researchers “have been adopting
a double standard” where they control for relatedness when statistically test-
ing reciprocity but not vice versa. In a meta-analysis of primate allo-grooming,
Schino (2007) looked at the relative effect sizes of kin selection and reciprocity,
each controlling for the other. He found that, across 14 primate species, reci-
procity had a stronger effect on allo-grooming compared to kinship, although
both predictors were positive (Schino 2007). A similar technique was applied
to observations of food sharing in humans and other primates, which again
found that reciprocity had a stronger effect on average than kinship, although
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the differences were not statistically significant (Jaeggi & Gurven 2013). Chap-
ters 4 and 7 will analyse how kin selection and reciprocal altruism can have
complementary, positive effects on cooperative behaviour.
1.5 Overview of thesis structure
This thesis investigates cooperative behaviour in real-world situations. The
following chapters explore kin and non-kin cooperation using datasets from
two field studies, including one which was collected for this thesis. The groups
in these chapters range from nuclear families living in households, to villages
of households and larger communities.
Part I of this thesis focusses on a population of reindeer herders living
around the Arctic tundra of northern Europe, while Part II focusses on a small-
scale farming community in rural China. While the two study populations lead
quite different lifestyles in very different environments, they have in common
the fact that they are ethnic minorities trying to keep alive their traditional
cultures that are, to varying extents, at odds with the nations in which they
find themselves. The research presented here will analyse the social dynamics
and the kinds of cooperation these two populations engage in, in the absence
of more formalised state institutions.
Within Part I, Chapter 4 uses social network analysis on a gift game played
among Saami reindeer herders in order to investigate the relative importance
of kin selection and reciprocal altruism in explaining cooperation. Chapter 5
analyses behaviour in a public goods game to understand how groups of Saami
herders cooperate in order to solve social dilemmas.
In Part II, Chapter 7 combines a real-world measure of cooperation—
working on the farm of another household—with two gift games played by
a population of Mosuo farmers in order to understand the factors affecting
observed social relationships. Chapter 8 focusses on how having a poor rep-
utation might lead to social isolation and detrimental effects on reproductive
success.
Finally, Chapter 9 discusses the overarching results of these analyses in the
context of the wider literature and concludes with suggestions for future work.
Chapter 2
Methods
This chapter will introduce experimental economics games—a key methodol-
ogy for understanding cooperative behaviour in this thesis—and review how
researchers have used these games to understand real-world cooperation. Fi-
nally, I provide an overview of the statistical methods used throughout this
thesis.
2.1 Measuring social relationships with experimen-
tal games
Scientific approaches to testing predictions derived from the theories of cooper-
ation reviewed in Chapter 1 have several features in common. Theoretical work
constructs stylised games that are mathematically precise yet general (Camerer
2011a); real-world situations that potentially lead to social dilemmas are dis-
tilled into highly abstracted models. Their general, abstract nature means that
the games are analytically tractable and their structure can potentially be ap-
plied to a number of situations. Empirical studies attempt to translate these
stylised games into relevant, real-world situations in order to understand how
individuals actually behave.
A core assumption of the empirical work presented in this thesis is that
experimental games can reveal meaningful underlying social relationships.
While abstract games involving anonymous interactions are of great use and
aid cross-cultural comparison of studies, I will argue that researchers should
not feel bound by them. It might prove equally enlightening to toy with a
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game’s structure in order to make it more contextual and relevant to particu-
lar ecologies (including subsistence mode, kinship system, etc.), thus increas-
ing the value of conducting games in field studies. Accordingly, the empirical
work presented in this thesis is centred on games framed such that a partici-
pant’s decisions reveal their underlying social relationships.
Models of humans as rational actors seeking to maximise their utility
(where utility may be fitness, money, happiness, etc.) do not adequately ex-
plain observed levels of cooperation in many situations across many societies.
Our constant and widespread economic irrationality has led some researchers
to consider human cooperativeness as non-adaptive (Gintis 2000), maladaptive
(Burnham & Johnson 2005) or adapted to ancestral conditions (Tooby & Cos-
mides 1996).
I will leave aside the debate surrounding the applicability of economic ra-
tionality versus ecological rationality – the latter suggesting that our apparent
and ‘predictable’ (Ariely 2009) biases are in fact rational when accounting for
context (Fawcett et al. 2014; Gigerenzer 2010). Suffice to say, Homo economi-
cus has led many researchers to concentrate on our cognitive biases and seem-
ingly irrational behaviours at the expense of understanding sociality in ecolo-
gies laden with context (McNamara & Houston 2009). While it is not an aim
of this thesis to develop these distinctions further, it is worth bearing in mind
that seemingly irrational behaviour, when analysed with the tools of evolution
in meaningful contexts, may turn out to make sense after all.
In recent years, researchers have taken the methods of experimental eco-
nomics and begun to apply them to situations that are salient to local groups
(Camerer 2011b; Ca´rdenas & Carpenter 2008; Harrison & List 2004). Early
work in this area used context-free games in order to explore variability in be-
haviour across societies (Henrich et al. 2001). However, field experiments tend
now to involve games framed in terms of relevant social institutions that pro-
mote particular norms (Cronk 2007; Gerkey 2013), games involving amounts of
money with high purchasing power (perhaps making up a large proportion of
a participant’s wages), or games played using goods relevant to the field situa-
tion, such as salt or honey rather than money (Apicella et al. 2012; Chaudhary
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et al. 2015; Lamba & Mace 2011). This enables researchers to study coopera-
tive behaviour in contextually relevant situations using a quasi-experimental
approach that will form the backbone of this thesis. I will use experimental
games as one method of testing evolutionary hypotheses about cooperation in
the real world.
The research reviewed in the following sections will be limited to studies in
which laboratory methods have been transposed to field sites (i.e. the kinds of
societies that are the traditional fodder of human behavioural ecology). Thus,
I will ignore experiments carried out among students at Western universities
and elsewhere, although I include experiments conducted among other urban
dwellers in Western(ised) nations. I will also ignore online experiments such as
those conducted via the Amazon Mechanical Turk labour market. For brevity, I
do not include field experiments designed to capture behaviour towards com-
mon pool resources rather than public goods (e.g. Ruffle & Sosis 2006; Vollan
2008).
2.1.1 Games with gifts
Many field experiments that explore individual-level rather than group-level
cooperative behaviour tend to do so with ultimatum, dictator or trust games
(Camerer 2011a). The trust (or investment) game involves one participant giv-
ing part (or all or none) of an endowment to another player, who can then send
some, all or none back. The ultimatum game (UG) is a simpler version of the
trust game in which one player offers a split of their endowment to another
player who then chooses to accept or reject the offer; in the case of rejection,
neither player receives anything. The dictator game (DG) is simpler still: one
player gives a split of their endowment (or nothing) to another, often anony-
mous, player.
While undeniably useful as a proxy for understanding pro-social be-
haviour and fairness norms, I argue that the DG and UG exhibit shortcom-
ings that make them inappropriate tools for the purposes of this thesis, which
is to understand social relationships between individuals. The main criticism
involves how to interpret the seemingly irrational and variable behaviours ob-
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served worldwide in these games (Henrich et al. 2001; Lamba & Mace 2011).
The sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium strategy—i.e. the strategy arrived at
by a rational player working through backward induction—in the DG is to
donate nothing and in the UG is to offer the smallest possible split. However,
researchers tend to ignore the fact that any donations in the DG and any split of
the endowment in the UG, no matter how big or small, are also Nash equilibria
and, thus, rational strategies.
Here, I make use of a simpler, more intuitive experiment: the gift game.
Gift-giving is likely to be a human universal found in all societies, as well as
being classic grist to the anthropological mill (Mauss 1925). In a gift game,
participants are endowed with an amount which they must give away to one
or more people, not keeping any for themselves.
Gift games were first employed, to the best of my knowledge, by Apicella
et al. (2012) in their study of Hadza hunter-gatherer social networks, in which
they found that people gave gifts of honey to relatives as well as to spouses
and friends (who also considered the giver a friend). Chaudhary et al. (2015)
used this method, including the honey sticks, among a group of BaYaka hunter-
gatherers. They found that men who received more gifts (i.e. were more popu-
lar) were also more likely to be in polygynous relationships, which in turn was
associated with greater reproductive success. In addition, men who were the
appointed spokespeople for their camps received the highest number of gifts,
suggesting there were also reputational factors at play.
Gift-giving can also be leveraged for a different purpose. Researchers
working for an international charity based in Switzerland found that includ-
ing gifts with letters soliciting donations led to a substantial increase in charity
giving (Falk 2004), perhaps sparking norms of obligation and reciprocity in
potential donors. Similarly, tourists visiting a Costa Rican national park gave
slightly larger donations after they were given a refrigerator magnet, although
the marginal increase was less than the cost of the gift itself (Alpizar et al. 2008).
In an interesting reversal of gift-giving, Rucas et al. (2010) played a ‘so-
cial strategy game’ in which Tsimane forager-horticulturalist women from
three communities in Bolivia were given the opportunity to anonymously take
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coloured plastic beads (a favoured commodity in the area) away from other
women. They took fewer beads from neighbours, friends and enemies, but
more beads from distant relatives (although still some from close relatives).
In my experience (see Chapter 4 and Thomas et al. 2015), gift games require
little explanation and so are an easy yet efficacious way of revealing meaning-
ful social relationships between individuals. Chapter 4 uses a gift game to ex-
plicitly compare the relative importance of genealogical relatedness and social
group membership, while Chapter 7 tests whether patterns of gift-giving pre-
dict a real-world cooperative behaviour: helping on the farms of other house-
holds during planting and harvesting seasons.
2.1.2 Public goods games
How group-level cooperation emerges from individual decisions is also im-
portant for understanding cooperative dynamics across human societies. The
canonical model of group-level cooperation is a social dilemma known as the
public goods game (PGG). PGG participants are given an initial endowment
and they must choose a proportion to donate to the public good (often a pot of
money), keeping any remainder for themselves. Once everyone has made their
decision, the group pot is multiplied—either by a fixed amount (linear PGG) or
as a function of donations (nonlinear PGG)—and the total is distributed equally
to all group members, regardless of their donations.
A social dilemma arises because the structure of the PGG forces group
members to balance their own self-interest (following an individually rational,
income-maximising strategy, which is to donate nothing) with the collective in-
terest of maximising everyone’s welfare by all members donating their full en-
dowments. Thus, if everybody behaves in a self-interested manner, the public
good does not get provisioned. However, when deployed in laboratory exper-
iments, the majority of people donate (Ledyard 1995).
2.1.2.1 Variation in cooperativeness within and across cultures
PGGs played in the field have uncovered a wide variation in cooperative be-
haviours. One review of PGGs involving non-student samples found that
donations ranged from 23% to 81% of the initial endowments (mean = 51%;
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Ca´rdenas & Carpenter 2008). In a study of 15 small-scale societies, the differ-
ences in contributions were larger between groups than within (Henrich et al.
2005). However, Lamba & Mace (2011) found considerable variation in con-
tributions across villages in a single society in Pahari Korwa, India. Similarly,
among Hadza hunter-gatherers there was substantial variation between camps,
while people donated similar amounts to a PGG within camps (Apicella et al.
2012). A study in southwest China found large variation in PGG contributions
across eight ethnic groups (including Mosuo people – the focus of Part II), asso-
ciated with differing norms of female-biased dispersal. Populations featuring
low rates of female dispersal contributed less, while individuals gave more
when they lived in their natal villages (Wu et al. 2015).
Researchers disagree over whether this variation is primarily driven by
market integration and stable society-wide cultural norms (Henrich et al. 2005),
localised and changing expectations of fairness and trust resulting from so-
cial dynamics (Gurven et al. 2008), or village-level demography and ecology
(Lamba & Mace 2011). While measuring and explaining intra-cultural and
inter-cultural variation in cooperative behaviour is beyond the scope of this
thesis, I attempt to minimise confounding factors in PGG donations by playing
them only among herding groups within a single district in northern Norway
(Chapter 5).
2.1.2.2 Group size affects contributions
The number of people in a group can affect cooperativeness by changing the
returns each player can expect from their donations. This is known as the
marginal per-capita return rate (MPCR; Ledyard 1995). When a player would
receive less than they put in—e.g. for every one monetary unit (MU) con-
tributed, they receive less than one MU in return, meaning MPCR < 1—a social
dilemma exists by which every player has a self-interested incentive to con-
tribute nothing (the Nash Equilibrium), despite the welfare-maximising strat-
egy being to donate the full endowment (Pareto optimality). The vast majority
of PGG experiments employ MPCR < 1, although exact rates vary from study
to study.
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Different studies have found positive (Zhang & Zhu 2011), negative
(Soetevent 2005) and curvilinear (Yang et al. 2013) responses to group size, and
one study found no effect of group size at all (Baldassarri 2014). Overall, there
appears to be a ‘Goldilocks zone’: groups that are not too big and not too small
are the most cooperative (Aaron MacNeil & Cinner 2013; Agrawal & Goyal
2001; Poteete & Ostrom 2004).
A meta-analysis of the effects of punishment on cooperation reported
across 18 countries found that group size (and thus MPCR) did not have a
statistically significant effect (Balliet & Lange 2013). In other cases, people con-
tribute despite low MPCR; for example, most Hadza people donated more than
half their endowment despite a very low marginal return where people would
receive a maximum of 0.27 honey sticks for each honey stick they donated (Api-
cella et al. 2012). In Chapter 5, I exploit the natural variation in the size of mean-
ingful social groups in order to test whether perceived returns affect donations
to PGGs.
2.1.2.3 Individual characteristics
Age affects cooperativeness. Some studies have found that older people are
more likely to donate to the public good or contribute more, e.g. evacuees from
Hurricane Katrina (Whitt & Wilson 2007); in rural Vietnam (Carpenter et al.
2004); Kamchatka, Russia (Gerkey 2013); and Pahari Korwa, India (Lamba &
Mace 2011). In some places, age may have a curvilinear relationship with do-
nating; for example, Rieger & Mata (2013) found that donations in rural Mo-
rocco peaked for people aged between 41 and 50 years, although 50− 60% of
the youngest and eldest people also contributed.
Sex also affects contributions in some studies. Women were found to
contribute more in rural Zimbabwe (Barr 2001); Nairobi, Kenya (Greig &
Bohnet 2009); Maharashtra, India (Bouma et al. 2014); and in Vietnam, al-
though women contributed less in Thailand (Carpenter et al. 2004). In PGGs
played with Ache forager-horticulturalists, 70% of women contributed their
entire stake, although men contributed slightly more to the group overall (Hill
& Gurven 2004). Males across eight ethnic groups in southwest China con-
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tributed more than women (Wu et al. 2015). A meta-analysis of public goods
games (and other social dilemmas) found no sex effects, although the major-
ity of studies involved students in laboratories (Balliet et al. 2011). The PGGs
presented in Chapter 5 will thus control for the age and sex of participants.
2.1.2.4 Group composition shapes cooperation
A group’s composition—its level of homogeneity or heterogeneity on a partic-
ular measure—can affect cooperation. Here, I will discuss three of the most
salient: sex ratio, ethnic diversity and relatedness.
A study of people living in slums in Nairobi, Kenya, found no difference
in contributions between sexes when they were placed in same-sex groups.
However, women contributed more to all-female groups compared to mixed-
sex groups, but contributed less than men in mixed sex groups, while men
were not affected by group composition (Greig & Bohnet 2009). Males also
expected others in mixed-sex groups to donate more than they actually did,
while females underestimated contributions. It is possible, however, that the
effects observed in this study were due to a local social institution (harambee)
and the increased activity of women in community groups compared to men
(see section 2.1.2.5). In southwest China, males gave more in mixed-sex groups,
while a male-biased sex ratio in the PGG groups was associated with smaller
contributions (Wu et al. 2015).
The ethnic composition of groups can also affect contributions to public
goods. PGGs conducted among multiple ethnic groups (castes) in India found
that players cooperated conditionally, increasing their donations if others from
the same caste also donated more (Waring & Bell 2013). Similarly, a survey
study conducted in Indonesia found that individuals were more likely to take
part in community groups if more people from their own ethnic group were
also members (Muller & Vothknecht 2012). The relative social standing of dif-
ferent ethnicities in a group can also affect contributions. For example, cooper-
ativeness was reduced when groups contained people from the servant (Dalit)
caste along with higher-ranking castes (Waring & Bell 2013).
The bulk of field-based PGGs do not account for the relatedness of people
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to their groups. This is predominantly because these studies do not derive their
hypotheses from evolutionary theory and so tend not to account for theoreti-
cally important factors such as relatedness to community groups. As discussed
in section 1.4.1, evolutionary theory predicts that more related groups would
be more cooperative (Hamilton 1964; Rendueles et al. 2015), except where there
is competition for limited resources (Wilson et al. 1992). In the rare cases where
relatedness data are collected, they tend to be treated as a nuisance to be con-
trolled for rather than an explanatory variable affecting cooperative behaviour
(Waring & Bell 2013; Wu et al. 2015). Wu et al. (2015) found that the presence
of close kin in the PGG group did not affect contributions.
For the purposes of this review, I re-analysed the PGG data published by
Waring & Bell (2013) but using mean group relatedness as the predictor of in-
terest, controlling for each participant’s age, caste and experimental treatment
and including each player as a random effect. Overall, higher mean relatedness
to the group was associated with higher contributions to the PGG (Figure 2.1).
The PGGs presented in Chapter 5 explicitly account for group-level relatedness
and analyse its effect on public goods contributions.
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Figure 2.1: Predicted contributions to a public goods game by mean relatedness to a
player’s group. Data were re-analysed from Waring & Bell (2013). The
multilevel model controls for age and caste, and includes each player as a
random effect.
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2.1.2.5 Context matters
The framing of a PGG can have mixed effects on cooperation. Some studies
have found positive effects of framing; for example, PGGs framed in terms
of local collective social institutions were associated with slightly lower dona-
tions when played among reindeer herders and salmon fishers in Kamchatka,
eastern Russia (Gerkey 2013). Overall, donations were high, however, with
nearly 80% of people contributing their full endowment and the mean do-
nation was 89% of the endowment. Communities in post-civil war northern
Liberia contributed more to a PGG when the winnings were funnelled into a
community-driven reconstruction programme run by a non-governmental or-
ganisation (Fearon et al. 2009).
Others have found negative framing effects. Villagers in Sierra Leone do-
nated 25% of their initial endowment to a PGG framed in terms of a commu-
nity project, although they contributed 40% of their endowment to an abstract
public good (Voors et al. 2012a). In rural India, framing had no effect on coop-
eration when comparing behaviour in a PGG framed around irrigation systems
to an unframed PGG (Bouma et al. 2014).
Social institutions that prime or encourage particular behaviours can also
shape cooperation. Harambee (Swahili for “let’s pull together”) is one such ex-
ample. In Kenya, harambee refers to community projects and cooperative in-
vestments; participants contributed more to a PGG when they had equated the
structure of the game with this social institution (Ensminger 2004). In Nairobi
slums, women take part in more harambee activities than men, and were seen
to contribute more to all-female groups compared to mixed-sex groups, which
matches ethnographic evidence that women in these areas trust men less (Greig
& Bohnet 2009). Harambee also creates an expectation that more affluent com-
munity members will contribute more to public projects (Ensminger 2004), al-
though higher income was not associated with PGG donations (Greig & Bohnet
2009).
The perceived legitimacy of communal organisations has been posited to
be an important factor in cooperation. Bouma et al. (2014) tested perceptions
of legitimacy (in the sense of procedural justice, i.e. the implementation and
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interpretation of rules) among farmers in rural Maharashtra, India. Their study
found that although decentralised irrigation management organisations were
seen as more legitimate, this did not translate into increased cooperation in
PGGs. Other social organisations with high perceived legitimacy in the eyes
of their members—namely, religions—may induce cooperation. For example,
religious people living in a low-income urban neighbourhood in Texas, USA,
gave more to religious causes (de Oliveira et al. 2012).
Beyond institutions, social networks are also likely to matter. In India, for
example, the number of people invited to a harvest festival from surrounding
villages—a proxy of social network size—was associated with increased con-
tributions to a PGG (Lamba & Mace 2011).
Wider social, cultural and historical contexts matter as well. Previous ex-
posure to violence, either individually or at the level of one’s community, af-
fects community cooperation. Conflicts can impede access to markets (Ver-
poorten 2009), thus potentially lowering cooperation, since better access to
markets has been shown to increase collective action (Rustagi et al. 2010). Com-
munities in Nepal exposed to violence through civil war were more likely to
contribute to a PGG (Gilligan et al. 2014). Note, however, that in this case the
PGG was structured such that nobody faced a trade-off between their own self-
interest and the group’s interest since they gained nothing through defecting;
there was no social dilemma, so contributions are unsurprising.
Other studies (not utilising PGGs) have found that exposure to violence
is associated with increased altruism to neighbours (Voors et al. 2012b). On
the other hand, a survey of districts in Indonesia affected by violence after the
2007 Asian financial crash contributed less to real-life public goods (Muller &
Vothknecht 2012).
In a similar vein, natural disasters can also have consequences on coop-
eration. African-American people who had been evacuated from Hurricane
Katrina and had been unable to contact missing family members contributed
less to a PGG (Whitt & Wilson 2007).
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2.1.2.6 Sanctioning and punishment help cooperation
Monitoring and norm enforcement are needed, especially in larger and more
heterogeneous groups, in order to maintain cooperation (Rustagi et al. 2010).
Evolutionary scientists tend to define two kinds of mechanism: sanctions (a
costless act, such as withholding investment) and punishment (an action that
is costly to both the cheater and the cheated) (Raihani et al. 2012). Carpenter
et al. (2004) found that Vietnamese communities responded to high variance
in contributions (indicating the presence of free-riders as well as contributors)
by sanctioning more; high contributors were not more likely to sanction than
relative free-riders. Perhaps unsurprisingly, older people were also more likely
to signal their disapproval in Thailand and Vietnam (Carpenter et al. 2004).
Groups in Ethiopia that contained more conditional co-operators also in-
vested more time in monitoring the forest (Rustagi et al. 2010). Ugandan farm-
ers tended to elect better-educated and wealthier local men as their group mon-
itors, and their election was associated with higher PGG contributions (Baldas-
sarri & Grossman 2011). In addition, donations to PGGs featuring a randomly
chosen monitor were still higher than donations in a control PGG, even before
the monitor had punished anyone (Baldassarri & Grossman 2011).
Sanctions do not have to be monetary. Low and high contributors were
criticised in rural Zimbabwe; people adjusted their donations based on criti-
cisms received by others who had behaved in a similar manner (Barr 2001).
Shame, in a sense, selected out variation in behaviour. I will not make use of
sanctioning or punishment mechanisms in the PGGs presented in Chapter 5. I
do, however, investigate the role of withholding cooperation as a form of sanc-
tioning in Chapter 8.
2.1.2.7 Communication and information increase contributions
Public discussion about contributions to a PGG was associated with an in-
creased probability of selling coffee through producer organisations and at-
tending general assemblies for Ugandan farmers (Baldassarri 2014). Informa-
tion about the behaviour of others is also important. Ache people contributed
more when they had information about how others had acted, even though
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they did not know who else was in their group (Hill & Gurven 2004). A study
of charitable giving (not making use of PGGs) also found that when people had
more information about the donations of others, they donated more (Shang &
Croson 2009).
Complete information does not always lead to socially optimal outcomes.
Making people aware of the ethnic composition of their group, for example,
has been shown to reduce cooperation among male agriculture workers in In-
dia (Waring & Bell 2013). The PGGs presented in Chapter 5 involve anonymous
contributions and no information about group composition; however, partici-
pants know the pool of potential group members, since they belong to the same
herding groups.
2.1.2.8 PGGs do not always predict real-world cooperation
There is equivocal evidence that cooperation in experimental games is re-
lated to real-world cooperative behaviours or outcomes. On the positive side,
Ugandan farmers who contributed more to a PGG in which public discus-
sion of strategies was allowed were also more likely to have sold their cof-
fee through local producer organisations and attended general assemblies (Bal-
dassarri 2014). Similarly, people from a low-income urban neighbourhood in
Texas, USA, who donated more to the PGG were also more likely to donate to
charity (de Oliveira et al. 2012).
Groups of forest users in Ethiopia that contained more conditional coop-
erators (measured through PGG behaviours) had more crop trees and invested
more in monitoring the forest (Rustagi et al. 2010). However, in this case the
PGGs were played with only two anonymous, randomly paired individuals,
with a return rate that would lead rational players to be more willing to do-
nate. In addition, Rustagi et al. (2010) did not link the behaviour in games
to actual social behaviours that may have led to better outcomes, only to the
outcomes themselves.
Other studies have found no link between game contributions and real-
world behaviour. PGG donations were not associated with food sharing be-
haviours among the Ache, even when game participants had information about
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other’s contributions (Hill & Gurven 2004). Members of a non-profit village
banking organisation in Ayacucho, Peru, who borrowed money from their
peers were more likely to contribute to a PGG, although PGG donations did
not predict whether or not people had repaid loans or saved more money one
year later (Karlan 2005).
In this thesis, I will compare game behaviour to real-world outcomes as
well as actual cooperative behaviour. Chapter 5 will analyse cooperation in
PGGs alongside the productivity of herding groups. In Chapter 8, I compare
cooperation in an experimental setting to measures of labour investment on
farms.
2.2 Statistical analyses
This section will discuss model selection and model averaging approaches to
testing hypotheses. I also outline the approaches taken to analyse the social
networks emerging from my field experiments.
Traditionally, evolutionary scientists have drawn inferences from their
data by using null hypothesis significance testing (NHST). This approach com-
pares a hypothesis (normally formalised as a statistical model) with a null hy-
pothesis in which no data-generating processes (variables or predictors) affect
the observed outcome. While much of the work presented in this thesis es-
chews NHST in favour of an information theoretical approach (described be-
low), I use NHST in Chapters 5 and 8 due to its simplicity and familiarity.
2.2.1 Model selection
Compared to NHST, model selection allows researchers to quantify the relative
importance of a set of alternative hypotheses simultaneously, without neces-
sarily being constrained by arbitrary significance thresholds (p-values). Model
selection is an information theoretic approach that employs criteria to identify
the ‘best’ model or set of models.
Like much in science, model selection relies on the principle of parsimony
and entails a trade-off between simplicity (favouring models with fewer pa-
rameters but prone to under-fitting the data) and precision (favouring more
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complex models but prone to over-fitting) (Burnham & Anderson 2004). The
advantage of a model selection approach is that the relative support for com-
peting hypotheses (i.e. a set of models) can be quantified, allowing robust infer-
ences to be drawn based on estimates of parameters and uncertainty (Grueber
et al. 2011).
2.2.1.1 Information theoretical approaches to hypothesis testing
Information theoretical (IT) approaches make no claim to the ‘truth’ of a model,
in the sense that models can be nothing more than approximations of reality
rather than an exact representation of full, noisy, ineffable reality (Burnham &
Anderson 2004). Even the ‘best’ model from a set of candidates will be contin-
gent on the available data and the precision of parameter estimates will depend
on factors such as sample size. Large datasets contain more information and
thus can be used to more accurately estimate smaller effects.
IT approaches are based on the concept that information, specifically the
loss of information, can be quantified – in essence estimating the expected ‘dis-
tance’ between a model and reality (Burnham & Anderson 2002). Model selec-
tion is a formalised process for identifying which model (or models) loses the
least amount of information, relative to competing models, about what pro-
cesses (i.e. model predictors) generated the observed data (Efferson & Rich-
erson 2006). Thus, we know nothing about how far each model is from the
‘truth’, only which is closer relative to the others. To co-opt the metaphor given
by Efferson & Richerson (2006), if I stand next to Big Ben and my thesis exam-
iners are standing three feet to my west, none of us know how far we are from
Wales (where Wales represents truth in this example) by any absolute measure;
we would only know that the examiners stand relatively closer to the truth: i.e.
they have lost the least amount of information.
Information criteria, such as Akaike’s Information Criterion and its non-
parametric equivalent the quasi-likelihood under the independence model in-
formation criterion (AIC and QIC; both used in this thesis), estimate the in-
formation lost by a model, while penalising complexity in terms of a model’s
number of parameters. This allows a balance between reducing bias and re-
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ducing variance, i.e. under-fitting and over-fitting (Efferson & Richerson 2006).
The best model is selected based on the minimum value(s) of informa-
tion criteria calculated. Models with an AIC within a certain range of the least
lossy model (typically ∆i ≤ 2) are considered to have the most substantial sup-
port (Burnham & Anderson 2004). However, since this threshold captures the
95% set of top models (discarding the 5% ‘worst’ models), it is in practice little
different to the arbitrary cut-off of p = 0.05 common in NHST. While NHST
calculates the probability of observed data given the null hypothesis, IT ap-
proaches consider the strengths of competing hypotheses given the observed
data (Garamszegi 2011). Of course, the best model will only be as good as the
set of candidate models defined a priori.
2.2.1.2 Model averaging
When two or more models are highly and similarly ranked as being the ‘best’
models—the ones losing the least information—inferences can be drawn from a
set of models using model averaging. This process, rather than simply taking a
single top model despite others losing only slightly more information, can lead
to more accurate parameter estimates – especially for weak effects (Grueber
et al. 2011). Model averaging takes point estimates into account, as well as
uncertainty estimates for model parameters, allowing inferences to be drawn
from multiple well-fitting models according to the weighted support of each.
Following standard practice, I will use model averaging in cases where the
model selection procedure reveals that either the 95% confidence set (in the case
of AIC-based selection) or a set of models with ∆i ≤ 2 (for QIC-based selection).
All multimodel inferences will use the ‘zero’ method (Burnham & Anderson
2002; also known as the ‘shrinkage’ method). This means that a parameter
estimate missing from particular models in the top set will be set to zero for
those models and the estimate will be averaged across all models, reducing
bias (Grueber et al. 2011).
2.2.2 Analysing social structure
Social interactions represent the structure of a population (Hinde 1976; Ilany
et al. 2015) which can facilitate the evolution of cooperation through patterns
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of relationships between individuals (Fehl et al. 2011; Nowak & May 1992).
Individuals and their relationships can be modelled on a graph, a mathemati-
cal structure also known as a social network. Networks consist of nodes (also
called vertices), representing individuals, and edges forming the ties between
them.
Analysing individual-level behaviour on a network presents a challenge
for classic statistical methods because data are clustered and thus violate the
independence assumption of generalised linear models. For the purposes of
the forthcoming chapters, the unit of analysis will be the dyad, i.e. a pair of
individuals, where one is the ‘ego’ (e.g. a gift-giver) and the other is the ‘al-
ter’ (e.g. a recipient). Many methods have been developed to draw statistical
inferences from dyadic data, including generalised linear models with robust
standard errors, multilevel (mixed-effect) models, exponential random graph
models, social relations models, structural equation models, and actor-partner
interdependence models (Kenny et al. 2006). For the research presented in this
thesis, I make use of two: generalised estimating equations and quadratic as-
signment procedure, both of which I will describe below.
2.2.2.1 Generalised estimating equations
Generalised estimating equations (GEEs) are extensions of the generalised lin-
ear model (GLM) for dealing with correlated data (Hardin & Hilbe 2003). GEEs
can account for multiple observations of each ego in dyadic social network data
by clustering standard errors. Unlike multilevel models that explicitly account
for subject-specific effects, GEEs are population-averaged models that average
across all subjects; since I am interested in the effects of particular predictors
rather than the differences between particular individuals, GEEs are the appro-
priate tool for modelling the network data presented here.
GEEs have become a popular method for analysing network data in the
behavioural sciences, due in part to their relaxed assumptions compared to
GLMs (e.g. GEEs can model non-normally correlated data with non-normal
residuals; Ghisletta & Spini 2004). All GEEs presented in this thesis are logistic
regressions across all possible dyads in each of the social networks, clustered
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on each ego. For each model, I specified an exchangeable working correlation
matrix, which models the dependence of observations within clusters; an in-
dependent specification did not improve model fits in any case. GEE does not
use full likelihood estimates, so I computed and compared the quasi-likelihood
under the independence model information criterion (QIC) for model selection
(Pan 2001).
2.2.2.2 Quadratic assignment procedure
Measuring correlations between social networks—e.g. quantifying how gift-
giving correlates with relatedness—also requires controlling for network struc-
ture. Quadratic assignment procedure (QAP; Krackhardt 1988) is a permu-
tation test that first calculates Pearson’s correlation coefficient between each
dyad in any two networks. Next, the procedure permutes the networks to cre-
ate multiple, random datasets. These ‘scrambled’ datasets represent the null
hypothesis of no correlation, as well as its sampling distribution. If the major-
ity (typically > 95%) of these scrambled datasets do not result in a larger effect
than the observed correlation, the relationship is unlikely to have occurred by
chance.
To the best of my knowledge, this procedure has not been adopted for
many anthropological social network studies, with the exception of Alvard
(2003), Kasper & Borgerhoff Mulder (2015), Koster (2011), and Ziker & Schnegg
(2005). Note that the first step of QAP algorithm described above calculates
point estimates as if the data are independent, potentially leading to biased co-
efficients (Koster & Leckie 2014); for this reason, I use QAP only to calculate
correlations and not to fit regression models.
2.2.3 Comparing relative effect sizes
Comparison of effect sizes is difficult when predictors are measured on differ-
ent scales (e.g. comparing a binary predictor, such as whether or not a dyad
belongs to the same social group, to a continuous one, such as the coefficient
of relatedness) (Grueber et al. 2011). Following Gelman (2008) and Schielzeth
(2010), I will standardise predictors to a mean of 0 and standard deviation of
0.5 in order to transform binary and continuous predictors to a common scale.
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Since these parameter estimates are not biologically interpretable due to the
scaling procedure (Schielzeth 2010), I will present them alongside the original,
unstandardised estimates.
2.3 Software
All analyses were conducted in R 3.2.0 (R Core Team 2012) using the following
packages:
• Model selection and averaging: MuMIn (Barton 2015) for GEE models and
AICcmodavg (Mazerolle 2015) for generalised linear models
• Social network descriptive statistics: iGraph (Csardi & Nepusz 2006)
• QAP correlations: sna (Butts 2014), using a customised function for han-
dling rectangular adjacency matrices (available from
https://gist.github.com/matthewgthomas/728c53b7c7b99c12f1af)
• GEE analysis: geepack (Højsgaard et al. 2006)
• Tobit regressions (see Chapter 5): VGAM (Yee & Wild 1996)
• Cox regressions (see Chapter 8): survival (Therneau 2015)
• Zero-inflated Poisson regression (see Chapter 8): pscl (Jackman 2015)
• Standardisation of predictors: arm (Gelman & Su 2015), using a cus-
tomised function to handle GEEs (available from
https://gist.github.com/matthewgthomas/6e4ae7f55a339bd8c036)
• Data manipulation: plyr (Wickham 2011); data.table (Dowle et al.
2014); reshape2 (Wickham 2007); car (Fox & Weisberg 2011)
• Plotting figures: ggplot2 (Wickham 2009), with the wesanderson
package (Ram & Wickham 2015) for colour schemes; HH (Heiberger 2015)
for plotting Likert scales
Social network diagrams were drawn in Gephi 0.8.2.
Part I
Saami reindeer herders
56
Chapter 3
Overview of Saami reindeer
husbandry and the study area
3.1 Introduction
This chapter will introduce Saami reindeer husbandry. I will provide an
overview of the study area and the data collection methods, and present de-
scriptive statistics from the sample.
The research presented in Part I was approved by the University College
London research ethics committee.
3.2 Saami reindeer husbandry
The term ‘Saami’ describes a group of people indigenous to the areas that com-
prise northern Fennoscandia (Norway, Sweden and Finland), as well as the
westernmost part of Russia. Today only a minority of Saami people subsist
on reindeer pastoralism. As of 2013, there were 533 licensed reindeer herders
(Norwegian: siidaandeler) living in Norway and 3,112 other Saami people con-
nected to reindeer husbandry (Anonymous 2013); other Saami make a living as
fishers, farmers, casual or skilled workers, with many migrating to large cities.
The siida is an important economic and cultural unit of cooperation and
subsistence (Paine 1994). Membership is, for the most part, influenced by long-
standing relationships between families, some of whom will be genealogically
related. Traditionally, the siida was based on conjugal and sibling solidarity,
which could be extended to include cousins and other affinal relatives of the
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same generation (Bergman et al. 2008). Unmarried people and unrelated wage
laborers may also join siidas on a facultative basis. Therefore, siidas can include
both kin and non-kin.
People from different siidas can interact in a number of ways. With the
adoption of snowmobiles and other vehicles as well as communication tech-
nologies, herders now live more sedentary lives: Members from several siidas
live in the same towns for much of the year. In addition, herders from different
siidas may help one another by splitting up mixed herds or finding lost rein-
deer. Conflicts may also arise, which has resulted in the destruction of fences
separating the pasture areas of different siidas, among other issues.
In general, herders belong to two siidas: summer and winter. Summer
siidas are large groups of households whose reindeer graze on the coastal pas-
tures and islands of Norway. The summer siida became a legal entity in 2007
and can be thought of akin to a corporation with elected boards of leaders. Be-
fore the legal consolidation of siidas, membership was more flexible and could
change over time; of the herders in my study sample (see section 3.4), only one
person had moved summer siida within the past 15 years. Every year, summer
siidas split into one or more smaller winter siidas whose herds graze in the
interior of the country (Paine 1994). Summer siidas are grouped into admin-
istrative regions defined by the government, known as districts (Næss et al.
2009).
Households are likely to take on alternative sources of income as well as
taking part in smaller-scale subsistence activities such as hunting and trap-
ping, and catering to a burgeoning tourism trade. Fifty to sixty percent of in-
come among herders in Finnmark is from meat production, and around 36%
comes from government compensation and subsidy schemes; the remainder
comes from additional labour and what are classified as ‘incidental earnings’
(e.g. hunting, fishing and foraging; Jernsletten & Klokov 2002). Livelihoods are
supplemented by trade with more sedentary Saami farmers and fishers (the so-
called ‘Sea Saami’), as well as with non-Saami. Saami people recognise a special
relationship with certain others outside of the husbandry business, with whom
they reciprocally exchange goods and services. These people are called verdde
3.3. Study area 59
(a Saami word loosely translated as ‘guest-friend’).
Saami herders face occupational stresses from predators, weather condi-
tions, financial pressures, changing land tenures, conflicts, and ethnic discrim-
ination (Allard 2011; Bjerkli 2010; Hansen et al. 2010; Pape & Lo¨ffler 2012). A
recent report found that the high levels of reindeer mortality observed in Finn-
mark might be due not to predation, as commonly believed, but rather over-
crowding of reindeer and the poor condition of the animals (Tveraa et al. 2013).
Conflicts can involve governments, industry (e.g. mineral extraction or logging
companies), landowners, researchers, as well as other reindeer herders. Within
the reindeer husbandry community, conflicts can arise over encroachment onto
a rival siida’s pasture, theft of reindeer, and destruction of fences, among other
things (Paine 1970). Sanctions range from ridicule, to stemming the flow of
information, and seizing or killing reindeer (Paine 1970; Sara 2002). Conflict
is mediated through between-siida networks of reciprocity as well as shared
collective action decision-making (Riseth & Vatn 2009).
Siidas are also loci for collective action. Siida group members work to-
gether on maintenance activities, run slaughterhouses, and gather herds into
corrals so as to weigh and administer medicine to the animals, determine the
number and quality of pregnant cows, and split herds by sex before seasonal
migrations. Given the conflicts and cooperative behaviors described above, we
would expect the siida to represent more than a decision-making body: rather,
it would act as an important social unit. The focus of the work presented in
Part I is the summer siida.
3.3 Study area
The research presented in Chapters 4 and 5 focusses on a single district in Finn-
mark County – the northernmost and largest reindeer herding area in Norway
(Figure 3.1). Finnmark makes up over 15% of Norway’s landmass and is the
least densely populated county, with 73,787 people as of 2012.
My sample was formed of licensed herd owners within summer siidas.
The Norwegian Government provides licenses to a subset of herders within
each summer siida/district. These license owners are legally allowed to keep
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Figure 3.1: Location of the study site, situated in the county of Finnmark, Norway
(shown in blue). The study site was a single district (dashed ellipse and
inset). The inset map shows the study site, with the black outline represent-
ing the district border and red outlines representing summer siida pasture
boundaries. Pastures are labelled with the siida code used in this study.
Note that siida ‘d’ has two pastures since it was two siidas at the time the
map was drawn; it is now considered a single siida. The map of Norway
was created by Michal Jan Warecki and adapted by me. It is licensed un-
der the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 2.5 Generic license via
Wikimedia Commons. The inset map was adapted from a map available
on the study district’s website.
reindeer and the Norwegian Agriculture Agency (Landbruksdirektoratet) tracks
the productivity of their herds over time. As of 2013, there were 377 license
owners in the county of Finnmark and 75 in the focal district (Anonymous
2013).
3.4 Data collection
In July and August 2013, I interviewed 30 licensed reindeer herders across all
nine summer siidas in a single district in Finnmark, Norway (Figure 3.1) with
the help of a Saami field assistant. My field assistant was the son of a local si-
ida leader and we were also able to make use of his contacts in the community
to arrange interviews. In addition, the names of siida leaders were published
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on the district’s website and telephone numbers were freely available via Nor-
way’s public online directory, Gule Sider. We also collected contact information
through snowball sampling, whereby one participant suggested other poten-
tial participants.
All materials were translated into Norwegian by an independent person
and back-translated by Marius Warg Næss. Næss and I agreed on the final
translations. Information sheets, surveys and game scripts are reprinted in Ap-
pendix B.
Interviews were conducted either in Saami or Norwegian, depending on
the respondent’s preferred language. Informed consent was obtained from par-
ticipants and interviews proceeded as follows:
1. District-level public goods game
2. Siida-level public goods game
3. Survey
4. Gift game
3.4.1 Surveys
Table 3.1 lists the categories and types of data collected from the survey, not
necessarily in the order the questions were asked. Of the 30 interviews, most
(n = 22) were conducted in the respondent’s home, with the remainder taking
place in local cafe´s or, in one case, at the summer corral. Some participants also
engaged in unstructured interviews to further explore some of the topics raised
once the formal data collection had finished; this sub-sample was gathered op-
portunistically.
3.4.2 Experimental games
After the survey, respondents played two public goods games (PGGs) and a gift
game. The game scripts are included in Appendix B. The Norwegian-language
instructions used in the field are available on request.
The currency for both games was petrol, measured in litres. I chose petrol
because I wanted to investigate cooperative behaviour using a culturally salient
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Table 3.1: Categories of questions asked during the interview process.
Variable Details
Personal data
Place of birth
Year of birth
Part of siida’s leadership board Yes/no
Marital status From show cards
Post-marital residence (if ever married) From show cards
Education From show cards
Age at leaving education
Measures of cooperation
Within-siida labour sharing 8 item × 7 point Likert scale
Between-siida labour exchange 8 × 7 Likert scale
Vehicles, tools and other household items shared with siida From show cards
Has verdde relationships Yes/no
Trades with verdde? Yes/no
Assortment
Summer/winter siida membership history for past 15 years Open answer
Reasons for leaving/joining siidas Open answer
Wealth
Types of income sources and main source From show cards
Reindeer herd size From show cards
Vehicles, tools and other household items owned From show cards
Kinship
Number of parents, siblings and children alive and living
in the same household/siida (split by sex) Numeric
currency: all herders require petrol to run snowmobiles, all-terrain vehicles and
other modes of transport. Petrol becomes especially important during spring
and autumn migrations, when they consume vast quantities over a two-week
period.
Herders received vouchers for five litres of petrol in one litre denomina-
tions for each of the two PGGs. For the gift game, herders received three vouch-
ers, each for five litres of petrol. At the time of the study, one litre of petrol cost
NOK 15 (GBP 1.60; US$ 2.54). After I had completed all interviews, participants
were paid their winnings plus a participation fee of NOK 150 (corresponding
to 10 litres of petrol); people who did not take part in the interviews but who
received petrol in the gift game were paid only their winnings. All payments
were made in cash.
I will describe the gift game and public goods games procedures in more
detail in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively.
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3.4.3 Kinship data
Genealogical data were collected in May 2014 detailing how each license owner
in the district (n = 75) was related to one another. I linked license owners to
their previously assigned ID numbers and calculated a coefficient of related-
ness (ri j) for each pair of herders (i, j). This resulted in a full kinship network
of licensed herd owners in the study district.
3.4.4 Herd productivity data
Herd sizes held by individual license owners were collected from data pub-
lished by the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation (Norsk rikskringkasting AS;
Aslaksen 2014). I used the numbers of reindeer held by individuals in 2012 –
the most recent data available. I was able to match herd sizes for 62 of the 75
people in our database, not achieving complete coverage due to changes in li-
cense owners between 2012 and the study period. Herd sizes were group-mean
centred across the district.
3.5 Descriptive statistics
61 of the 75 herd owners in the district were male, with a median age of 53 (see
Figure 3.2 for the age distribution and Table 3.2 for descriptive statistics). The
median number of reindeer owned by herders in the district in 2012 was 456.5,
ranging between 55 and 1,604 reindeer (Figure 3.3). Reindeer husbandry was
the primary source of income for 23 of the 30 participants; four derived most of
their income from other activities and three mainly lived on subsidies/benefits.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics about predictors from the questionnaire.
Variable n (= 30)
Male 26
Siida leader 18
Marital status
- Never married 10
- Married/cohabiting 17
- Other 3
Education
- Primary/secondary 18
- Upper secondary 6
- High school/University 6
Mean Median S.D.
Age 47.40 49 12.40
No. children 2.07 2 1.70
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of herder ages within the study district.
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Figure 3.3: Distribution of reindeer owned by herders in 2012, according to figures
published by the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation (Norsk rikskringkast-
ing AS). The mean herd size was 448.8 reindeer; the median was 456.5.
Chapter 4
Saami reindeer herders cooperate
with social group members and
genetic kin1
4.1 Introduction
Cooperation is prevalent in a wide range of taxa, including humans. Cooper-
ative behaviours benefit other individuals, either at a cost to the cooperator or
not; such behaviours can be favoured by selection due to their effects on others
(West et al. 2007b). The most long-standing explanations of the evolution of co-
operative behaviour are kin selection (Hamilton 1964) and reciprocal altruism
(Trivers 1971), both of which are likely to play a role in human social interac-
tions. A panoply of theoretical models of these and other effects have shown
how the existence of cooperation is relatively easy to explain in evolutionary
terms (Lehmann & Keller 2006; Nowak 2006; West et al. 2007b). Ultimately,
cooperative behaviours will evolve if they increase the inclusive fitness of the
individuals performing the behaviour. Exactly with whom one should cooper-
ate, and to what extent, remains a contentious issue that is expected to depend
on context.
Humans cooperate extensively in many regards. For example, coopera-
tion is vital for survival and reproduction among humans following a pas-
1Originally published as: Thomas, M. G., Næss, M. W., Ba˚rdsen, B.-J., & Mace, R. (2015).
Saami reindeer herders cooperate with social group members and genetic kin. Behavioral Ecol-
ogy, 26, 1495–1501.
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toralist way of life: a subsistence strategy involving a dependence on live-
stock. Across the world, most pastoralist societies work in cooperative herd-
ing groups formed from multiple families in multiple households (Næss 2012).
Ariaal and Rendille pastoralists of East Africa herd in cooperative units typ-
ically formed of siblings’ families that, among the Ariaal at least, can fission
from the wider settlement (Fratkin 1986). In Tibet, the rukor (or ru skor) is a co-
operative group which tends to form for the summer and disband during win-
ter (Nietupski 2012). Mongolian nomadic herders cluster into groups known as
Khot-Ail, living and managing livestock as a socio-economic unit (Upton 2008).
Saami pastoralists work in a cooperative institution known as the siida (Paine
1994).
Working in cooperative groups has many advantages, allowing herders to
pool risk, defend herds from raiders or predators, protect pastureland, share
knowledge and information, loan or gift animals to those in need, and ex-
change labour (Aktipis et al. 2011; Dyson-Hudson & Dyson-Hudson 1980;
Næss 2012; Paine 1994). These forms of cooperative behaviour may be a least-
cost strategy compared to herding alone, allowing herding groups to achieve
economies of scale, i.e. an increase in the percentage of output coupled with
a reduction in the costs related to labour investment (Næss et al. 2009; Næss
2012).
Kin selection theory (Hamilton 1964) predicts that cooperative behaviours
would evolve between genetic relatives as long as the fitness benefits, tempered
by the degree of relatedness between them, outweigh the costs. Previous work
on Saami reindeer pastoralists has shown that decisions to slaughter are medi-
ated through kin relations (Næss et al. 2012) and that the presence of relatives,
along with the availability of workers, had a positive effect on herd size (Næss
et al. 2010). Such an effect is important for year-on-year household viability as
well as during crisis periods; those with large pre-collapse herd sizes also had
the largest post-collapse herds (Næss & Ba˚rdsen 2010, 2013).
Group living can lead to a social dilemma where rational actors might
choose not to contribute to a common enterprise (i.e. defect) but still try to
reap the benefits of other’s contributions, eventually leading to a breakdown
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in cooperation. Avoidance of defectors can allow cooperators to assort together,
either through mobility (Aktipis 2011), severing social links (Wang et al. 2012)
or choosing partners (Stiff & Van Vugt 2008). The ability to choose from a ‘mar-
ketplace’ (Noe¨ & Hammerstein 1994) of competing potential partners can lead
individuals to act more cooperatively in relation to others, resulting in an es-
calation of ‘competitive cooperation’ (Barclay & Willer 2007). Individuals may
direct cooperative behaviours to others based on their knowledge of the re-
cipient’s reputation (indirect reciprocity; Nowak 2006). In biological markets,
being cooperative could act as an indicator of status, as can factors such as skill,
prestige or experience.
Once partners have been chosen, rewards (such as gifts) and punishment
may be important mechanisms for maintaining cooperation through partner
control (Trivers 1971; West et al. 2007b). However, gift exchange might also
function as a method of pooling risk in unpredictable environments in order to
benefit all social group members. For pastoralists, exchanging gifts of livestock
has been theoretically shown to boost long-term herd survival (Aktipis et al.
2011).
4.1.1 Predictions
Previous work on Saami pastoralists has looked at how relatedness and labour
availability affect cooperation across districts, which are administrative clus-
ters of herding groups (Næss et al. 2010, 2012). I extend this to investigate the
relative effects of kinship and cooperative group membership on gift giving
behaviour between individuals within a district. Saami pastoralists organise
themselves into groups—composed of kin and non-kin—for the purposes of
cooperative herding, their primary means of subsistence. Given the reliance
on herding groups, I predict a strong cooperative bias towards fellow group
members, regardless of whether or not the recipients are genealogical relatives.
However, this hypothesis does not imply that kinship will be unimpor-
tant. One manifestation of kin selection in humans may take the form of inter-
generational resources flows from older to younger family members, especially
from parents to children (Kaplan 1994). Thus, I predict that resources such
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as gifts would be given preferentially to younger people when they are given
within families.
I aim to quantify the relative effects of factors predicting cooperative
behaviour by conducting a culturally salient experimental gift game among
Saami reindeer herders living in Finnmark, Northern Norway. Participants
could choose between one and three other reindeer herders to receive a gift of
money. In order to ensure the game had contextual relevance to participants, I
framed the gifts in terms of how much petrol they could be used to purchase,
since petrol is a valuable commodity for Saami pastoralists.
4.2 Methods
4.2.1 Gift game
The 30 participants were endowed with vouchers (see below) and were then
asked to give these as anonymous gifts to other licensed herd owners in their
district. Respondents were presented with a list of license owners in the dis-
trict (collected by a combination of publicly available contact information and
snowball sampling, whereby one participant suggested other potential partici-
pants) coded with randomly generated ID numbers. Respondents read the ID
numbers of their desired gift recipients to the field assistant. This procedure
aimed to minimise experimenter bias, since the assistant was also a member of
the district, although not a licensed herd owner.
I gave players 3 vouchers, each representing 5 litres of petrol. At the time,
1 litre of petrol cost approximately NOK 15 (US$ 2.54). Players could choose
to give the vouchers to 1− 3 other license owners – in multiples of 5 litres.
They were not allowed to keep anything for themselves; they had to give the
vouchers to at least 1 recipient. Players also gave reasons for their distribution
of gifts. I coded these open answers into 1− 3 keywords, blind to the giver’s
name, siida and distribution of gifts (see below). At the end of the experimental
period, all recipients were given their rewards in the form of cash, since the
vouchers were created for the purposes of this study and were not legal tender,
although all gift decisions were framed in terms of litres of petrol.
Communication was not allowed within the parameters of the experiment.
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However, due to the vagaries of the herding lifestyle, I was unable to conduct
all interviews within a sufficiently short time to rule out for the chance that
herders did not communicate with one another.
I coded the open-response reasons for giving gifts using the following pro-
cedure:
1. Categorise the free-text reasons by whether or not each giver-receiver pair
were related and/or members of the same siida.
2. Code each reason into categories closely matching the perceived intent
behind the reason, but also fitting categories of theoretical interest (e.g.
reciprocity, kinship, reputation, etc.).
3. Repeat (2) in an iterative manner to reduce the final number of categories.
Some participants gave one reason covering all of their gifts; others gave
one reason per recipient. In cases of the former, I coded the same reason for
each gift. Note this is why the “family” reason was applied to two non-kin,
non-siida gifts (Table 4.8).
4.2.2 Statistical analysis
I fitted generalised estimating equation (GEE) models to all potential gift-
giving dyads, where the egos were the 30 gift game participants and alters
were the 75 licensed owners, giving 30× (75− 1) = 2,220 possible dyads. The
binary response variable in all models was whether or not a gift was given
within a dyad. I present unstandardised and standardised estimates, where
in the latter case, binary factors were mean-centred and continuous variables
were standardised over 2 standard deviations to allow estimates to be com-
pared within models, following the recommendations of Gelman (2008) and
Schielzeth (2010) (also see section 2.2.3). Note that I did not fit models contain-
ing the individual-level predictors gathered from the surveys since doing so
would have dramatically reduced the number of dyads in the analysis.
Data are available from the Dryad Digital Repository:
http://dx.doi.org/10.5061/dryad.s3v63
Analysis code is available on GitHub:
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https://github.com/matthewgthomas/saami-gift-games
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Description of the gift network
The 30 herders interviewed gave 71 gifts to 43 people (Figure 4.1a), some of
whom were also participants. Of the 71 gifts, 45 (63.4%) were given to members
of the same summer siida. A significantly higher proportion of gifts were given
within siidas (χ21 = 4.563, p= 0.033). The majority of gifts (59) were for 5 litres
of petrol and were given by 18 of the 30 people interviewed. Five gifts, given by
5 separate individuals, were worth 10 litres, while 7 gifts, given by 7 different
people, were for 15 litres.
(a) (b)
Figure 4.1: Gift networks showing license owners in the district (nodes) coloured by
siida membership for (a) the entire district and (b) reciprocated gifts only.
Filled circles represent the 30 license owners interviewed for this study.
Edges are gifts, where edge thickness corresponds to gift size (5, 10 or 15
litres of petrol) and colour shows the siida from which the gift came.
The number of gifts received by individuals (in-degree) ranged from 0 to
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Table 4.1: Number of gifts received (in-degrees) split by whether the herder is on their
siida’s leadership board or not.
In-degree
Leader? n Median Mean SD
Yes 18 1 1.28 1.02
No 12 1 1.75 1.91
Unknown 45 0 0.60 0.78
Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics for the gift network
No. components 26
Density 0.013
Reciprocity 0.282
Transitivity 0.17
7 (median = 1, mean = 0.95, standard deviation [SD] = 1.16). I do not report the
number of gifts given (out-degree) or include it in the models since only the
30 people interviewed were able to give gifts. Gift givers received more gifts;
that is, out-degree significantly correlated with in-degree (Pearson’s product-
moment correlation, r = 0.415, p < 0.001, 95% CI [0.208,0.587]). One outlier
received 7 gifts totaling 50 litres of petrol – twice as much as the second most
popular herder. The reasons given for his gifts fell on a wide spectrum, from
“Deserves it” and “Good reindeer herder” to “Always empty of fuel”.
Ten gifts (28.2%) were reciprocated (Figure 4.1b), despite communication
not featuring in the experiment. Of the reciprocated gifts, only 1 was given to a
member of another siida. In this case, both were males living in the same town
who clearly had a history of working together based on their stated reasons for
giving the gifts. Table 4.2 shows descriptive statistics for the gift network.
Siida leaders did not receive more gifts than others (Table 4.1). There was a
significant sex difference between number of gifts received where males on av-
erage received more (Mann-Whitney test,W = 258.500, p= 0.015), although the
sample contains substantially fewer females (4 of the 43 herders who received
gifts).
4.3.2 Relatedness in the district
The smallest two siidas (‘a’ and ‘f’ in Figure 4.2) were formed entirely of sib-
lings and/or parents with children (ri j = 0.5). These siidas contained, respec-
4.3. Results 73
tively, 2 and 3 licensed owners. As the number of members increased, there
was no discernible trend in relatedness across the nine siidas. The mean re-
latedness across the district was ri j = 0.02 (i.e., between 2nd and 3rd cousins),
whereas the grand mean of mean relatedness within siidas was ri j = 0.19. Due
to the small number of groups and their small sizes, I did not perform analyses
grouped by individual siidas.
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Figure 4.2: Relatedness within the nine siidas. Points are the mean coefficients of relat-
edness between licensed herd owners within each siida. Error bars show
standard deviation. Data are ordered, from left to right, in increasing group
sizes (also shown within the data points). The grey dotted line shows the
mean relatedness in the entire district (i.e. across all siidas); the red dotted
line shows the grand mean (i.e. mean of the mean within-siida relatedness
coefficients).
4.3.3 Analysis of gift giving
Table 4.3 shows the distribution of gifts, split by whether recipients were ge-
netically related to the giver and/or belonged to the same siida. I calcu-
lated correlation coefficients between the networks of gifts, relatedness and
siida membership (Table 4.4). Summer siida membership correlated with ge-
nealogical relatedness (r = 0.42, p 0.01, 95% CI [0.38,0.45]). The coefficient
of relatedness between givers and receivers correlated with receiving a gift
(r = 0.32, p 0.01, 95% CI [0.29,0.36]).
In the best-fitting GEE model (Table 4.5), belonging to the same summer
siida as the other person in a dyad was the strongest predictor of gift-giving
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Table 4.3: Counts of people receiving a gift or not, split by whether they are genealog-
ical relatives and/or members of the same summer siida, for all possible
dyads in the district.
Same siida? Related? Received gift? % receiving gift
No Yes
Yes Yes 74 30 28.8%No 153 15 8.9%
No Yes 88 3 3.3%No 1,834 23 1.2%
Table 4.4: Pearson’s correlation coefficients between the gift network, a network of
close kin (ri j = 0.5), a network of all kin (r > 0), and the siida membership
network. Correlations were calculated using a quadratic assignment proce-
dure (QAP; see section 2.2.2.2) to control for the non-independence of dyads
in the networks.
Gifts All kin Close kin
All kin 0.265 - -
Close kin 0.344 0.703 -
Siida member 0.308 0.428 0.423
(standardised log odds = 1.875, S.E. = 0.447) compared to genealogical related-
ness (standardised log odds = 0.691, S.E. = 0.187). Note that these estimates are
only biologically interpretable in their unstandardised form (Table 4.5).
From the full set of candidate models, the model containing only a term for
siida membership (Model 5 in Table 4.6) fitted the data better than the model
containing only a term for relatedness (Model 6 in Table 4.6). Models with
an interaction between relatedness and siida membership (Models 3 and 4 in
Table 4.6) and models containing herd sizes for the potential giver and recipi-
ent (Models 2 and 4 in Table 4.6) did not provide a better fit compared to the
model containing additive terms for relatedness and siida membership (Ta-
ble 4.5; Model 1 in Table 4.6).
I hypothesised that gifts would preferentially be given to younger herders
within families (where gifts to younger herders are scored as a negative age
difference). Contrary to expectations, gifts were not preferentially given to
younger kin (χ21 = 0.05, p = 0.82; Table 4.7). Age also had no significant effect
on the number of gifts received (Spearman’s rank correlation, ρ =−0.140, p=
0.279; Figure 4.3).
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Table 4.5: Results from the best-fitting generalised estimating equation. Column 2
shows unstandardised log odds (S.E.); column 3 shows log odds (S.E.) stan-
dardised over 2 SD (Gelman 2008; Schielzeth 2010) so that the effect sizes
can be directly compared. The predictors are the coefficient of relatedness,
r, and a binary factor coding whether or not a dyad belongs to the same
summer siida. The siida membership predictor most strongly predicts gift
giving, although relatedness also has a positive effect. See Table 4.6 for a
comparison of all candidate models.
Parameter Log odds (S.E.) Standardised log odds (S.E.)
Intercept -4.178 (0.225) -3.868 (0.184)
r 4.263 (1.152) 0.691 (0.187)
Same siida? 1.875 (0.447) 1.875 (0.447)
Table 4.6: Candidate set of generalised estimating equations. The full model contains
an interaction between relatedness and siida membership as well as group-
mean centred standardised herd sizes for the potential giver and recipient
in each dyad. Model 1, the best fitting model, is also presented in the main
text (Table 4.5).
Models ∆QIC Weight
1. kin + siida 0 0.651
2. kin + siida with herd sizes 2.5 0.187
3. kin, siida interaction 3.29 0.126
4. full model 5.79 0.036
5. siida only 19.33 0
6. kin only 22.58 0
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Figure 4.3: Age differences between givers and receivers of gifts where the pair are (a)
kin or (b) non-kin. Positive values represent gifts given to older herders
(brown bars) whereas negative values represent gifts to younger herders
(blue bars). No gifts were given to herders of the same age.
Table 4.7: Number of gifts given to older or younger herders, split by whether or not
the dyad were kin.
Gift to. . . Older Younger Unknown
. . . kin 19 13 1
. . . non-kin 16 14 8
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Table 4.8: Coded reasons for giving gifts, split by whether or not the recipient was a
genealogical relative and/or belonged to the same summer siida.
Kin in Non-kin in Kin in Non-kin
Reason category same siida same siida another siida another siida Total
Good herders 3 2 8 13
Young/new owners 1 1 5 7
Current or future reciprocity 12 9 1 2 24
Old friend 1 1
Need help 1 1 2
Deserving 2 1 3
Lazy 3 3
Selfish 1 1
Family 7 2 2 11
No reason given 4 1 1 6
Total 30 15 3 23 71
4.3.4 Why give?
Table 4.8 lists the coded translations of all reasons for giving gifts (Table 4.9
provides the full text). The most common category (n = 24) for giving a gift,
regardless of kinship and siida membership, was current or future reciprocity.
Thirteen gifts were given to recipients with good reputations.
An interesting case is the gifts given to non-kin belonging to other siidas.
Over half of these gifts were split between those with reputations of being a
‘good herder’ and young license owners who were newly established in rein-
deer husbandry.
4.4 Discussion
Summer siidas are stable cooperative groups. Only 1 person of 30 interviewed
had moved between summer siidas within the last 15 years. Belonging to the
same summer siida was the stronger predictor for gift-giving compared to be-
ing genetically related (Table 4.5). Interactions between relatedness and siida
membership (Models 3 and 4 in Table 4.6) did not provide a better fit to the
data. Similarly, including the herd sizes for the potential gift giver and recipi-
ent did not improve the fit (Models 2 and 4 in Table 4.6). Siida membership may
be important for this population if strategies that benefit direct fitness are opti-
mal compared to those increasing indirect fitness. Alternatively, herders might
receive inclusive fitness benefits by virtue of assorting into the same groups as
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kin, whereas cooperation with non-kin might need to be maintained via reward
mechanisms such as gift giving.
There was no preference for giving gifts to younger herders within fami-
lies (Table 4.7 and Figure 4.3), contrary to the prediction derived from parental
investment theory regarding the flow of resources down generations within
families. The absence of this pattern is likely due to participants not viewing
the gifts as resources to be invested in younger relatives. It should be noted
that some close relatives (such as a son and heir) might be jointly herding with
the herd owner and therefore not eligible to receive a gift as they are not yet a
licensed herd owner themselves.
Twenty-four of the 71 gifts (33.8%) were given for reasons related to ex-
isting reciprocal relationships or developing future relationships (Table 4.8
and 4.9). In addition, 10 gifts (28.2%) were reciprocated although the experi-
mental setup did not allow communication between participants (Figure 4.1b).
This form of direct reciprocity has been conceptualized as an important mech-
anism behind the evolution of cooperation (Nowak 2006; Trivers 1971). The
experiment did not explicitly account for either indirect (reputational) or direct
reciprocity as mechanisms underlying cooperation; rather, I investigated the
relative importance of kinship and social group membership in predicting gift
giving. Membership of the same siida may imply multiple opportunities for
reciprocation.
While the stated reasons for why participants gave particular gifts were ad
hoc, I argue they provide valuable insight into behaviour in the games. Thirteen
of the 71 gifts (18.3%) were given to those with the reputation of being a ‘good
herder’ (Table 4.8), something important to Saami pastoralists (Paine 1970).
Gifts were not given preferentially to siida leaders (Table 4.1). In this study,
I was not able to control for potential confounds such as prestige, skills, expe-
rience, etc. that may have biased gift giving behaviours, although I did con-
trol for herd size as a proxy of wealth. Given this indication that cultural fac-
tors such as reputation may be important mediators of cooperative behaviour
for Saami reindeer herders, future work could attempt to define measures of
reputation and prestige that are meaningful to this population. One approach
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would be to ask herders, preferably in group interviews, to rank others by their
experience, skill, history of good decisions, etc. These culturally derived mea-
sures could then be linked to quantitative measures of wealth and used to pre-
dict gift giving.
Gifts in this study were small and anonymous, and communication be-
tween participants was not allowed. This makes it unlikely that costly sig-
nals, reputation or competitive altruism were driving the observed behaviours,
although I was unable to test this formally. However, indirect reciprocity
and competitive cooperation play important roles in human social groups, es-
pecially when cooperative behaviours are public (Barclay 2013; Sylwester &
Roberts 2013). This chapter investigated the factors underlying partner choice
but did not look at mechanisms of partner control that might enforce or main-
tain cooperation. Future work should attempt to understand the relative im-
portance of partner control compared with partner choice as well as the roles of
indirect reciprocity, partner choice and direct reciprocity (especially reciprocity
based on reputation, i.e., competitive cooperation) in real-world contexts.
4.5 Conclusion
This work represents a first step towards quantifying the forms and diversity
of cooperative strategies among Saami people. Saami pastoralists face many
social and ecological challenges. Competition for access to winter pastures
may explain herd accumulation as the only viable risk-reducing strategy, al-
though the efficacy of this strategy may be limited by quotas on maximum herd
size (Næss & Ba˚rdsen 2010). This suggests the future of reindeer husbandry
presents a collective action problem for the herders: one that may be solved
from within the community without necessitating the privatisation of pastures
(Bjørklund 1990; Hausner et al. 2012; Marin 2006). At present, management
policies seem to be designed to attain sustainability by targeting only individ-
ual reindeer owners (e.g. providing subsidies to increase slaughter rates), while
disregarding the cooperative nature of reindeer pastoralism (Næss et al. 2012).
Understanding the mechanisms of cooperation in this population will be an
important task for its future viability.
Chapter 5
Solving Saami social dilemmas
5.1 Introduction
Group living often entails a balance between individual self-interest and bene-
fits to the group as a whole. When these interests are not aligned, individuals
may act selfishly to the detriment of all in the group, including themselves.
Such situations, where an individual’s vested interests conflict with collective
interests, are known as social dilemmas (Kollock 1998). Countless social dilem-
mas have been described and analysed, all tending to be variants of the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma (PD; see section 1.4.2.1), the problem of provisioning public
goods, or the tragedy of the (unmanaged) commons; the latter two being, in
essence, multiplayer extensions of the PD (Hardin 1968, 1994; Kollock 1998;
Samuelson 1954).
In this chapter, I investigate how Saami reindeer herders respond to so-
cial dilemmas by employing an experimental economic game, namely a pub-
lic goods game. Saami pastoralists work in cooperative groups formed of
kin and non-kin, and these groups cooperate and conflict to varying extents.
Social dilemmas pervade this way of life and individual herders must bal-
ance their own interests—generating income, managing the risks inherent in
pastoralism—with the interests of their herding group and the wider commu-
nity in which others face similar quandaries. Understanding how Saami people
solve their social dilemmas might have implications for the future of reindeer
husbandry in this area, especially given a background of shifting land tenure
regimes, overcrowding of reindeer and climate change.
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From an evolutionary point of view, social dilemmas are solved when ac-
cess to a good increases inclusive fitness, i.e. when fitness is at stake, public
goods are more likely to be provisioned or commons will not become over-
exploited. This might occur, for example, if reciprocal cooperation increases
the direct fitness of individuals within a group, when groups are formed of
genetic relatives (thus affecting indirect fitness) or when groups also contain
affinal kin with shared reproductive interests in future generations (Hamilton
1964; Hughes 1988; Trivers 1971).
A common tool for understanding the dynamics of cooperative behaviours
in groups is the public goods game (PGG). PGGs involve a group of players in-
dividually deciding how much of an endowment to contribute towards a pub-
lic account. Donations to the group are multiplied, in this case by a constant
factor. The increased sum is then shared equally among all group members
regardless of their initial contributions. When the multiplier is less than the
group size, contributors receive less in return than they contributed. The ra-
tio of multiplier to group size is known as the marginal per-capita return rate
(MPCR; Ledyard 1995). Donations when MPCR < 1 do not maximise utility
and are either interpreted as acts of prosociality (Camerer 2013) or mistakes
(Burton-Chellew & West 2013).
When the public good multiplier is held constant, group size becomes
an important factor in an individual’s cooperative calculus. MPCR shrinks
as group size increases, making donations less individually optimal (Ledyard
1995). A meta-analysis of laboratory-based public goods games found that
higher MPCR (range 0.003− 0.8) was associated with larger contributions to
the group (Zelmer 2003). Other laboratory experiments attempting to mirror
the small MPCRs expected in real-world public goods dilemmas have shown
that MPCR, but not necessarily absolute group size, has a strong effect on co-
operation (Weimann et al. 2012).
As discussed in section 2.1.2.2, larger groups can be more (Zhang & Zhu
2011) or less cooperative (Soetevent 2005), and this effect may not be linear
(Yang et al. 2013). Laboratory evidence suggests that intermediate group sizes
are favourable when the output from a public good means that benefits quickly
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accrue for early cooperators compared to those contributing later when groups
have become larger (Barcelo & Capraro 2015). In addition, factors such as par-
ticipants’ ages, group composition, and social context are likely to affect coop-
eration (see section 2.1.2).
Typically, MPCR ≈ 0.5 in field-based experiments, due to standard group
sizes of ∼4 people (Gerkey 2013; Henrich et al. 2005). Regressing donation size
on MPCR for the field-based PGGs reported in (Gerkey 2013; Table 1), the re-
turn rate has a positive but not statistically significant effect (B = 152.44, p =
0.128, R2 = 0.183). In a meta-analysis of the effects of punishment on cooper-
ation reported across 18 countries, group size (and thus MPCR) did not have
a statistically significant effect (Balliet & Lange 2013). A review of field-based
public goods games played with non-students (Ca´rdenas & Carpenter 2008)
found that the average donation was 51% of the initial endowment (range:
23%−81%).
My study takes advantage of natural variation in group size within a sin-
gle population, where the groups are important hubs of cooperation. Given the
evidence discussed above that group size affects levels of cooperation, I aim to
investigate how decisions to provision a public good are affected as the per-
ceived marginal per-capita return rates vary due to participants’ knowledge of
their herding group and, thus, potential PGG group members.
This study thus departs from the usual structure of public goods games
in that I did not artificially limit the number of participants in the groups but
rather used real-world group sizes. Quantifying how the size of meaningful
social groups affects cooperative behaviours could potentially have implica-
tions beyond lab-in-the-field experiments or pastoralism per se; our ability to
respond to large-scale collective action problems such as climate change might
be affected if increasing group size deters (or, in some cases, promotes) cooper-
ation.
5.1.1 Saami social dilemmas
Researchers have identified various mutually inclusive routes to solving so-
cial dilemmas, including assorting with kin and/or cooperative individuals,
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communication, coordination, exclusion, institutions, leadership, legislation,
mobility, monitoring, parcelling out cooperation or access to resources, part-
ner choice, partner control, policing, repeated reciprocal interactions, rewards,
sanctioning, and social norms (Levin 2014; Raihani & Bshary 2015; Trivers 2005;
West et al. 2007b; see section 1.4). In this section, I discuss individual and col-
lective strategies for how pastoralists, especially Saami reindeer herders, solve
real-world social dilemmas.
Much theoretical and experimental work has shown that people have
strong preferences for cooperating with members of an ‘in-group’ (e.g. their
family, neighbourhood, school, office, herding group) to the exclusion—and
sometimes the detriment—of ‘out-groups’ (Hewstone et al. 2002; Silva & Mace
2014). Saami pastoralists organise themselves into cooperative herding groups
known as siidas and, as shown in the previous chapter, herders exhibited a
preference towards cooperating with members of their siida.
The siida is a collective action group tied to an area of pastureland. Coop-
eration within siidas takes many forms and fulfils many purposes. The forms
of cooperative behaviours can broadly be categorised into those that provision
public goods and those that exploit common-pool resources, both of which can
lead to tensions between individual self-interest and collective interests.
Cooperative decisions in the form of labour investment can be understood
as akin to provisioning public goods. Everybody benefits from the labour of
those who help with herding tasks such as gathering reindeer for spring cor-
rals. The benefits of cooperative acts can extend beyond the siida. For example,
somebody might maintain a fence along the borders of their pasture to help
themselves and their fellow siida members but neighbouring siidas happen
to benefit as a by-product. In the case of shared borders, neighbouring siidas
would each have an incentive not to invest (i.e. to free-ride) if the other siida is
likely to provision the good and they can reap the benefits without expending
effort.
Some pastoralist societies have developed systems of livestock and labour
exchange, which theoretically allows groups of herders to pool risk (i.e. par-
tially transfer risk in order to decrease the severity of individual herd losses),
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boosting long-term herd survival (Aktipis et al. 2011). These are not systems
of reciprocal exchange per se (see Woodburn 1998); rather gifts are given only
when requested by those in need, if the giver is able to do so, as exemplified by
the Maasai tradition of osotua, which follows a norm of ‘from each according to
their abilities, to each according to their needs’, prizing restraint, responsibility
and respect (Cronk 2007). This form of collectivism might function as a nor-
mative cultural solution to a social dilemma, whereby members of the cultural
group are obliged to behave cooperatively.
Saami reindeer herders have an analogous needs-based social arrange-
ment with people outside the husbandry known as verdde (loosely translated
as ‘guest-friend’; Paine 1994). Verdde may be neighbours, friends from child-
hood and non-herder relatives, possibly representing long-standing family re-
lationships stretching back generations. The presence of verdde depends on
local conditions – e.g. non-Saami verdde are less likely to live on the tundra,
whereas herders with coastal pastures may have verdde relationships with fish-
ers. Herders might provide verdde with dried or smoked meat, perhaps receiv-
ing fish at some point in the future. One family in the study district received
bales of hay from a farmer verdde. As with the example of osotua described
above, verdde relationships are not explicitly systems of reciprocal exchange
(one informant described them as “natural favours”). Such relationships may
function as a way of pooling risk for Saami pastoralists, although this hypoth-
esis is yet to be explored.
Explicit cooperation also occurs between siidas. Borders to winter pastures
can overlap and are permeable to a certain extent, depending on the needs
of the reindeer – grazing rights in these patchy areas can shift to match herd
size, for example, so siidas might tolerate a modicum of encroachment, espe-
cially in ‘emergency’ situations such as during bad winters (Marin & Bjørklund
2015). Herders are also sensitive to situations in which encroachment becomes
a ‘shameful’ (Saami: hæppat) act of trespassing (Paine 1994). Herders will coop-
erate in a contingent and reciprocal manner, working with neighbouring siidas
to separate herds when they become mixed, and ensuring against the degrada-
tion of lichen along shared migration corridors (Marin 2006).
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Ties to the land were once formed around customary access rights oper-
ating in a system of sequential usufruct (Reinert 2006). In recent years, land
has been steadily privatised across many herding areas in Norway, especially
in the county of Finnmark – the location of this study. This has been due, in
part, to assumptions of a tragedy of the commons. Contrary to expectations
from a purely game theoretical treatment of common-pool resources (Hardin
1968), it is not uncommon that limited resources are managed by communities
in a sustainable manner (Lansing 1991; Ostrom 1990).
A recent report by the Norwegian Institute for Nature Research (Tveraa
et al. 2013) found that the high levels of reindeer mortality observed in Finn-
mark might be due not to predation, as commonly believed, but rather over-
crowding of reindeer and the poor condition of the animals. Overcrowding
does not necessarily imply overgrazing, however. Evidence for a tragedy of
the commons in this area is equivocal. There is a negative density depen-
dence effect where increased reindeer density in a district was associated with
decreased future herd size (Næss & Ba˚rdsen 2010) and lower reindeer body
mass (Ba˚rdsen et al. 2014), both of which are linked to higher rates of mortality
(Tveraa et al. 2013). However, a tragedy of the commons would also predict a
negative relationship between slaughter undertaken by neighbouring herders
and an individual’s own slaughter decisions, whereas the observed relation-
ship was positive (Næss et al. 2012).
The high reindeer numbers in Finnmark could be a product of the inten-
sive commercialisation of reindeer husbandry into a market-oriented industry,
beginning in 1976, which incentivises herders to maximise meat production
and thus their income (Hausner et al. 2011), whereas Saami pastoralists bal-
ance economic gains with the need to manage risk through increasing their
herd sizes (Næss & Ba˚rdsen 2015). An enforced shift away from customary
land tenure towards ‘common’ or ‘open’ pastures—and, increasingly, priva-
tised pastures—may be partly responsible for any apparent tragedies in this
area (Marin & Bjørklund 2015).
As discussed in this section, pastoralists face social dilemmas at many
turns. In order to manage these situations, herders deploy a range of flexi-
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ble cooperative strategies, both on an individual level as well as a collective
level. The next section will outline the hypotheses I will test regarding social
dilemmas relevant to Saami reindeer herders. The remainder of this chapter
will analyse data collected from field experiments and discuss the results in
the light of theoretical and ethnographic studies of collective action.
5.1.2 Predictions
Following the theoretical models of how marginal incentives affect cooperation
(Ledyard 1995), I predict that donations will increase as MPCR increases. Un-
like theoretical models, but in keeping with observed behaviour in the labora-
tory and in the field, I also predict that the majority of participants will donate
non-zero amounts even though, by design, MPCR will always be less than one,
thus creating a social dilemma.
These two hypotheses will be tested via two one-shot PGGs, both framed
in terms of petrol that can be donated to a group pot. In the first game, partic-
ipants can donate petrol to a group account that will be shared across the en-
tire district; the second game frames decisions in terms of their summer siida.
MPCR will be calculated based on the number of people in each participant’s
summer siida – a quantity that reflects perceived return rates and should factor
into strategic decision-making (provided participants understand the structure
of the game). Players did not know at the point of participating how many
other people in their siida would be taking part, beyond their own insights
into who might be likely to participate given their past experiences of working
with these people. While the final group size was not necessarily known to
each player at the time of the experiments, I hypothesise that players would
expect a certain number of participants—and, hence, perceive a certain return
rate—given their knowledge of and history with their siida. The variations in
group size within our study site will act as a form of natural experiment in
which ‘expected MPCR’ varies by siida.
Whereas herders work with members of their siida on a regular basis,
between-siida cooperation is more facultative. District-level cooperation is
likely to be lower compared to within-siida cooperation, since the district is a
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large administrative area rather than a salient cooperative unit. (Note that this
pattern of multiple siidas within a district is specific to my study site. In other
parts of Norway, most districts contain only one summer siida.) Therefore, I
expect donations to the siida PGG to be substantially larger than donations to
the district PGG. Similarly, from kin selection theory, I predict that members of
more closely related siidas will donate more compared to less-related siidas.
5.2 Methods
In July and August 2013, I interviewed 30 licensed herd owners belonging to all
nine siidas in a single district of Finnmark, Norway (see Chapter 3 for details
of the field site and sample).
5.2.1 Public goods games
Participants played two one-shot public goods games (PGGs), deciding how
much of their endowment to donate to the public good and how much to keep
for themselves. Before each PGG, herders received vouchers for five litres of
petrol in one-litre denominations. They could choose to donate any amount to
the group pot or keep as much as they wanted for themselves.
The first PGG was conducted with all participants in one large district-
level group with donations to the public good eventually distributed equally
among all 30 people who eventually took part in the study (42.3% of all licensed
herd owners in this district). Participants were originally told they would be
split into randomly-formed groups of six (see Appendix B). For logistical rea-
sons, I changed the protocol so that there was only one district-level group.
Based on participants’ stated reasons for donating the amounts they donated,
they understood the district-level PGG as if it would be one large group any-
way. After participants made their donation decision in the district-level PGG,
they played a second PGG. This group in the second PGG was formed of only
the members of the participant’s summer siida; this game followed the same
protocol as the first but without limitations on group size.
At the time of interview, respondents did not necessarily know exactly
who else would be participating in the study. The games, therefore, were
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pseudo-anonymous in the sense that players had no knowledge of exactly who
would be in their PGG groups, although players were told their groups would
be formed of license owners from the district (for the first game) and license
owners belonging to their summer siida (for the second game).
The total amounts donated in each PGG were multiplied by a factor of
1.5. This number was chosen because for some siidas, especially the smallest
(n = 2), I could not guarantee in advance I would be able to interview more
than two herders: the minimum number required for a social dilemma to exist.
I was only able to interview one person for three of the nine siidas. In these one-
player cases, the dominant strategy would become the Pareto optimal strategy
of donating the entire endowment since no social dilemma exists. However,
the respondents (and the experimenter) would not have been aware of this
fact at the time. MPCR varied for different participants since siida group sizes
differed.
After both donation decisions, I asked respondents why they chose to give
particular amounts. Reasons were given verbally in either Saami or Norwegian
(in whichever language the interview was conducted), recorded in Norwegian
by the field assistant and translated into English by the field assistant and me.
5.2.2 Siida productivity data
I use the following siida-level measures (see section 3.4) in the analyses pre-
sented here: total herd size in 2012; number of reindeer per herder (not lim-
ited to license owners); average calf slaughter weight in 2012 (kg); average
adult slaughter weight in 2012 (kg). (Reindeer aged 0−1 years are classified as
calves.)
5.2.3 Statistical analysis
Because the amount an individual contributes to the PGGs can be no larger
than five litres of petrol, I use Tobit regressions to account for this right-
censoring (Tobin 1958). Table 5.1 lists the Tobit models fitted in this chapter;
all models control for participants’ age, sex, education and number of reindeer
owned in 2012. Parameter estimates are interpreted in the same manner as a
standard linear regression.
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Table 5.1: Tobit regressions predicting contributions to either the siida or district public
goods games (PGGs). All models control for age, sex, education and number
of reindeer owned in 2012. Models are listed in the order they appear in the
main text.
Model Response variable Predictor of interest
1 Donation to siida PGG Self-reported within-siida cooperation
2 Donation to district PGG Self-reported between-siida cooperation
3 Donation to siida PGG Mean relatedness within siidas
4 Donation to siida PGG Marginal per-capita return rate
5.3 Results
5.3.1 People cooperate more with their herding group
Participants donated more to their siida pot (median = 3 litres of petrol) than
to the district pot (median = 0 litres; Figure 5.1). Donations to the siida pot
were significantly larger than donations to the district pot (two-tailed paired
Wilcoxon test, V = 246, p < 0.001, 95% CI [2.0,4.0]). Eight people gave equal
amounts to the district and their siida, while one person gave more to the dis-
trict than to the siida.
Eighteen people gave nothing to the district and three people gave noth-
ing to their siida. The same three people also donated nothing to the district.
Five people donated 4 or more litres of petrol to the district pot. Of these, four
donated all 5 litres to their siida (the fifth donated 3 litres). Of the four people
donating all 5 litres, the primary source of income for two of them was through
reindeer sold, the other people’s income came from outside the reindeer hus-
bandry.
Herders reported taking part in cooperative activities more frequently
within their own summer siida compared to the frequency of doing those ac-
tivities for other siidas (Figure 5.2). For most questions, the majority of people
interviewed reported never taking part in the list of activities for other siidas.
Ranking herders by cooperation scores did not predict larger donations to the
siida from higher-ranked individuals (B = 0.056, S.E. = 0.354, p = 0.873; Ta-
ble 5.2). Similarly, ranking herders by their cooperativeness to other siidas did
not predict donations to the district PGG (B = −0.325, S.E. = 0.361, p = 0.367;
Table 5.3).
5.3. Results 90
Siida pot District pot
0
5
10
15
0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5
Donation size (litres)
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Figure 5.1: Distribution of donations in the district (yellow) and siida (green) public
goods games. The median donation size in the district game was 0 litres of
petrol; the median donation in the siida game was 3 litres.
Table 5.2: Effects of (1) relatedness, (2) marginal per-capita return rate and (3) self-
reported cooperation on contributions to the siida public goods game. Pa-
rameter estimates are from Tobit regressions predicting size of contribution
(0− 5 litres of petrol). Statistically significant effects are in bold. ∆AIC rep-
resents differences compared to the best-fitting model (Model 2).
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Parameter B S.E. p B S.E. p B S.E. p
Mean relatedness 3.184 4.291 0.458
MPCR 67.775 33.442 0.043
Cooperation rank 0.056 0.354 0.873
Age -0.008 0.053 0.873 0.013 0.051 0.795 -0.015 0.055 0.786
Sex (ref: male) 0.830 2.762 0.764 1.069 2.494 0.668 0.641 2.700 0.813
Education (years) -0.098 0.080 0.221 -0.072 0.073 0.323 -0.102 0.081 0.209
Siida leader? 1.083 1.330 0.415 0.420 1.175 0.721 1.390 1.261 0.270
Herd size in 2012 -0.003 0.004 0.432 -0.003 0.004 0.531 -0.004 0.004 0.373
(Intercept) 6.942 3.952 0.079 3.082 3.870 0.426 7.589 3.739 0.042
Log-likelihood -44.286 -41.577 -44.461
∆AIC 5.236 0.000 5.550
Siida size did not affect self-reported cooperation, either within or between
siidas (Figure 5.3). A participant’s mean relatedness to their siida did not pre-
dict contribution size (B= 3.184, S.E. = 4.291, p= 0.458).
Combining with the gift game data reported in the previous chapter,
herders with higher self-reported cooperative scores towards their own si-
ida did not preferentially give gifts to other cooperators within their siida
(B = −0.002, S.E. = 0.162, p = 0.992, R2 0.001). Similarly, herders reporting
more frequent cooperation with other siidas did not give more gifts to other co-
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Table 5.3: Effect of self-reported cooperation on contributions to the district public
goods game. Parameter estimates are from a Tobit regression predicting the
size of contributions (0−5 litres of petrol). Statistically significant effects are
in bold.
Parameter B S.E. p
Cooperation rank -0.325 0.361 0.367
Age -0.018 0.052 0.736
Sex (ref: male) 1.117 2.784 0.688
Education (years) -0.096 0.081 0.236
Siida leader? 1.265 1.242 0.309
Herd size in 2012 -0.003 0.004 0.490
(Intercept) 8.329 3.850 0.031
Log-likelihood -44.039
operators (B=−0.320, S.E. = 0.321, p= 0.342, R2 = 0.091). Overall, people re-
porting higher within-siida cooperation did not receive more gifts from people
in their siida (B= 0.021, S.E.= 0.047, p= 0.652, R2 = 0.008) whereas those who
behaved cooperatively by donating more to their siida’s public good received
more gifts from fellow siida members, although the effect was borderline sta-
tistically significant (B = 0.219, S.E. = 0.112, p = 0.061, R2 = 0.133). Similarly,
participants who donated more in the siida PGG did not give gifts to one an-
other (B=−0.055, S.E. = 0.167, p= 0.746, R2 = 0.004).
5.3.2 Marginal incentives matter
Despite the district PGG’s marginal per-capita return rate being very low
(0.004), 12 people (40%) donated at least one litre of petrol to the district.
Expected MPCR—the return rate herders might calculate or perceive—
depends on the number of herders in each siida. This ranged from 0.0197 in
the largest siida (n= 76 people) to 0.107 in the smallest (n= 14 people). Increas-
ing MPCR predicted larger donations to the siida (B= 67.775, S.E.= 33.442, p=
0.043; Table 5.2 and Figure 5.4).
As shown in Figure 5.4, the three people from the smallest siida seem to
be driving the positive effect of MPCR. Removing these three people from the
model reduced the effect and caused the parameter estimate to no longer be
statistically significant (B= 44.324, S.E. = 46.534, p= 0.341).
Group size had a linear rather than curvilinear effect on PGG contributions
(Table 5.4). For every additional person in the siida, there was an expected
5.3. Results 92
Count
Taking animals to slaughterhouse
Repairing vehicles
Repairing fences/corrals
Repairing cabins
Other
Herding activities
Handcrafts
Finding lost reindeer
20 10 0 10 20
Own siida
20 10 0 10 20
Other siidas
 
Never 2 3 4 5 6 Every day
Figure 5.2: Self-reported frequencies for a range of cooperative activities that individ-
uals took part in on behalf of their own summer siida (left panel) and for
other siidas (right panel). Study participants were asked to report how of-
ten they had performed each activity on a scale of 1 (never) to 7 (every day)
over the previous year. Red bars show the number of people who answered
‘never’; darkening blue bars show increasing frequencies of activity.
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Figure 5.3: Total self-reported cooperation for each participant, aggregated into siidas
and split by whether cooperation was directed towards the participant’s
own siida (left panel) or to other siidas (right panel). Siidas are ordered,
left to right, in ascending order of size, based on number of license owners.
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Figure 5.4: Marginal per-capita return rate predicts the size of donations to the summer
siida public goods game (Model 2 in Table 5.2). Points show individual
donations coloured by the summer siida of each herder. The line shows the
fitted Tobit regression with 95% confidence interval.
Table 5.4: Linear and curvilinear effects of group size on contributions to the siida
public goods game. Parameter estimates are from Tobit regressions predict-
ing size of contribution (0−5 litres of petrol). Statistically significant effects
are in bold. ∆AIC represents differences compared to the best-fitting model
(‘Linear’).
Linear Quadratic
Parameter B S.E. p B S.E. p
Group size -0.082 0.030 0.006 0.006 0.146 0.965
Group size2 -0.001 0.001 0.543
Age 0.017 0.047 0.723 0.016 0.046 0.730
Sex (ref: male) 0.366 2.296 0.874 0.132 2.398 0.956
Education (years) -0.049 0.069 0.478 -0.049 0.070 0.487
Siida leader? 0.595 1.075 0.580 0.756 1.114 0.498
Herd size in 2012 -0.004 0.004 0.298 -0.005 0.004 0.234
(Intercept) 9.605 3.371 0.004 8.018 4.155 0.054
Log-likelihood -40.425 -40.261
∆AIC 0.000 1.670
decrease in contributions of 0.082 litres of petrol. Restricting group size to in-
clude only license owners did not significantly predict donation size (results
not shown).
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Table 5.5: Reasons for donating to the district public goods game (or not) and donation
size (litres). Reasons were translated from the participants’ Norwegian or
Saami responses.
ID Donation reason Donation
1 So reindeer herders keep the work going 5
2 Supporting the district 5
60 Can’t do much with 5L 5
73 People I know 5
36 Those siidas who receive should keep their own animals at their ownplace to avoid herds mixing 4
16 If district asks he’ll give but if not, won’t give. Depends on situation. 2
85 It depends on the time of year. It can be used for everything 2
5 For good conscience 1
26 It’s necessary for people to drive 1
27 For herding my reindeer 1
49 To show manners. If they really need it 1
3 A symbol of sharing 0.5
9 Has worked enough for free. [District] gets paid by the state.Have no relationship 0
18 Not herder’s choice to have one big district. Giving nothing 0
19 Give nothing back. Needs it himself 0
34 Don’t get anything back 0
35 They don’t need it 0
40 Doesn’t give any fuel because district are not doing anything useful for him 0
46 They are such a small siida it will have no influence 0
64 Gets nothing and gives nothing 0
70 They don’t need it and they don’t drive for me. They get money from the state 0
72 Doesn’t want to share 0
74 Because so many sharing the litres and challenging for a few litres 0
75 Not sharing with the district 0
76 Don’t know 0
77 District doesn’t have any responsibility for driving. It is given to each siida 0
82 Doesn’t give for no reason 0
86 I need it myself. District is too big for sharing 0
97 Needs it himself 0
100 Why give when I won’t get anything back 0
5.3.3 Reasons for provisioning the public good
Tables 5.5 and 5.6 show, respectively, the stated reasons for donating to the
district and siida public goods games. Reasons in both tables are listed with
herders’ IDs so can be compared across tables. Three people gave the same
reason for their siida donation as for their district donation (IDs 9, 16 and 82).
Three of the four people donating all 5 litres of petrol to the district did so
because they knew the other people and wanted to support the district and/or
reindeer husbandry. The fourth (herder 60) donated his entire endowment of
petrol because he “can’t do much with 5 litres”. Two people (herders 3 and 5)
donated as a symbolic or normative gesture. Of the 18 people who donated
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Table 5.6: Reasons for donating to the siida public goods game (or not) and donation
size (litres). Reasons were translated from the participants’ Norwegian or
Saami responses.
ID Donation reason Donation
2 Giving to siida. Working together 5
3 Close family and they will have good use of it 5
18 We have the same job 5
34 It will be used for the purpose that I have needs for 5
35 It will come to good use for everybody in the siida 5
36 We are only 3. We have a good infrastructure. We are using the petroltogether after a meeting about scheduling work. 5
49 It’s demanding to drive, so giving to younger herders becausethey have good health and agility 5
60 Someone in summer siida does something for me and I do something for them 5
64 Gets it back anyway 5
70 If I’m not there myself, the others can use it 5
73 I also have a use for this 5
76 Work together anyway 5
27 Wants cooperation 4
77 We are often 5 who are driving 4
1 They have the same herd and the same work 3
26 Everyone should participate 3
46 When we see all of the work for example in autumn is a lot of work 3
74 Keeping work together (cooperating) 3
75 We work together 3
5 For the young people, for better yield 2
16 If district asks he’ll give but if not, won’t give. Depends on situation. 2
40 For cooperating and working against the predators 2
72 Even/equal sharing 2
85 If I take everything for myself it’ll be used for driving the herd.If I give everything, will they give back? 2
100 It comes to good use for everyone 2
86 So the job will be done 1
97 We are 2. Need it ourselves 1
9 Has worked enough for free. [District] gets paid by the state. Have no relationship 0
19 Little cooperation in summer siida. We (the family) drive for the most part 0
82 Doesn’t give for no reason 0
nothing in the district PGG, 13 reasoned that they had no relationship with the
district as a whole and would be unlikely to receive anything in return.
Overall, 21 people reported donating to their siida for reasons relating to
cooperation, shared work and reciprocity. Two people donated in order to help
younger herders. Herder 19 reported little cooperation in his summer siida,
while herder 85 seemed to worry about whether other members of his siida
would contribute to the PGG.
There seemed to be some misunderstanding of the PGG. For example,
herder 36’s response (Table 5.5) implied that he thought particular siidas would
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Table 5.7: Estimates from four separate linear regressions, each with a single siida-
level predictor. The response variable in all four models was the size of
donations in the siida public goods game. Average calf slaughter weight
(Model 3) was a borderline statistically significant predictor of donation size
and, comparing AICs, that model best fitted the data.
Model Predictor B S.E. p R2 AIC
1 Reindeer per capita 0.021 0.017 0.279 0.164 35.485
2 Total herd size in 2012 0.000 0.000 0.709 0.021 36.905
3 Calf slaughter weight in 2012 0.602 0.262 0.055 0.430 32.042
4 Adult slaughter weight in 2012 0.140 0.202 0.511 0.064 36.502
receive petrol from the PGG, as opposed to everybody receiving a share. Sim-
ilarly, herder 97 only donated 1 litre to his siida (Table 5.6), claiming that he
and the only other license owner in the siida needed the petrol for themselves,
perhaps without realising they would be the ones receiving the pot (“Need it
ourselves”) since they were the only eligible participants.
5.3.4 Herd size and slaughter weights do not predict siida do-
nations
Individual donations to the siida were not predicted by number of reindeer
owned in 2012 or by the mean number of reindeer owned between 2008 and
2012 (results not shown). Table 5.7 shows estimates from four linear regressions
on PGG donations aggregated by siida. Note that these are standard linear re-
gressions rather than Tobit regressions because aggregated PGG contributions
are not right-censored. Each model contains a single siida-level predictor relat-
ing to herds. None of the predictors produced a statistically significant effect,
although the calf slaughter weight in 2012 had a borderline significant effect
size and explained 43% of the variation in donation size (Model 3 in Table 5.7);
higher average slaughter weight in the previous year predicted larger dona-
tions to the siida PGG. Siidas required to reduce their herd sizes did not receive
more gifts (two-tailed Wilcoxon test,W = 2, 95% CI [−20,4], p= 0.186). Lack of
statistical significance in these cases is likely due to the small number of siidas
in the district (n = 9).
Self-reported measures of cooperation within and between siidas (Fig-
ure 5.2) did not correlate with the four measures of siida herd productivity
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Table 5.8: Pearson’s correlation coefficients between four measures of siida productiv-
ity and self-reported measures of within-siida and between-siida coopera-
tion (see Figure 5.2). For each correlation, p 0.05.
Productivity measure Within-siida cooperation Between-siida cooperation
Reindeer per capita -0.049 0.005
Total herd size in 2012 0.363 0.571
Calf slaughter weight in 2012 -0.433 -0.516
Adult slaughter weight in 2012 -0.037 -0.074
(Table 5.8).
5.4 Discussion
Herders donated larger amounts of petrol to their summer siida’s group pot
than to the district’s pot (Figure 5.1). Participants also reported more fre-
quent cooperative interactions with their own siida compared to how often
they helped other siidas (Figure 5.2). These patterns support the idea that the
siida is an important locus for collective action. Participants who were, on aver-
age, more related to their siida did not contribute more to the siida PGG (Model
1 in Table 5.2).
Most field experiments using PGGs tend either to ignore relatedness or
control for it, rather than treating it as an interesting explanatory variable (see
section 2.1.2). Unlike in previous lab-in-the-field public goods games, I find no
support for effects of age, sex, education (years of education), or wealth (mea-
sured as herd size) on size of contributions. Future studies should investigate
whether this pattern holds in a larger sample including other herding districts.
Self-reported cooperation, measured as the frequency that participants en-
gaged in cooperative activities on behalf of their own as well as for other si-
idas, was not associated with donations to the siida’s public good (Model 3 in
Table 5.2) or with the number of gifts received in the gift game. The lack of
relationship implies that self-reporting was not a useful measure of real-world
cooperative behaviour. The Likert scales employed here also have a particu-
lar shortcoming, namely they cannot capture rare events where herders turn
up every time: these instances would be reported as a low Likert score. These
issues may have ramifications for future field studies of cooperation that rely
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on survey methods and self-reports. In order to better understand social be-
haviours relevant to real-world situations, researchers should seek to combine
these sociological methods with observational data and longer-term ethnogra-
phy.
There was a positive and borderline statistically significant association be-
tween the size of a participant’s donation to their siida PGG and the number
of gifts they received. This suggests that the PGG might be providing a better
measure of cooperation compared to self-reports, and that more cooperative
herders are themselves likelier targets of cooperative behaviours (here, in the
form of gifts) or, simply, are more popular. However, people who donated more
in the siida PGG did not give gifts to one another. In future work, I intend to
explore the extent to which more cooperative herders have better reputations
and engage in directly reciprocal cooperation.
Group size had a linear, rather than curvilinear, effect on PGG contribu-
tions (Table 5.4). Different siida sizes allowed me to explore natural variation
in marginal per-capita return rates (MPCR). If people understood the PGG and
behaved as theoretically predicted, larger perceived returns (as a function of
smaller group size) would lead to people donating more to their siida pot.
This pattern emerged from the data, although the magnitude of the effect was
mostly driven by the three members of a single, small siida (Model 2 in Ta-
ble 5.2 and Figure 5.4). Removing this siida from the analysis caused the effect
to lose statistical significance, although the magnitude and direction remained
comparable.
Two limitations restrict my interpretation of this result. First, by keeping
the pot multiplier constant at 1.5 for all groups, I was unable to test whether
MPCR > 1 would have led all players to donate their full endowment to the
public good, as predicted by theory. Second, I did not investigate whether
players thought strategically in terms of maximising their returns based on the
MPCR. From the ex post facto reasons given by participants for their donation
decisions (Table 5.6), the majority donated for reasons pertaining to collective
action (e.g. “We have the same job”, “It will come to good use for everybody
in the siida”, “We work together”), including a normative approach to cooper-
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ation (“Everyone should participate”). Others reported reciprocity (“Someone
in summer siida does something for me and I do something for them”). Con-
versely, those who donated nothing to their siida pot reported little cooperation
in their siida or declared they needed reason to donate.
Since these reasons are likely to be post hoc rationalisations of behaviour, I
caution against over-interpretation of these results as giving insights into the
decision-making process. Regardless, participants donated to their siida pot
even though MPCR < 1, which is not the predicted behaviour of economically
self-interested rational actors. My findings mirror those of other field-based
public goods games (Gerkey 2013; Henrich et al. 2005; Lamba & Mace 2011).
People on the whole donated little to nothing to the district PGG (Fig-
ure 5.1). Only four people (13.3%) gave their full endowment, whereas 18
(60%) donated nothing. Two people who donated their full endowments to
the district seemed to reason in terms of large-scale collective action (“So rein-
deer herders keep the work going”; “Supporting [the district]”); another ap-
proached the dilemma in a more cautious, contingent manner (“If district asks
he’ll give but if not, won’t give. Depends on situation”). Three participants
(10%) donated 0.5 - 1 litres as a form of normative signal of cooperation (“For
good conscience”; “To show manners. . . ”; “A symbol of sharing”). One person
stated that the endowment was too small (“Can’t do much with 5 [litres]”; all
quotes from Table 5.5). Future work could involve more significant amounts
of petrol/money, although the expensive nature of this field site might further
limit the sample size attained. There were also hints towards demand sharing
regarding the district PGG (“If district asks he’ll give but if not, won’t give”;
“Doesn’t give for no reason”; Table 5.5). One participant stated after the in-
terview that donation decisions may depend on the time of year; herders may
need more petrol for themselves during summer, no matter how cooperative
the siida.
The productivity of siidas—measured as herd size in 2012, number of rein-
deer per capita, and average slaughter weights of adults and calves in 2012—
did not predict donations to the siida PGG (Table 5.7) and did not correlate
with the self-reported measures of within-siida and between-siida cooperation
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(Table 5.8). We might expect that larger herds would encourage more cooper-
ation as much as they result from efficient cooperation, since siidas with more
animals can potentially capture better-quality land (Paine, 1994). However,
with the increasing privatisation of pastures, this may soon not be possible.
On the other hand, more reindeer held by a siida might lead to more conflicts
rather than cooperation because of the increased risk of reindeer mortality and
worsening quality of reindeer as the overall number of animals in Finnmark
has increased – a trend not simply due to climate change (Ba˚rdsen et al. 2014;
Tveraa et al. 2013).
An unexpected outcome was that average calf slaughter weight had a bor-
derline statistically significant effect size and explained 43% of the variation in
donations to the siida (Table 5.7). Calf slaughter weight may therefore func-
tion as an indicator of how well a siida cooperates, given the importance of
good-quality calves for pastoralists. Alternatively, high slaughter weight might
signal that the siida had a good year previously and its members were well-
disposed to one another at the time of our study. Regardless, the small number
of siidas in this district (n = 9) means that siida-level analyses cannot attain
statistical power in order to be confident in the parameter estimates.
The cooperative activities used in my survey (Figure 5.2) only represent a
small portion of Saami pastoralist life. Several participants criticised the choice
of activities as being biased towards males, with one stating that women “are
the forgotten part of the Saami story.” With the advent of compulsory school-
ing, closure of boarding schools and the increased use of heavy machinery,
women were “pushed out of daily work” and now work less in the fields. The
pastoralist lifestyle requires herders to be available to tend to their herds 24
hours a day. As well as looking after children (grandparents also work so can
only provide limited care for grandchildren), mothers are also “doing the invis-
ible work” within households: according to one informant, women are “work-
ing to keep the family running.” Another informant lamented that Saami peo-
ple “lost part of our culture” when women could no longer take part in herding.
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Table 5.9: Typology of economics goods based on whether or not they are excludable
and subtractable.
Non- excludable Excludable
Non-subtractable Public(streetlights, National Health Service)
Club
(religions, European Union)
Subtractable Common(pastures, planets)
Private
(clothes, cars)
5.4.1 The efficacy of public goods games
The results presented in this chapter suggest that public goods games might
not provide the best model for at least some of the major social dilemmas fac-
ing this population. Some of the stated reasons for donating to the siida public
good suggest that some participants may have misunderstood the structure of
the game (Tables 5.5 and 5.6). Other researchers have questioned the utility
of the public goods game as a model of real-world behaviour. Laboratory ex-
periments suggest that participants do not immediately understand the game’s
payoff structure but rather learn it over repeated rounds, all the while acting
to maximise their own incomes (Burton-Chellew & West 2013; Burton-Chellew
et al. 2015), although some researchers go so far as to argue that inexperienced
or poorly incentivised players “cannot usefully be modeled as optimizers of
anything at all,” (Binmore & Shaked 2010: 88). Due to logistical constraints, the
PGGs were one-shot and so I was not able to investigate these issues.
It is worth mentioning that economists distinguish four types of good (I
use the term ‘good’ in its broadest sense to refer to goods, resources, services)
based on whether or not they are excludable and/or subtractable (Table 5.9).
Potential users cannot be excluded from accessing public goods or common-
pool resources; however, the difference between the two is that common-pool
resources are finite and through using them, they become depleted (i.e. they
are subtractable or rivalrous).
Public goods and common-pool resources (CPR) are typically conflated
since both are non-excludable (and so are vulnerable to free-riders) and can
be reduced to a Prisoner’s Dilemma (Ledyard 1995). However, the two social
dilemmas are distinct. Although the two games have the same Pareto opti-
mum, they have different Nash equilibria (Apesteguia & Maier-Rigaud 2006).
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The Pareto optimal (welfare-maximising) outcome in both games is for every-
body to donate their full endowment to the group pot. The Nash equilibrium
strategy in the PGG is for everyone to hold on to their endowments, whereas
everybody should cooperate in the CPR game (Apesteguia & Maier-Rigaud
2006). Therefore, rivalry is important – that is, whether or not a good is finite
and subtractable will affect the behaviours of individuals in a group (Dionisio
& Gordo 2006).
Unlike laboratory games, my study investigated cooperative behaviour in
real-world groups (siidas and the district) using a currency important to the
reindeer herding lifestyle (petrol). However, I argue a similar point to Burton-
Chellew and colleagues (Burton-Chellew & West 2013; Burton-Chellew et al.
2015), namely that PGGs may not be the best approach to modelling social
dilemmas in real-world groups. In the case of pastoralists such as the Saami,
the most important social dilemmas to solve (e.g. use of common pastures)
might better be modelled as a tragedy of the commons game involving re-
sources that diminish in a density-dependent manner. Even what seem on the
surface like public goods (e.g. fences or corrals) are in reality more like club
goods, in the sense that others can be excluded from their benefits (Table 5.9).
Future experimental work could attempt to tease apart the cooperative dynam-
ics of herders when faced with different types of goods and a need to balance
their own interests with those of their fellow siida members, for example by
playing games in which participants must individually choose to extract ‘re-
sources’ from a common pool (Ca´rdenas 2003).
In the experiments presented here, provisioning the public good was costly
to participants in the sense that most herders—especially in the siida PGG—
were not maximising their returns. This might be the case for several (not mu-
tually exclusive) reasons: (i) participants did not understand the game1, as was
evident from at least one player; (ii) relatedly, participants may have learned to
maximise their personal incomes over repeated rounds (Burton-Chellew et al.
2015); (iii) participants did not have the incentive to maximise their income
1Due to my field assistant’s dyslexia, many participants preferred reading the game instruc-
tions themselves. Unfortunately this meant we were often unable to test whether participants
understood the PGG instructions.
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(Binmore & Shaked 2010); (iv) there are social factors affecting decisions to do-
nate. The latter has some support from the reasons people gave for their dona-
tions (Tables 5.5 and 5.6), which included ideas of obligation, reciprocity and
collective action.
Experiments involving explicit costs as well as benefits are likely to al-
ter the resulting behaviours. Thus, while abstract PGGs serve some utility in,
e.g., comparative studies, future research may benefit from considering games
whose structure more closely models the costs and benefits as well as the ex-
cludability and subtractability of real-world contexts.
Siidas fulfil many roles. For example, cooperative herding can prevent
land-grabs from competing groups. Although this is less of a worry given the
current shift towards privatised and fenced land, pastoralists still face the task
of preventing unwanted encroachment. Similarly, herders must work together
to protect their livestock from predators, not all of which can be legally hunted
(this is especially relevant for the siida whose summer pasture is located in
a national park). Contribution problems such as provisioning public goods
(e.g. deciding whether to invest time and energy in labour, herd protection,
fence repair, etc.) are likely to exist in concert with consumption problems
regarding how to best use common-pool resources. Thus, I recommend that
researchers should consider the interplay between public goods (e.g. in the
form of cooperative labour investment) and common-pool resources, perhaps
playing both types of game in the field.
This chapter investigated cooperative behaviour within context-laden ex-
perimental games and linked cooperation with real-world outcomes. Future
work on Saami reindeer husbandry should investigate other arenas in which
social dilemmas might occur. For example, while the majority of herders
must sell their reindeer on the hoof to a purchasing oligopoly (oligopsony)
of Norwegian-owned slaughterhouses, approximately 20% of herders in Nor-
way operate their own slaughterhouses (Reinert 2006). The latter have greater
economic freedom although they face opportunity costs in the sense that time
and labour spent on their slaughterhouses diverts from their herding and hus-
bandry tasks, and introduces additional social dilemmas brought about by run-
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ning a business.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter investigated how cooperative behaviour within and between
groups can solve social dilemmas. To do so, I played two public goods games
(PGGs) – one where participants could choose to donate petrol to their summer
siida and another where they were grouped with the entire district. Contrary
to expectations, increasing mean relatedness had no effect on the number of
gifts given within siidas. Participants donated larger amounts of petrol to their
siida’s group pot than to the district, supporting the idea that the summer si-
ida is an important locus of collective action. The natural variation in group
size across siidas allowed us to investigate the effect of changing marginal per-
capita return rate (MPCR) on PGG donations. Increasing MPCR—a feature of
smaller groups—predicted an increase in donation size.
Participants donated to their group pots despite the return rate being less
than one. Theoretically, individuals playing a pure strategy of self-interested
utility-maximisation would donate nothing in this situation. These results – in
line with a number of laboratory and field studies – found that players donated
regardless, suggesting that mechanisms such as reciprocity, social norms and
aligned interests help siidas solve their social dilemmas.
Cooperation need not always be tangible. Saami people also share tradi-
tional knowledge (TK: “a systematic way of thinking applied to phenomena
across biological, physical, cultural and spiritual systems;” Inuit Circumpolar
Council 2013) about herding and husbandry (including ways of understanding
the quality of herds and individual reindeer), weather conditions (famously re-
lating to snow and ice), navigation and social norms or conventions. Older
herders are commonly sources of TK. One informant described grandparents
as “psychologists and teachers and providers of clothes and knowledge,” espe-
cially, in the case of TK, relating to herding decisions and names for antlers, pelt
and snow. Coordination via common knowledge is one method of achieving
cooperation (Cronk & Leech (2013) but see Binmore (2008)), and researchers are
beginning to explore how TK interacts with observed behaviours (Ziker et al.
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2015). A tantalising possibility is that shared knowledge could be considered a
good with its own provisioning problem, whereby some people might strate-
gically withhold or manipulate what and with whom they share.
Flexibility has been an important aspect of Saami cooperation. Nowhere
is this more apparent that in the movement of individuals between winter si-
idas. The ability to walk away from uncooperative others has been theoretically
shown to maintain cooperation through the positive assortment of cooperators
(Aktipis 2004; Lewis et al. 2014). Similarly, Apicella et al. (2012) found that co-
operative people assorted together in Hadza public goods games. My public
goods games, self-reported measures of cooperation and gift network did not
lend support to the idea that cooperative people prefer to interact with one an-
other and cluster in social networks. However, I urge caution in interpreting
the lack of evidence for cooperative assortment; my analyses are based on a
small sample from a single district and so suffer from low statistical power.
Despite the many theoretical and empirical avenues towards cooperation
discussed in this chapter, Saami herders have reported that trust and coopera-
tion are lacking in Finnmark, especially on winter siidas (Hausner et al. 2012).
This mistrust may be borne of herders’ responses to Finnmark’s particular ecol-
ogy, resulting in overstocking of reindeer compared to the good levels of co-
ordination found among reindeer herders further south (Riseth & Vatn 2009).
While this study focussed on cooperation within and between summer siidas,
future work could investigate cooperative and competitive behaviours in win-
ter siidas, where land tenure changes may create barriers to mobility and so
potentially prove detrimental to cooperative reindeer husbandry.
Part II
Mosuo farmers
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Chapter 6
Overview of Mosuo society and the
study area
6.1 Introduction
This chapter will introduce the Mosuo way of life as well as the study area
for Chapters 7 and 8. The research presented in Part II was approved by
the University College London research ethics committee and by the Chinese
Academy of Sciences, Beijing.
6.2 Study area
‘Mosuo’ refers to an ethnic group in rural southwest China, located around
Lugu Lake on the border of Sichuan and Yunnan provinces. Mosuo (also
known as Na) social life is typically organised around matrilineal households
in which family members spend most if not all of their lives.
Agriculture is a primary means of subsistence in this area, although suit-
able land is constrained by steep, forested hills. Likewise, diet is constrained
by depleted wildlife resources and an increasingly polluted lake. Members of
different households come together to help one another during planting and
harvesting seasons; everybody works the fields during this time, regardless of
gender or age. Households also cooperate in the construction of new houses,
share funeral costs if the deceased’s household cannot afford the ceremony, and
jointly invest in economic ventures (Shih 2009).
The area has become an increasingly popular tourist spot, which has led to
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a number of Mosuo households deviating from matrilineal norms due to a mix-
ture of cultural diffusion and economic motivations (Mattison 2010). House-
holds in Sichuan province, the site of this study, follow the traditional Mosuo
way of life, although encroaching tourism and more intermarriage with Han
people are causing this to shift (Ji et al. forthcoming).
Within the matrilineal families, all residents share the fruits of household
labour. Sisters reproduce communally. Older sisters invest more time in farm
work and have correspondingly higher reproductive success compared to their
younger sisters (Ji et al. 2013). (Note that unlike the Han and others in China,
rural ethnic minorities like the Mosuo people have been allowed 2-3 children
since the 1979 fertility policy.)
In traditional Mosuo life, “marriage is rejected as an institution that dis-
rupts household harmony,” (Blumenfield 2003: 487). Harmonious relation-
ships are the ideal between household members (Shih 2009) and grandmothers
tend to be the heads of houses. Family members will eat and farm together,
pool money and care for children communally. Big families are preferred but
households can fission if they become too large or if relationships are riven
by conflict (Mattison 2010); however, fissions are seen as shameful and to be
avoided (Shih & Jenike 2002).
The most famous aspect of Mosuo culture is sese (or tisese: ‘walking mar-
riage’). A man in a walking marriage will visit his partner’s house during the
night and return to his natal household at daybreak (Cai 2001). Once a union is
publicly recognised, the male may eat with or give gifts to his partner’s family
(Shih 2009). Sese does not prescribe how individuals should behave sexually;
it is fine to want many (potentially simultaneous), one or no partners. How-
ever, since the 1980s, formal marriage has been a requirement for reproduction
throughout China as part of the government’s family planning policy, so the
idea of conjugal partners has become more similar to the Han norm if a child
is involved, even when partners live apart. For simplicity, I use the terms ‘hus-
band’ and ‘wife’ to refer to male and female sese and/or marriage partners
identified as such in the household surveys.
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6.3 Data collection
All data collection was carried out by Jiajia Wu, Qiao-Qiao He and Ting Ji. De-
mographic surveys were conducted in five villages in Sichuan province around
Lugu Lake during 2012. One adult was interviewed on behalf of all house-
hold members about details including name, age, sex, ethnic group, names of
spouses and parents. GPS locations were also captured for households. Pedi-
grees were created by linking every person in the census to their mother and
father.
In 2013, participants played two gift games: one in which they gave gifts
to individuals (the “individual game”) and another in which they could give
cash to the heads of households, who would then share the gifts among co-
residents (the “household game”). In both games, participants were endowed
with 15 yuan, which they could give—in five yuan denominations—to between
one and three recipients. Here I will only analyse gift-giving in the individual
game.
Spot observations of people working on farms were conducted during the
planting seasons of 2011 and 2012 and the harvest season of 2012. Locations
were randomly sampled within the study villages, giving unbiased, although
incomplete, coverage. Workers were linked to their records in the demographic
database.
Wealth ranking of households was conducted by 1-3 people in each village.
The fieldworkers presented them with cards representing the heads of each
household; they then divided the cards into three piles: rich, medium, and
poor. The villagers further divided ‘medium’ into another four piles, leaving a
total of 6 piles of households: very rich (1) to very poor (6). The people who
did the wealth ranking were usually heads of that village who were familiar
with every household. Note that wealth ranks can only be interpreted within
the context of each village – e.g. a household ranked 3 in village 1 does not
necessarily have equivalent wealth to a household ranked 3 in village 5.
All analyses in Part II will be conducted on Mosuo and Han people only.
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6.4 Descriptive statistics
6.4.1 Individual demographics
In total, there were 3,795 people aged 15 or older, and 960 children aged < 15;
4,618 people were Mosuo and 137 were Han. There were 12 more males than
females in the sample (sex ratio = 1.005). Figure 6.1 shows the age distribution
of the sample split by sex and ethnicity.
Han Mosuo
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Figure 6.1: Age distribution of each ethnic group in the sample, split by female (green)
and male (yellow).
There were 953 couples in the study area. The majority of couples
(51.8%) lived in the same house. Only 12 people had more than one part-
ner (i.e. opposite-sex person with whom they had a child). In relation-
ships where both partners were Mosuo, slightly more lived in separate
households (Table 6.1), although the proportional difference compared to
numbers living together was not statistically significant (proportion test
P= 0.526, 95% CI [0.493,0.560], χ21 = 2.328, p= 0.127).
6.4.2 Household demographics
Across all five villages in the study area, there were 780 households headed
by Mosuo people. 373 household heads (47.8%) were female. Members of
200 households had wives living in another house (n = 258 dyads) and 209
households had husbands in other houses (n = 257 dyads). Four households
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Table 6.1: Number of couples living together or apart, split by ethnicity of both part-
ners.
Ethnicity of partners Live in same house?
(male-female) No Yes
Han-Han 0 1
Han-Mosuo 1 8
Mosuo-Han 0 73
Mosuo-Mosuo 458 412
Table 6.2: Median distance (km) between households and number of households in
each of the five study villages.
Village ID Median distance (km) No. households
A 0.601 120
B 0.812 120
C 1.209 132
D 1.222 250
E 0.521 158
had both wives and husbands living in another household.
Table 6.2 shows the distances between all household dyads in each of the
five study villages. The largest distance between any two houses was 7.1 km
(in village D) and villages contained 120-250 households headed by Mosuo
people. Household size, including adults and children, ranged from 1 to 18
people (median = 5).
Figure 6.2 shows the mean relatedness of individual between and
within households in each village. Related households tended to be ge-
ographically nearer one another (Pearson’s product-moment correlation,
r = −0.102, 95% CI [−0.110,−0.094], p 0.001; Figure 6.3). The grand mean
coefficient of relatedness across all villages was r = 0.003.
The majority of households (94.1%) were not related on average but, of
those where r > 0, most were related at r ∈ [0.031,0.063). Households were
more closely related to themselves than to other households, since people live
with close family (Figure 6.2); note, however, that 33 pairs of households were
related to one another at the level of grandparents, uncles, aunts, nephews
and nieces (r ∈ [0.25,0.5)). Residents were not related to one another in four
households.
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Figure 6.2: Relatedness between and within households, coloured by village.
Figure 6.3: Mean relatedness between households as a function of distance in kilome-
tres. Points are coloured by village.
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6.4.2.1 Wealth ranks of households
The relative ranking of households by wealth varied greatly across villages
(Figure 6.4; a rank of 1 means the wealthiest in the village; note that wealth
ranks are only comparable within villages). The majority of households in
village B were ranked 1 or 2, whereas in village C, most households were
towards the bottom end of the scale. In the remaining villages, most house-
holds were ranked 3. Larger households were slightly wealthier (Pearson’s
r =−0.210, 95% CI [−0.277,−0.142], p 0.001).
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Figure 6.4: Households’ wealth ranks, split by village (coloured bars). Note that
wealth ranks are only comparable within villages. A rank of 1 means the
wealthiest households in the village.
Chapter 7
Affinal links encourage cooperation
between Mosuo households
7.1 Introduction
Households are hubs for our social relationships. Within them, biological
and affinal kin, friends and neighbours eat, sleep and perpetuate their genes.
Households work together in communities on common enterprises such as
farming, herding and neighbourhood watches. The household in essence re-
flects our common willingness to cooperate with non-kin as well as kin.
This chapter will investigate the factors affecting cooperation between
households. I will use a real-world measure of cooperation—labouring on
farms—and a gift game, to understand the dynamics of cooperation in a multi-
ethnic population of rural farmers living in southwest China.
7.1.1 Networks of household cooperation
No human is an island; we live in groups composed, variably, of family and
non-kin. In many contexts, the household is a seemingly intuitive concept but
is difficult to define in practice (Randall et al. 2011). ‘Household’ here will re-
fer to a physical building, usually around a gated courtyard, in which multiple
generations of a single family live alongside livestock, sharing all food and re-
sources from their communal business, which is usually a farm. Occasionally
marriage partners join the household, but often only when there is an imbal-
ance in the sexes.
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Cooperation within a household is no surprise. The combination of higher
relatedness and the chance for repeated interactions sets up a context for re-
ciprocal cooperation with kin. However, cooperation between households is
commonly observed worldwide, despite relatedness being concentrated within
houses. Dispersal (e.g. through the exchange of marriage partners) increases
the average relatedness between households, potentially nurturing a context
for cooperation through kin selection (Wu et al. 2015). This can in turn lead to
the creation of reciprocal helping between non-relatives in these households.
In addition to bolstering reciprocal relationships, individuals might choose to
help others in order to signal their quality as a potential mate. Where parents
and affinal kin do not live with all their offspring, different households may
share reproductive interests and so helping may act as a form of parental or
grandparental investment.
Households cooperate in many ways, from farming, hunting and sharing
food, through to policing their communities and arranging marriages. Recip-
rocal relationships between households might mitigate the risks of living in
variable environments, for example, if crops fail in bad years. Labour invest-
ment, such as through working on the farms of other households, might help
create economies of scale, where investment costs are reduced while output
increases (Næss 2012).
Sharing food is a particularly well-studied form of cooperation and the
factors that affect sharing vary from place to place. Among north Siberian
reindeer herders, kinship was the strongest predictor of food-sharing between
households of nuclear families (Ziker & Schnegg 2005). A combination of re-
latedness, geographical proximity and an index of association measuring the
time members of households spend together explained food sharing among
horticulturalists in Nicaragua (Koster & Leckie 2014), although non-kin re-
lations were more important for horticulturalists in Venezuela (Koster et al.
2015). Reciprocity also explains food transfers among Ache people, more so
than kin selection (Allen-Arave et al. 2008). A meta-analysis of food sharing
across human and non-human primates found that reciprocity had a relatively
(although not statistically significantly) stronger effect than kinship (Jaeggi &
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Gurven 2013).
Non-kin relations are also important in domains beyond food sharing.
Membership of a cooperative herding group was the strongest predictor of
gift-giving among Saami pastoralists in Norway (Thomas et al. 2015; see Chap-
ter 4), although close kin were also important. Similarly, lineage membership
explained cooperative hunting alliances for whale hunters in Indonesia, more
so than relatedness (Alvard 2003).
7.1.2 Predictions
Mosuo people, the focus of this chapter, do not traditionally reckon kinship
through the patriline (Cai 2001; Shih 2009). Matrilineal kin are also likely to be
seen working on each other’s farms (Wu et al., 2013). Therefore I predict pa-
trilineal relationships to be less important compared to matrilineal relatedness
in explaining occurrences of help on other households’ farms. Although kin-
ship is not reckoned through the patriline and men tend not to live with their
offspring, fathers do invest with direct care and money (Mattison et al. 2014).
Therefore, I expect a household will be more likely to work on another’s farm
when members of the former have children living in the latter.
The unique form of marriage institution found in the study population
(see Chapter 6) can forge cooperative bonds between households (Shih 2009).
Thus I predict that the presence of partners in another household will be as-
sociated with labouring on their farm. Wu et al. (2013) found that duolocal
females worked on their natal farms as well as farms belonging to matrilin-
eal kin, while males preferred to help on their natal households’ farms as their
number of communally breeding sisters increased. In this chapter I will anal-
yse cooperation on the household level, so the labour patterns of individual
females and males will be aggregated; however, I will include matrilineal kin
and numbers of reproductive-age females as predictors.
Following previous studies of household cooperation (e.g. Koster & Leckie
2014; Koster et al. 2015), I also expect help to be more likely on the farms of
closer neighbours compared to more distant households. According to Shih
(2009: 208): “the prosperity of a [Mosuo] household was usually a function
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of its size.” Land was allocated to households on the basis of household size
shortly after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. There-
fore, larger households and those identified as wealthier will be more likely to
receive help on their farms.
I analyse behaviour in a gift game to gain insights into the relationships
between households; participants could give gifts to specific others of their
choosing (see section 6.3). Therefore, I predict that gifts will preferentially be
given to households in which the giver’s partners or children reside, and thus
will be associated with patterns of labour on other households’ farms, where
affinal links exist.
7.2 Methods
7.2.1 Data preparation
Relatedness between each pair of individuals was calculated from the pedigree
data using a modified version of PyPedal (Cole 2012). Relatedness between
households was calculated as the mean relatedness between each pair of indi-
viduals in the ego and alter households (Allen-Arave et al. 2008; Hames 1987;
Koster & Leckie 2014). Matrilineal and patrilineal kinship was calculated as
the coefficient of relatedness between one individual to the mother and father
(respectively) of another. Means were calculated for matrilineal and patrilin-
eal relatedness, in the same manner as mean between-household relatedness.
The numbers of co-resident reproductive-aged females was calculated for each
household.
Distance in kilometres between households within the same village was
calculated from the longitude and latitude GPS coordinates. Household size
was calculated as the total number of people living there at the time of the
census. The three seasons of farm observations were aggregated by household.
Relative wealth ranking was calculated by subtracting ego’s rank from alter’s;
positive relative rank means the household receiving help was ranked lower
than the helping house (i.e. alter’s wealth rank number > ego’s rank). Larger
differences in rank indicate greater wealth disparity.
Household dyads were limited to include only those headed by Mosuo
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people. Binary predictors were coded as 1 for each household dyad if any
member of one household:
• was ever observed helping on the farm of another household
• ever gave a gift to any member of another household
• had any children (of any age) in another household
• had a partner in another household
7.2.2 Statistical analysis
As in many human societies, I expect cooperation to be variable and facultative,
with no single ‘silver bullet’ neatly predicting interactions. Thus, I will use a
model selection and model averaging approach (see section 2.2.1) to examine
which factors predict farm work and estimate their relative importance within
the best-fitting model via standardisation of predictors.
I used quadratic assignment procedure (QAP) to calculate correlation co-
efficients between the farm labour and gift game networks. QAP controls for
social network structure because dyads are not independent (Krackhardt 1988;
see section 2.2.2.2). I also calculated asssortativity coefficients to measure the
correlation between pairs of connected nodes on variables of interest (Newman
2002). I calculated whether households within the farm-work and gift networks
assort on the amount of help or gifts they received (in-degree).
Generalised estimating equations (GEEs) were fitted to investigate which
household dyadic covariates predicted whether any residents of ego ever
worked on an alter household’s farm. In order to allow comparison of co-
efficients within models, I standardised continuous parameter estimates over
2 standard deviations and mean-centred binary estimates (see section 2.2.3).
Note that all reported coefficients are standardised log odds unless otherwise
stated. To select the best models, I compared the quasi-likelihood under the
independence model information criteria (Pan 2001).
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Table 7.1: Attributes for networks of observed work on other households’ farms in
each of the five study villages. Here, n is the number of household dyads
observed helping one another rather than the total number of instances of
help observed. See Table 6.2 for the number of households in each village.
‘Assortativity’ refers to assortativity on in-degree.
Village ID n Clusters Reciprocity Density Transitivity Assortativity
A 29 91 0.000 0.002 0.000 -0.320
B 78 55 0.205 0.005 0.106 -0.146
C 132 34 0.258 0.008 0.146 -0.086
D 154 117 0.078 0.002 0.065 -0.058
E 165 48 0.194 0.007 0.165 -0.082
7.3 Results
I limited the analyses to Mosuo and Han people living in households whose
heads were ethnically Mosuo. See section 6.4 for a description of individual
and household demographics in the sample.
7.3.1 Working on farms
A total of 952 Mosuo and Han people from 565 (out of 780) households were
observed working on the farms of 310 other households over three seasons.
Assortativity in networks indicates a bias whereby households connect to
other households with similar properties. The assortativity on in-degree was
negative in all villages, suggesting households receiving a lot of help them-
selves tended not to help others that received a lot of help, but rather helped
households with lower in-degrees, if they helped anyone (Table 7.1). The neg-
ative assortativity coefficients were particularly strong in villages A and B. In
village A, for example, three households had an in-degree of 10 (i.e. received
help from members of 10 other households), did not help other households,
and received all their help from households who were not helped themselves
(in-degree = 0).
Across all villages, there were 345 clusters. Reciprocity was 0.168, tran-
sitivity was 0.113 and the network’s density was 0.001. There was a slight
disassortment on help received (assortativity on in-degree = -0.098); the small
negative coefficient suggests that households receiving more help (higher in-
degree) slightly preferred helping other households that, overall, received less
help (lower in-degree).
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Table 7.2: Social network attributes for the gift game, split by village. ‘Assortativity’
refers to assortativity on in-degree.
Village ID n gifts Clusters Reciprocity Density Transitivity Assortativity
A 84 59 0.262 0.006 0.263 0.340
B 90 53 0.311 0.006 0.262 0.015
C 58 82 0.207 0.003 0.044 0.068
D 116 156 0.276 0.002 0.084 0.231
E 138 66 0.217 0.006 0.132 0.211
7.3.2 Gift games
Residents of 285 Mosuo-headed households took part in a gift game, giving a
total of 522 gifts to people in 319 other households. Most households (87.4%)
received one gift from another household, although 24 households received
two gifts from a single household and 6 households received three gifts. See
Figure 8.5 in the next chapter for gift networks.
Across all villages, there were 416 clusters. Reciprocity was 0.255, transitiv-
ity was 0.153 and the network’s density was 0.001. Assortativity on in-degree
was 0.222, suggesting that households who gave more gifts also received more
gifts. Table 7.2 shows the social network attributes for each village.
7.3.3 Cooperation between households
Correlations between the gift game and observed farm work were in the range
0.052− 0.174 (Table 7.3). The presence of partners in another household was
positively correlated with gift-giving in all villages (range 0.029−0.098). Pres-
ence of children in other households was negatively (albeit weakly) correlated
with gifts in villages B and C, but positively correlated in the other three vil-
lages. The presence of partners and children in other households was positively
correlated with observations of help on those household’s farms as well with
gift-giving. As expected, the partners and children networks were positively
correlated with one another. Overall, the presence of children (of any age) liv-
ing in a household were most strongly correlated with instances of help and
gift giving.
I fitted GEE regressions to analyse which factors best predicted observa-
tions of working on other households’ farms (n= 55,780 dyads, including only
complete cases from 507 households). The response variable was whether
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Table 7.3: Pearsons’ correlation coefficients between adjacency matrices for gifts, ob-
served instances of working on another household’s farm, partners living
in other households and children (of any age) living in other households.
All matrices were split into within-village household dyads and all house-
holds were included regardless of whether or not they participated in the
gift game or were observed to have worked on farms. Coefficients were
calculated using quadratic assignment procedure (QAP) to control for the
non-independence of ego and alter households within social networks.
Gift Help Partner Gift Help Partner
Village A Village B
Help 0.078 – – 0.066 – –
Partner 0.093 0.080 – 0.029 0.156 –
Children 0.195 0.097 0.347 0.096 0.212 0.585
Village C Village D
Help 0.052 – – 0.073 – –
Partner 0.035 0.185 – 0.076 0.182 –
Children 0.045 0.201 0.497 0.117 0.144 0.514
Village E
Help 0.174 – –
Partner 0.098 0.158 –
Children 0.232 0.159 0.275
or not any member of the ego household was observed working on the alter
household’s farm. Table 7.4 shows the unconditional averaged estimates from
the best-fitting models where ∆QIC < 2 (see Table 7.5 for the full set of can-
didate models). For ease of comparison between effect sizes, I will discuss
standardised odds ratios with 95% confidence intervals.
By far the strongest predictor of helping on another household’s farm
was the presence of male partners (‘husbands’) in that household (Odds ra-
tio [OR] = 7.423, 95% CI [4.033,13.663]; Table 7.4). The next strongest pre-
dictor was the presence of female partners (‘wives’) in the landowning house
(OR = 5.429, 95% CI [2.035,14.479]).
Households more closely related were more likely to work on each other’s
farms (OR = 2.822, 95% CI [2.497,3.19]). Help was given to closer neighbours
(i.e. distance had a strong negative effect: OR = 0.293, 95% CI [0.162,0.529]).
The interaction between distance and relatedness had a positive effect (OR =
1.528, 95% CI [1.226,1.906]), meaning the people were willing to travel further
to help a highly related household.
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Households were more likely to help one another if children (of any
age, not just < 15 years) sired by any member of one household resided in
the other (OR = 4.689, 95% CI [1.227,17.917]). However, the negative in-
teraction between child presence and mean between-household relatedness
(OR = 0.624, 95% CI [0.481,0.81]) suggests that help was less likely as related-
ness increased when children lived in the landowning households (Figure 7.1).
Therefore, farm labour might act as a form of parental investment when chil-
dren do not live with other people who are related to the helper(s).
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Figure 7.1: Predicted probability of observed farm work as a function of relatedness
when members of a potentially helping household have children living in
the landowning household (red line) or not (black line). See Table 7.4 for
parameter estimates.
Matrilineal and patrilineal relatedness did not appear in the best-fitting
models. Comparing the subset of models containing only predictors for relat-
edness, matrilineal relatedness provided a better fit to the observed data com-
pared to patrilineal relatedness (Table 7.6), as expected, due to the emphasis
traditionally placed on matrilines in this population.
In addition, larger households were more likely to receive help (OR =
1.584, 95% CI [1.237,2.028]) and give help (OR = 1.557, 95% CI [1.211,2.001]).
Differences in the wealth ranks of the two households were not associated with
instances of help.
Gift-giving appeared in the best-fitting models, suggesting it was an im-
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Table 7.4: Model-averaged parameter estimates for the best-fitting GEE predicting
whether instances of farm working were observed on behalf of other house-
holds. Ego refers to the household providing help; alter is the landowning
household. Predictors are presented in descending order of absolute stan-
dardised effect size (column 3). See Table 7.5 for the full set of candidate
models.
Unstandardised Standardised
Parameter log odds (S.E.) log odds (S.E.)
(Intercept) -6.565 (0.275) -6.092 (0.104)
Any husbands in alter? 2.005 (0.311) 2.005 (0.311)
Any wives in alter? 1.692 (0.501) 1.692 (0.501)
Any children in alter? 1.587 (0.694) 1.545 (0.684)
Distance (km) -0.696 (0.168) -1.228 (0.302)
r 24.29 (1.623) 1.038 (0.063)
Any children in alter? ×r -14.84 (4.191) -0.471 (0.133)
Size of landowner household (alter) 0.083 (0.023) 0.46 (0.126)
Size of helper household (ego) 0.079 (0.023) 0.443 (0.128)
Distance ×r 7.344 (1.949) 0.424 (0.113)
Relative wealth rank -0.058 (0.033) -0.245 (0.138)
Gift given from ego to alter? 0.137 (0.273) 0.137 (0.273)
portant predictor of farm help, although it had a small, imprecise effect size
(OR= 1.147, 95% CI [0.672,1.957]). The number of reproductive-age females in
helper and landowning households did not appear in the best models.
7.3.4 Close neighbours, relatedness and child presence predict
gifts
I re-ran the GEE analysis with a similar set of candidate models but with the
response variable as whether or not a gift was given from anybody in the ego
household to anyone in the alter household. In the average over the best-fitting
models where ∆QIC < 2 (Table 7.7; see Table 7.8 for the full set of candidate
models), by far the strongest predictor of a gift given between households was
geographical proximity (i.e. spatially nearer neighbours were more likely to
receive gifts; odds ratio [OR] = 0.007, 95% CI [0.001,0.034]).
Relatedness was also important in gift-giving: closer relatives were more
likely to receive gifts (OR = 3.646, 95% CI [3.108,4.28]) even if they lived
further away (Distance ×r; OR = 2.46, 95% CI [1.761,3.44]). More people
in the household receiving gifts also increased the likelihood of gift-giving
(OR = 1.442, 95% CI [1.06,1.96]).
Children present in the household receiving gifts led to more instances of
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Table 7.5: Full set of candidate models predicting labour investment on farms from
one household (ego) to another (alter). The averaged best models (∆QIC <
2, highlighted in bold below) are detailed in Table 7.4. The control model
includes: distance between households + relative wealth rank of the two
households + no. people in ego + no. people in alter. ‘Partners’ refers to
whether or not any members of ego have a ‘husband’ or ‘wife’ living in
alter. Similarly, ‘Children’ refers to whether or not any members of ego have
children (of any age) living in alter. ‘No. reproductive females’ refers to total
numbers of females aged between 15 and 50 years living in ego and in alter
at the time of the census. ‘Gift’ refers to whether or not any member of the
ego household gave a gift to any member of the alter household.
Model qLik ∆QIC
Control + Partners + Children + r×Distance + r× Children -1255 0.00
Control + Gift + Partners + Children + r×Distance + r× Children -1254 1.33
Control + Partners + Children + r× Distance -1262.39 12.66
Control + Gift + Partners + Children + r× Distance -1261.38 14.17
Control + Partners + r× Distance -1265.77 16.08
Control + Gift + Partners + r× Distance -1264.67 17.36
Control + Partners + Children + r× Distance + No. reproductive females -1262.20 17.58
Control + Gift + Partners + Children + r× Distance + No. reproductive females -1261.17 18.99
Control + r× Distance -1315.97 111.98
Control + Gift + r× Distance -1315.15 113.92
Control + r -1333.22 141.56
Control + Gift + r -1332.85 145.04
Control + Gift + Partners + Children -1413.73 310.45
Control + Gift + Matrilineal r -1419.47 317.28
Control + Matrilineal r -1423.29 320.35
Control + Partners + Children -1436.67 351.52
Control + Gift + Patrilineal r -1453.79 384.79
Control + Gift + Children -1460.03 394.98
Control + Patrilineal r -1474.47 421.67
Control + Children -1481.08 433.01
Control + Gift -1534.49 538.62
Control + Gift + No. reproductive females -1534.31 542.34
Control model -1581.77 630.20
Control + No. reproductive females -1581.66 633.64
Null model -1639.09 736.51
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Table 7.6: Subset of candidate models predicting observed farm work (see Table 7.5)
containing only terms for relatedness in order to rank the importance of each
relatedness predictor. Mean relatedness between households (top row) best
predicts helping on farms. The model containing matrilineal relatedness
outranks the model containing patrilineal relatedness. The control model
includes: distance between households + relative wealth rank of the two
households + no. people in ego + no. people in alter.
Model qLik ∆QIC
Control + r -1333.22 0.00
Control + Matrilineal r -1423.29 178.79
Control + Patrilineal r -1474.47 280.10
Control + Children -1481.08 291.45
Control model -1581.77 488.64
Null model -1639.09 594.95
Table 7.7: Model-averaged parameter estimates for the best-fitting GEE model predict-
ing whether gifts were given from one household (ego) to another (alter).
Estimates are sorted in descending order of absolute standardised log odds.
Unstandardised Standardised
Parameter log odds (S.E.) log odds (S.E.)
(Intercept) -5.509 (0.364) -7.703 (0.357)
Distance (km) -2.785 (0.454) -4.989 (0.813)
Any children in alter? 1.817 (0.661) 1.779 (0.652)
r 22.841 (1.716) 1.294 (0.082)
Distance ×r 15.585 (2.956) 0.9 (0.171)
Any children in alter? ×r -13.43 (3.859) -0.426 (0.123)
Size of recipient household (alter) 0.066 (0.028) 0.366 (0.157)
Any wives in alter? 0.361 (0.528) 0.361 (0.528)
Size of giving household (ego) 0.059 (0.033) 0.326 (0.186)
Relative wealth rank 0.062 (0.045) 0.26 (0.188)
Ego helped on alter’s farm? 0.226 (0.341) 0.226 (0.341)
Any husbands in alter? -0.044 (0.562) -0.044 (0.562)
gift-giving (OR = 5.924, 95% CI [1.652,21.2]). As with farm labour, there was
a negative interaction between child presence and between-household related-
ness (OR= 0.653, 95% CI [0.514,0.83]), suggesting that people preferred giving
gifts to households in which their children did not live with other relatives of
the giver.
Observations of help on the recipient households’ farms appeared in the
best-fitting models but the effect size was weak and imprecise; similarly, gifts
were not given preferentially to wealthier or poorer households. Predictors for
the presence of wives or husbands in the household potentially receiving gifts
also appeared in the best-fitting models but did not have any inferential power.
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Table 7.8: Full set of candidate models predicting gifts given from one household (ego)
to another (alter). The best models (∆QIC< 2, highlighted in bold below) are
detailed in Table 7.7. The control model includes: distance between house-
holds + relative wealth rank of the two households + no. people in ego + no.
people in alter. ‘Partners’ refers to whether or not any members of ego have
a ‘husband’ or ‘wife’ living in alter. Similarly, ‘Children’ refers to whether or
not any members of ego have children (of any age) living in alter. ‘No. re-
productive females’ refers to total numbers of females aged between 15 and
50 years living in ego and in alter at the time of the census. ‘Help’ refers to
whether or not any members of the ego household were observed helping
on the alter household’s farm.
Model qLik ∆QIC
Control + Partners + Children + r×Distance + r× Children -972.00 0.00
Control + Help + Partners + Children + r×Distance + r× Children -970.00 0.94
Control + r× Distance -983.41 3.64
Control + Help + r x Distance -980.64 4.05
Control + Partners + Children + r× Distance -977.65 5.61
Control + Partners + Children + r× Distance + No. reproductive females -975.93 5.84
Control + Partners + r× Distance -978.71 6.16
Control + Help + Partners + r× Distance -976.39 7.69
Control + Help + Partners + Children + r× Distance -975.52 7.91
Control + Help + Partners + Children + r× Distance + No. reproductive females -973.66 8.59
Control + r -1002.58 50.18
Control + Help + r -999.99 53.57
Control + Help + Matrilineal r -1054.43 160.93
Control + Matrilineal r -1063.00 166.28
Control + Help + Patrilineal r -1145.61 337.82
Control + Help + Partners + Children -1151.83 358.13
Control + Help + Children -1154.89 358.99
Control + Patrilineal r -1165.11 363.20
Control + Partners + Children -1174.16 394.21
Control + Children -1176.68 395.34
Control + Help + No. reproductive females -1212.00 470.57
Control + Help -1214.45 471.13
Control + No. reproductive females -1254.55 540.65
Control model -1256.65 544.10
Null model -1409.94 850.75
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7.4 Discussion
The strongest predictor of cooperation between households in the best-fitting
model was whether or not anyone in the helping household had a male part-
ner (‘husband’) in the landowning household (Table 7.4); the presence of a fe-
male partner (‘wife’) also predicted help, although it had a smaller effect. De-
spite this, very few gifts were given by males directly to their partners and
no gifts were given to partners by females. Therefore, although conjugal re-
lations were not necessarily important predictors of help on an individual-to-
individual scale, they might forge links between households. Affinal networks
may be important sources of cooperation between women in Mosuo house-
holds, as observed ethnographically (Shih 2009). These patterns suggest that
individuals might be seeking to invest in their partners when neither resides in
the same household.
The presence of children (of any age, not just those younger than 15 years)
in one household belonging to members of another was associated with a
higher likelihood of helping on the farm where the children reside (Table 7.4),
but only when the child did not live with other relatives of the parent (Fig-
ure 7.1). Only 7.1% of males who were observed working on the farms of other
households did so where their children lived in those households. These re-
sults seem at odds with evidence that Mosuo fathers living in the agricultural
areas on the other side of Lugu Lake had a positive effect on their children’s
educational attainment and decreased their age at first reproduction (Mattison
et al. 2014). However, Mattison et al. (2014) found that fathers residing with
their children were important, while I focussed solely on between-household
cooperation when children lived elsewhere. Farm labour might only function
as a form of paternal investment in this population when children live with
fewer other relatives.
Households were more likely to help on other farms as between-household
relatedness increased; geographically closer neighbours tended to be more re-
lated (Figure 6.3) and received more help (Table 7.4). Households located fur-
ther away were less likely to receive help. Mean relatedness within households
was r = 0.354, an order of magnitude higher than household relatedness re-
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ported in other studies. For example, mean r = 0.06 among horticulturalists
living in Venezuela (Koster et al. 2015) and r = 0.03 among horticulturalists in
Nicaragua (Koster 2011), while r = 0.02 within Ache households (Allen-Arave
et al. 2008). Larger Mosuo households were more likely to receive and give
help. Although larger households were slightly wealthier, the difference in
wealth rank between pairs of households did not predict labour investment.
Relatedness through the matriline or patriline was not important com-
pared to mean relatedness between households and did not appear in the best-
fitting models (Tables 7.5 and 7.6); this is most likely because matrilineal re-
latedness tends to cluster within Mosuo households, while patrilines are not
traditionally important in this area (Cai 2001; Shih 2009; Wu et al. 2013). Matri-
lineal relatedness was a better predictor of farm help compared to patrilineal
relatedness (Table 7.6). Wu et al. (2013) found that Mosuo women helped on the
farms of households to whom they were related through the matriline; in this
chapter (using the same dataset), I found that when farm help was aggregated
at the household level, this sex-specific pattern did not hold.
Gifts were given to geographically closer neighbours and to closer relatives
(Table 7.7). The presence of conjugal partners had no effect on gift-giving. Peo-
ple gave gifts to households where their children resided but not when those
children lived with other relatives. Thus, gift-giving may have been considered
a form of parental investment in cases where children might receive less pro-
visioning from other relatives since the smallest gift (5 yuan) was equivalent
to, at most, ∼8% of a day’s unskilled labour (60− 80 yuan in 2014), while the
largest gift (15 yuan) formed at most 25% of daily wages.
Observations of help on another household’s farm did not predict gift giv-
ing between households, although it did appear as a predictor in the best-fitting
models. Similarly, the odds of working on other households’ farms did not
increase when members of the helping house also gave gifts; although the pa-
rameter estimate appeared in the best-fitting model, its effect was statistically
indistinguishable from zero (Table 7.4). The gift game did not strongly correlate
with farm work either (Table 7.3).
These results suggest that although gift games are useful tools for investi-
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gating social relationships (Apicella et al. 2012; Chaudhary et al. 2015; Thomas
et al. 2015; Chapter 4), gift relationships in this case provided only equivocal
insights into the patterns of labour investment. Given that real-world coop-
eration heavily depends on context (Gerkey 2013), researchers should design
experimental games with this in mind and attempt to make games reflect par-
ticular salient forms of cooperation rather than study ‘generic’ cooperativeness.
I will discuss these issues further in Chapter 9.
It is hard to make causal claims from observational data and disentan-
gle cases where household members fulfil multiple roles, e.g. being related
on average yet also having partners and children present in other locations.
Through mean-centering and standardising regression coefficients (Gelman
2008; Schielzeth 2010), I was able to contrast effect sizes within the best-fitting
models (Table 7.4 and Table 7.7). The strongest predictors of observed farm
labour were the presence of marital partners and/or children of someone in
the helping household residing in the household being helped (predominantly
‘husbands’) and closer spatial proximity to the households providing help.
These results match studies of food sharing networks, which similarly found
that proximity, genealogical relatedness and affinal links were predictors of co-
operative behaviour (Koster & Leckie 2014; Koster et al. 2015).
7.5 Conclusion
I have shown that households are more likely to cooperate through labouring
on one another’s farms when there are genetic and/or affinal links between
the households, as well as when the households are geographically closer to
one another. Links between households due to the presence of partners were
the strongest predictors of farm work. This reflects and quantifies ethnographic
observations from Mosuo villages whereby affinal associations between house-
holds promote cooperation (Shih 2009).
The traditional Mosuo lifestyle has been and continues to change with in-
creased tourism, media attention and shifting economic opportunities (Matti-
son 2010). Households in the study area help one another by investing labour
into each other’s farms. This chapter has shown that relatedness, shared repro-
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ductive interests and affinal kinship are important predictors for this form of
cooperation. It remains to be seen whether these evolutionarily salient factors
continue to be important as Mosuo culture transitions.
Chapter 8
People accused of witchcraft are
isolated but not helpless in Mosuo
communities
8.1 Introduction
Cooperation that is based on reputation seems fundamentally important to hu-
man social dynamics (Roberts 2015a). As with all social behaviour, in order
for reputation-based cooperation to evolve, the helpful individual must be in-
creasing their lifetime inclusive fitness (West et al. 2007b). Indirect reciprocity
explains cooperation in cases where individuals might not necessarily be re-
lated or have direct experience of interacting with one another; rather, coop-
eration becomes contingent upon the reputations of others, which in turn are
affected by their own past social behaviours (Nowak 2012a).
Field studies of reputation-based cooperation tend to focus on the impor-
tance of building a good reputation in order to accrue benefits or gain access to
cooperative partners (Alvard & Gillespie 2004; Lyle & Smith 2014; Price 2006;
Sylwester & Roberts 2013). In this chapter, I focus on the opposite situation
to investigate whether having a poor reputation negatively affects cooperative
interactions and has detrimental effects on reproductive success.
While much existing work—including the previous three chapters of this
thesis—focusses on the positive side of cooperation, a large body of literature
exists detailing how mechanisms such as punishment can also promote coop-
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eration. Punishment can either be direct and costly to the punisher, or indirect
and costless (Raihani et al. 2012). Indirect punishment (also known as sanction-
ing) is a key assumption of indirect reciprocity (Balafoutas et al. 2014; Nowak
& Sigmund 1998; Panchanathan & Boyd 2003); an example would be refusing
to help people with bad reputations.
Theoretical and field studies suggest that indirect punishment—costless
punishment such as the withholding of help or rewards—is preferable to di-
rect, costly punishment as a means of maintaining cooperation via indirect
reciprocity (Balafoutas et al. 2014; Ohtsuki et al. 2009). For populations who
rely on agriculture, help with farming can provide very real boons to survival
and reproduction (see previous chapter). On the other hand, withholding help
might have long-term repercussions, leading to harmful effects on fitness for
people held in poor standing.
Publicity is the key to reputation systems, both in terms of public be-
haviours (e.g. conspicuously helping) and public knowledge (e.g. of who to
trust). Reputation systems require image scoring, some form of coordination
(everyone must agree, to an extent, on what constitutes a good or bad repu-
tation), and social networks through which reputations become known. Such
systems can also lead to reputation-based exclusion: the selective admission of
co-operators into beneficial interactions alongside the isolation of others.
Reputations change and spread based on direct observation of social inter-
actions as well as the communication of information about individuals (Som-
merfeld et al. 2007). Up to 70% of conversation time relates to social matters,
at least in Western samples, although a smaller proportion of chat tends to be
about absent third-parties, and negative gossip forms a smaller proportion still:
14% of conversation time according to estimates from one workplace (Foster
2004).
Gossip networks can spread information about the past behaviour of oth-
ers in order to protect against free-riders (Enquist & Leimar 1993). Gossip al-
lows the spread of reputations not just as a means of identifying others as good
or bad social partners but also potentially to advance the interests of the gos-
siper by painting others in a certain light, regardless of their actual behaviour
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(Paine 1967). As such, forms of negative gossip (e.g. slander, denigration,
ridicule, rumours) might also be dishonest signals because they further the
interest of the gossip-spreader to the detriment of the gossiped-about. This
creates a second-order (and beyond) problem of reputation, where individu-
als must take into account not only the gossip but also the reputation of the
gossiper.
While the mechanisms by which reputations spread and change, such as
gossip, are beyond the scope of this chapter, it is informative to bear in mind
the potentially self-interested reasons that somebody might try to damage the
reputation of another. Tarnishing or manipulating reputations can also act as
a mechanism for punishing individuals; for example, a Saami pastoralist with
a poor reputation might lose the help of others, who disassociate their herds
from his (Paine 1970; gendered pronoun intentional).
Reputations can also translate into reproductive success. For example, suc-
cessful Meriam turtle hunters in Australia had greater reproductive success
due to the reputational benefits of their prowess (Smith et al. 2003). In a Pe-
ruvian village, people and households with good reputations due to their con-
tributions to collective projects had larger support networks and better health
outcomes: important proxies of fitness (Lyle & Smith 2014). It follows that the
converse may be true: people with poor reputations may receive fewer benefits
(Price 2006), which in turn may negatively affect reproductive success.
In this chapter, I will investigate how a poor reputation—associated with
accusations of food poisoning—affects a household’s cooperative relationships
with others in their villages. I also analyse how living in a house shrouded by
this reputation affects the reproductive success of its residents. As such, I aim to
further our understanding of the consequences of poor esteem in a real-world
reputation system. The reputation system in question is based around taboos
and beliefs outside of what we in a Western scientific context would consider
‘natural’, and so shares commonalities with witchcraft. Thus I will begin with
an overview of witchcraft, as studied by anthropologists.
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8.1.1 Witchcraft in anthropology
Swanson (1960: 151) wrote that “witchcraft tends to be prevalent when people
must interact with one another on important matters in the absence of legiti-
mated controls and arrangements.” Accusing people of witchcraft could there-
fore function as a form of social sanctioning in places where no formal institu-
tions exist to act as third-party punishers. Witchcraft, then, can been seen as a
strategy of social exclusion or rejection (Douglas 1991), strongly linked to con-
flicts within communities (Levine 1982), emerging as a response to inequalities
in production (e.g. poor harvests) and reproduction (e.g. infertility). Further-
more, witchcraft can be a dynamic cultural trait, becoming dormant during
times of growth or lessened competition (Douglas 1970).
Witchcraft refers to a worldview, a system of knowledge and an entwined
set of social institutions involving not only witches (in the pejorative sense) but
that can also include healers (witchdoctors), diviners (who detect witches) and
witch-cleansers. Far from being a primitive or supernatural belief, witchcraft
regulates social relations, forms an agentive way of explaining cause and ef-
fect, and has been linked to economic reforms (Evans-Pritchard 1977; Geschiere
1997). As a ‘natural philosophy’, witchcraft can explain inequality in mis-
fortune: why a bad event befalls one person in particular but not all people
equally (Evans-Pritchard 1977). In some societies, witches are understood to
gain wealth at the expense of others losing material goods or even their lives;
magic, in an ’occult economy’, acts as a means of conjuring wealth without
production (Comaroff & Comaroff 1999).
Witchcraft is often embodied as a physical, heritable substance. Among
the Tibetan Nyinba, the most common pattern of inheritance is from mothers
to daughters (Levine 1982). Witches are often well known, even related, to the
people suffering misfortunes (Mesaki 2009). In a study of Ghanaian witchcraft,
(Bleek 1976) found that, of 71 witch accusations, 27 occurred between close
relatives (mothers, siblings, grandparents, uncles and aunts), while 40 were be-
tween more distant relatives and 4 between affines. The majority of accusations
(56) were cases of younger people accusing older people; 66 accusations were
directed at women (31 of which also came from women).
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Witchcraft accusations may be a way to air grievances as a form of ‘covert
aggression’ (Nash 1973) while still maintaining relationships. Accusations
might also sever social relations, allowing individuals to disassociate with un-
cooperative people, a mechanism that has been shown to promote cooperation
and increase individual payoffs (Wang et al. 2012). Accusations may also allow
for publicly sanctioned harm on particular groups of people. Older women
are vulnerable to accusations of witchcraft and their consequences, including
death, although a non-trivial number of men may also suffer the same fate
(Mesaki 2009).
The reputation system present among the Mosuo is similar to witchcraft in
the sense that a person’s poor standing is widely known in their community,
appears to be heritable, and involves notions of harm and taboo. Taking an
evolutionary perspective, I will analyse this Mosuo reputation system in terms
of its functional relationship to an individual’s inclusive fitness. I use an emic
definition of poor standing, as employed by the Mosuo (see section 8.2). This
chapter will therefore focus on the social outcomes of being held in poor regard
within one’s community and whether this reputation is associated with indi-
rect punishment in the form of withheld help during planting or harvesting
seasons, as well as lowered reproductive success.
8.1.2 Mosuo food taboos
People whose reputations are damaged through accusations of poisoning oth-
ers who eat in their houses are known as zhubo. For the Mosuo, these accusa-
tions cast a cloud over an entire household. Little is known ethnographically
about the beliefs and practices associated with the food taboos in the areas sur-
rounding Lugu Lake. Based on observations in the field (see section 6.3), zhubo
can marry one another as well as marry people from other ethnic groups. This
pattern of behaviour is similar to the qualms over food purity seen among Ti-
betan Nyinba (Levine 1982). However, Mosuo zhubo can labour on the farms
of zhubo and non-zhubo alike, receiving food in return. The presence of zhubo
seems to be tolerated within Mosuo villages. In other parts of the world, people
with similarly accursed reputations may be exiled or even killed. To the best of
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my knowledge, such practices do not occur around Lugu Lake.
8.1.3 Predictions
If accusations of poisoning function as a form of punishment, households con-
taining zhubo will receive less help on their farms as well as fewer gifts, es-
pecially from non-zhubo houses. Since there appears to be no taboo against
zhubo eating in non-zhubo households, I expect zhubo households to help all
households equally, regardless of reputation. If zhubo are marginalised within
villages, residents of non-zhubo households will rarely have partners or chil-
dren living in zhubo households. In cases where non-zhubo do have part-
ners/children in zhubo households, I predict members of the non-zhubo house-
hold will help on the zhubo farm.
People with ‘dangerous’ reputations need not be uncommon within a com-
munity, even where accusations leading to such a reputation act as a form of
punishment (Evans-Pritchard 1977). One might therefore expect those accused
of poisoning to interact preferentially with each other as a form of resilience
against sanctions that might otherwise harm their lifetime reproductive suc-
cess. Thus, I predict that members of zhubo households will cluster on coopera-
tive behaviours such as exchange of farm labour and gift-giving. I also predict
that where such clustering occurs, zhubo will not suffer a decrease in their fit-
ness compared to members of non-zhubo households.
If poor reputations negatively affect reproductive success (measured as
number of living children) or age at first birth, models containing a predictor
for zhubo will appear in the 95% confidence set of selected models (see sec-
tion 8.2.2 and Tables 8.1 and 8.2). I predict that zhubo and people living in
zhubo houses will have fewer children compared to non-zhubo and also experi-
ence later age at first birth. One possibility for escaping the detrimental effects
of poor reputations would be through neolocality (i.e. where both partners
have dispersed from their natal households). Therefore, I predict that people
in neolocal relationships who are zhubo will have higher reproductive success
compared to zhubo in other kinds of relationship.
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8.2 Methods
An informant identified households containing zhubo, some of which were cor-
roborated by behavioural observations of whether or not people would eat in
certain houses. To the best of my knowledge, household heads are the ones
identified as zhubo, although the accusation casts a shadow over all residents
of the household. A poor reputation, for the purposes of this chapter, is thus a
household-level phenomenon, except where applied to household heads.
8.2.1 Data preparation
8.2.1.1 Number of reproductive-age siblings
I counted each person’s number of brothers and sisters (aged≥ 15 years) living
in the same household. Siblings were defined as individuals related r ≥ 0.5
who shared at least one parent.
8.2.1.2 Number of children
For the purposes of household-level cooperation, measured as labour invest-
ment on farms (see previous chapter), the number of children belonging to
members of one household but living in another was calculated regardless of
age; ‘children’ might be adults in some cases.
8.2.1.3 Partnership types
For each person in the census, we know their natal household as well as where
they lived in 2012. If these two households differed, I flagged the person as
having dispersed. A couple’s partnership type was coded as ‘neolocal’ if both
partners had dispersed, ‘duolocal’ if neither dispersed, ‘patrilocal’ if only the
female dispersed, or ‘matrilocal’ if only the male dispersed; people not in rela-
tionships at the time of the census were coded as ‘single’.
8.2.2 Statistical analysis
Analyses of reproductive success were limited to Mosuo people (because they
believe in zhubo), whereas all other analyses were conducted on all Mosuo and
Han people. I used Poisson regressions to analyse the relationship between
reputation and reproductive success, measured as number of living children,
and Cox regressions to determine the effect of being known as a zhubo on age
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Table 8.1: Full set of candidate models for estimating number of living children for
Mosuo females and males. Control includes age + age2 + no. adult sisters
+ no. adult brothers + age × no. brothers + age × no. sisters + years of
education + income from tourism in 2012 (yes/no) + no. livestock in 2012.
‘Partnership type’ refers to people living neolocally with a partner (i.e. both
dispersed from their natal households), in a duolocal relationship (i.e. nei-
ther dispersed), or people not in relationships (the reference category).
Candidate models
Null model
Control
Control + Zhubo
Control + Partnership type
Control + Partnership type + Zhubo
Control + Partnership type × Zhubo
Table 8.2: Full set of candidate models for estimating age at first birth for Mosuo fe-
males and males. Control includes age cohort (categorical variable with
three levels: born before 1941, between 1941 and 1972, and born after 1972)
+ no. adult sisters + no. adult brothers + years of education + income from
tourism in 2012 (yes/no) + no. livestock in 2012.
Candidate models
Null
Control
Control + Zhubo
at first birth. For both analyses, I used a model selection approach on sets
of a priori candidate models (Tables 8.1 and 8.2) fitted separately for Mosuo
females and males; both samples contained adults aged 15 years or older. Note
that I fitted single-level models since a multilevel null model accounted for a
statistically insignificant amount of variance at the household level compared
to a one-level null model (likelihood ratio test, χ21  0.001, p≈ 1).
I used Zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) regressions to model how being known
as a zhubo house affected the instances of help observed on a household’s farm
and the number of gifts received from other households (both measures of in-
degree). ZIP models account for overdispersion—in this case, an ‘excessive’
number of households with in-degree of zero—by assuming there are two
‘types’ of household: households whose in-degree is generated by a Poisson
process, and households with a zero probability of having in-degree > 0 (i.e.
households for which no farm work was observed due to the random sam-
pling of households). ZIP models thus estimate a Poisson model for the count
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Table 8.3: Candidate set of models for estimating the number of observations of farm
labour and gifts received for each household (both measures of in-degree).
Control model includes household size + wealth rank + sex of household
head + dummy variables for villages.
Candidate models
Null
Control
Control + Zhubo
data alongside a logistic regression predicting the log odds that a household
had in-degree = 0; both are interpreted in the standard manner.
The ZIP models controlled for household size, wealth rank and sex of the
household head, and included village as a dummy variable (Table 8.3). This
analysis did not include village A because the fewest farm observations were
made there and none included helping on zhubo farms – most likely due to
chance rather than prejudice. This left n= 660 households.
I used ‘join count’ statistics to examine whether or not zhubo houses were
physically clustered in the study villages. Join counts test the extent to which
the occurrence of zhubo households at spatially adjacent locations was due to
chance (Fortin & Dale 2005). In cases where there were more observations of
zhubo/non-zhubo ‘joins’ than expected, there was negative spatial autocorrela-
tion, meaning that zhubo households were dispersed throughout their villages.
Where there was positive spatial autocorrelation, zhubo households clustered
together. If the test statistic was not statistically significant then zhubo house-
holds were randomly distributed within villages (no spatial autocorrelation).
8.3 Results
As in Chapter 7, I limited analyses to Han and Mosuo people living in house-
holds headed by Mosuo people. 107 of the 780 households (13.7%) in the sam-
ple were identified as being home to zhubo.
8.3.1 Household composition
Zhubo and non-zhubo households did not differ in age or sex composition (Fig-
ure 8.1; note that the sample contained people for whom I do not know age,
sex or whether or not zhubo reside in their homes). There were no significant
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differences in the numbers of Han and Mosuo people in zhubo and non-zhubo
houses. In total, 64 females and 43 males (all Mosuo) were heads of zhubo
households, compared to 307 females and 363 males heading non-zhubo house-
holds. Among the household heads, older women were not more liable to be
accused of being zhubo (Table 8.4).
Proportionally, 39.3% of zhubo households were in the top two wealth
ranks, compared to 31.9% of non-zhubo households. While 15.3% of non-zhubo
households were ranked least wealthy, only 3.7% of zhubo households fell into
this bracket. Overall, zhubo houses were ranked towards the wealthier end of
the community (Figure 8.2).
Zhubo: No Zhubo: Yes
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Figure 8.1: Household composition for households containing zhubo (right panel) or
not (left panel). Bars show the mean number of females (green) and males
(yellow) in each type of house, categorised by age. Child refers to people
aged < 15, ‘adult’ means aged 15 to 50 and ‘elder’ is 50 or older.
8.3.2 Partners, children and post-marital residence of zhubo
Table 8.5 and Figure 8.5 show links between households (containing zhubo or
not) where members of one had a partner or a child (aged < 15 years) in an-
other household. Fifteen non-zhubo households had partners living in zhubo
households (Table 8.5a). Only one of these non-zhubo households gave gifts to
two different zhubo houses; members of this same non-zhubo house were also
observed working on the farms of the two zhubo households. One other house-
hold was observed helping on the farm of a zhubo household (giving a total of
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Figure 8.2: Wealth rankings of zhubo (yellow) and non-zhubo (green) households. Bars
show the proportions of households in each rank compared to the total
numbers of zhubo and non-zhubo households.
Table 8.4: Demographics of Mosuo household heads and all people in the sample, split
by sex and whether or not they are zhubo.
Age Age at first birth
Sex Zhubo? n (mean ± SD) (mean ± SD)
Household heads
♀ No 307 50.7 ± 12.1 21.8 ± 3.4♀ Yes 64 50.8 ± 12.4 22.3 ± 3.6♂ No 362 47.7 ± 12 25.8 ± 4.2♂ Yes 43 47.3 ± 10.8 25.7 ± 3.9
All Mosuo/Han people
♀ No 1,647 40.6 ± 17.8 22.4 ± 3.6♀ Yes 240 41 ± 17.2 22.6 ± 3.8♂ No 1,643 37.6 ± 15.9 26 ± 3.9♂ Yes 265 36.9 ± 15.3 26.1 ± 4
three instances where non-zhubo were observed helping zhubo when partners
were present in the zhubo households).
There were more non-zhubo/non-zhubo partnerships (n = 455) than ex-
pected (n= 432.3) under the null hypothesis that poor reputation has no effect
on marriage patterns (χ21 = 177.26, p 0.001). Similarly, there were also more
zhubo/zhubo partnerships (n = 26) than expected (n = 3.3), while there were
fewer zhubo/non-zhubo partnerships (n= 15) than expected (n= 37.7).
There were more cases of non-zhubo children living in non-zhubo house-
holds (n = 489; Table 8.5b) than expected (n = 450.8) and more zhubo children
living in zhubo households (n = 45) than expected (n = 6.8) under the null hy-
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Table 8.5: Counts of whether or not households containing zhubo (a) have partners liv-
ing in, or (b) have children living in other households containing zhubo (or
not). Note that ‘children’ refers to all offspring, regardless of age.
(a) Households containing partners
Non-zhubo house Zhubo house
Households with Non-zhubo house 455 15
partners elsewhere Zhubo house 15 26
(b) Households containing children
Non-zhubo house Zhubo house
Households with Non-zhubo house 489 24
children elsewhere Zhubo house 11 45
Table 8.6: Post-marital residence patterns of couples, partitioned by whether both, one
or neither are zhubo. Numbers are raw counts of observed couples; percent-
ages show proportions of residence strategies relative to the rest of that row
(e.g. 44.6% of all zhubo-zhubo couples were neolocal).
Neolocal Duolocal Matrilocal Patrilocal Row totals
Neither zhubo 295 (36.3%) 243 (29.9%) 115 (14.2%) 159 (19.6%) 812 (100%)
One zhubo, one not 5 (20.0%) 10 (40.0%) 5 (20.0%) 5 (20.0%) 25 (100%)
Both zhubo 50 (44.6%) 19 (17.0%) 23 (20.5%) 20 (17.9%) 112 (100%)
pothesis that poor reputation has no effect on child residence (χ21 = 264.31, p
0.001). There were fewer children of non-zhubo people living in zhubo houses
(n= 24) than expected (n= 62.2), as well as fewer children of zhubo people liv-
ing in non-zhubo housesholds (n= 11) than expected (n= 49.2).
Table 8.6 shows the numbers and proportions of post-marital residence
strategies for couples where one, both or neither of the partners lived in zhubo
houses. A greater proportion of zhubo-zhubo couples were neolocal compared
to the proportion of non-zhubo couples; the latter had more instances of duolo-
cality. Note that the higher proportion of patrilocal relationships described here
compared to earlier work (Wu et al. 2013) is due to defining relationship type as
a property of the couple, whereas previously it was a property of a household.
8.3.3 Reproductive success of zhubo
8.3.3.1 Age at first birth
The earliest ages at first birth were 16 years for female zhubo and 15 years for
female non-zhubo, 17 years for male zhubo and 15 years for male non-zhubo.
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Table 8.7: Hazard ratios [95% confidence intervals] predicting age at first birth esti-
mated from Cox regressions and averaged over the 95% confidence set of
models (Table 8.8). Models were fitted separately for all Mosuo females
(n= 1,667) and males (n= 1,691) aged 15 years and over.
Hazard ratio [95% CI]
Parameter Females Males
Zhubo
No 1 1
Yes 0.923 [0.781, 1.092] 0.973 [0.805, 1.176]
No. sisters 0.76 [0.688, 0.841] 0.939 [0.859, 1.027]
No. brothers 0.866 [0.808, 0.929] 0.895 [0.83, 0.964]
Education (years) 0.972 [0.95, 0.994] 1.001 [0.985, 1.017]
Tourist income 1.024 [0.91, 1.153] 1.063 [0.929, 1.216]
No. livestock 1.008 [1.001, 1.014] 0.998 [0.993, 1.004]
Cohort
Before 1941 1 1
1941 to 1972 1.915 [1.566, 2.341] 1.493 [1.117, 1.997]
After 1972 2.07 [1.657, 2.586] 1.605 [1.179, 2.185]
Table 8.4 summarises the ages at first birth for female and male zhubo and non-
zhubo.
To analyse whether an association with witchcraft was also associated with
delayed age at first reproduction, I fitted Cox regression models, accounting for
censored cases in which some individuals may not yet have given birth or may
never have reproduced. The sample was restricted to all Mosuo people aged
15 years or older (n= 1,667 females and 1,691 males); females and males were
analysed separately. Parameter estimates averaged over the 95% confidence set
of models are shown in Table 8.7, summaries of the models are in Table 8.8 and
the complete set of candidate models is presented in Table 8.2.
Poor reputation did not have an effect on age at first birth for females or
males (confidence intervals overlapped with zero; Table 8.7). The number of
co-resident adult sisters was associated with later age at first reproduction for
females (hazard ratio [HR] = 0.76) and but there was no discernible trend for
males. A larger number of adult brothers was also associated with later age at
first birth for females (HR = 0.866) and for males (HR = 0.895). Larger herd sizes
were linked to a slightly earlier age at first birth for females (HR = 1.008) but
not for males, while more time spent in education was associated with a later
age at first birth for females (HR = 0.972). In Figure 8.3, zhubo have a slightly
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Table 8.8: 95% confidence set of models for Cox regressions on age at first birth, in-
cluding number of parameters (K), differences in AICc relative to the mini-
mum in the set (∆AICc), Akaike weights (ωi) and the log-likelihood of each
model (LL). Control includes age cohort (categorical variable with three lev-
els: born before 1941, between 1941 and 1972, and born after 1972) + no.
adult sisters + no. adult brothers + years of education + income from tourism
in 2012 (yes/no) + no. livestock in 2012. Model-averaged estimates are
shown in Table 8.7.
Sample Models K ∆AICc ωi LL
♀ Control 7 0.00 0.64 -7822.04Control + Zhubo 8 1.13 0.36 -7821.59
♂ Control 7 0.00 0.73 -5639.55Control + Zhubo 8 1.94 0.27 -5639.51
later age at first birth compared to non-zhubo, although the confidence intervals
overlap (not plotted for additional clarity).
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Figure 8.3: Kaplan-Meier survival curves showing progression to first birth for (a) fe-
male and (b) male non-zhubo (black line) and zhubo (red line). Confidence
intervals have not been plotted for greater clarity.
8.3.3.2 Number of living children
I fitted Poisson regressions to analyse the effect of poor reputation on repro-
ductive success, measured as number of living children, controlling for factors
such as age, age2, education, wealth, and reproductive competition (numbers
of co-resident reproductive-age brothers and sisters, as well as interactions be-
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tween these terms and age). Model-averaged parameter estimates are shown
in Figure 8.4, with 95% confidence sets of candidate models in Tables 8.9 to 8.12
and the full set of models in Table 8.1.
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Figure 8.4: Model-averaged parameter estimates with unconditional 95% confidence
intervals predicting number of living children for Mosuo adults aged 15
and over, including (a) all females (n = 1,667), (b) female heads of house-
holds (n = 363), (c) all males (n = 1,691), (d) male heads of households
(n= 394). In all cases, the response variable was number of living children
at the time of census.
Poor reputations were associated with fewer living children for female
household heads, although the confidence intervals slightly overlapped with
zero (Figure 8.4b; β = −0.15, 95% CI [−0.322,0.023]). Living in a zhubo house-
hold was associated with lower fertility for the remaining subsamples, al-
though there was greater uncertainty in the estimates (Figure 8.4; females:
β =−0.023, 95% CI [−0.126,0.079]; males: β =−0.039, 95% CI [−0.157,0.079];
male household heads: β =−0.024, 95% CI [−0.242,0.193]).
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Table 8.9: Summary of the best 95% a priori models predicting number of living chil-
dren for all Mosuo female adults, including number of parameters (K), dif-
ferences in AICc relative to the minimum in the set (∆AICc), Akaike weights
(ωi) and the log-likelihood of each model (LL). Control includes age + age2 +
no. adult sisters + no. adult brothers + age× no. brothers + age× no. sisters
+ years of education + income from tourism in 2012 (yes/no) + no. livestock
in 2012. ‘Partnership type’ refers to people living neolocally with a partner
(i.e. both dispersed from their natal households), in a duolocal relationship
(i.e. neither dispersed), in a matrilocal or patrilocal relationship (i.e. male
or female dispersal, respective), or people not in relationships (the reference
category).
Models K ∆AICc ωi LL
Control + Partnership type 14 0.00 0.71 -2338.66
Control + Partnership type + Zhubo 15 1.84 0.28 -2338.56
Table 8.10: Summary of the best 95% a priori models predicting number of living chil-
dren for all Mosuo female household heads, including number of param-
eters (K), differences in AICc relative to the minimum in the set (∆AICc),
Akaike weights (ωi) and the log-likelihood of each model (LL). Control in-
cludes age + age2 + no. adult sisters + no. adult brothers + age × no.
brothers + age × no. sisters + years of education + income from tourism in
2012 (yes/no) + no. livestock in 2012.
Models K ∆AICc ωi LL
Control + Zhubo 11 0.00 0.59 -577.75
Control 10 0.86 0.38 -579.25
Type of partnership—being in a duolocal, neolocal, matrilocal or patrilocal
relationship—had positive effects on number of children from Mosuo females
(but not the subset of female household heads) as well as all males; this is un-
surprising since fewer people not in relationships at the time of the census had
reproduced (642 Mosuo people had children but were not in partnerships). In-
teractions between partnership types and poor reputation did not appear in
any of the best-fitting models, contrary to predictions.
8.3.4 Working on zhubo farms
There were 34 observations of people from non-zhubo households working on
the farms of zhubo households and 35 instances where zhubo houses worked
on non-zhubo farms (Table 8.13a). Of the 35 instances where zhubo households
helped on non-zhubo farms, nine were directly reciprocated by non-zhubo peo-
ple. There were more observations of help between pairs of non-zhubo house-
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Table 8.11: Summary of the best 95% a priori models predicting number of living chil-
dren for all Mosuo male adults, including number of parameters (K), differ-
ences in AICc relative to the minimum in the set (∆AICc), Akaike weights
(ωi) and the log-likelihood of each model (LL). Control includes age + age2
+ no. adult sisters + no. adult brothers + age × no. brothers + age × no.
sisters + years of education + income from tourism in 2012 (yes/no) + no.
livestock in 2012. ‘Partnership type’ refers to people living neolocally with
a partner (i.e. both dispersed from their natal households), in a duolocal re-
lationship (i.e. neither dispersed), in a matrilocal or patrilocal relationship
(i.e. male or female dispersal, respective), or people not in relationships
(the reference category).
Models K ∆AICc ωi LL
Control + Partnership type 14 0.00 0.67 -1879.16
Control + Partnership type + Zhubo 15 1.61 0.30 -1878.95
Table 8.12: Summary of the best 95% a priori models predicting number of living chil-
dren for all duolocal/neolocal Mosuo male household heads, including
number of parameters (K), differences in AICc relative to the minimum in
the set (∆AICc), Akaike weights (ωi) and the log-likelihood of each model
(LL). Control includes age + age2 + no. adult sisters + no. adult brothers +
age × no. brothers + age × no. sisters + years of education + income from
tourism in 2012 (yes/no) + no. livestock in 2012. ‘Partnership type’ refers
to people living neolocally with a partner (i.e. both dispersed from their
natal households), in a duolocal relationship (i.e. neither dispersed), in a
matrilocal or patrilocal relationship (i.e. male or female dispersal, respec-
tive), or people not in relationships (the reference category).
Models K ∆AICc ωi LL
Control + Partnership type 14 0.00 0.73 -590.40
Control + Partnership type + Zhubo 15 2.12 0.25 -590.37
holds (n = 443) than expected (n = 408.6) under the null hypothesis that poor
reputations do not bias labour investment (χ21 = 135.04, p 0.001; Table 8.13a).
Similarly, there were more observations of help given between pairs of zhubo
households (n = 46) than expected (n = 11.6), while there were fewer observa-
tions of non-zhubo houses helping zhubo (n= 34) than expected (n= 68.4) as well
as fewer zhubo households helping non-zhubo (n= 35) than expected (n= 69.4).
When both the helping and landowning households contained zhubo, affi-
nal kinship accounted for 53.4% of relationships, while 12.9% of helpers were
related through the matriline and 2.6% were related through the patriline (Ta-
ble 8.14). 13.8% of helper relationships were siblings. Where zhubo households
helped on non-zhubo farms, only 32.3% of relationships were affinal, whereas
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Table 8.13: Counts of whether or not households containing zhubo (a) help on the farms
of or (b) gave individual gifts to other households containing zhubo (or not).
(a) Households receiving help on farms
Non-zhubo house Zhubo house
Households helping Non-zhubo house 443 34
on other farms Zhubo house 35 46
(b) Households receiving gifts
Non-zhubo house Zhubo house
Households giving Non-zhubo house 382 34
gifts to others Zhubo house 29 41
Table 8.14: Relationship frequencies of observed help split by whether zhubo reside in
the helping or landowning households.
Relationship Ego zhubo, alter not Alter zhubo, ego not Both zhubo
Affine 8 9 21
Grandchildren 1 0 1
In same village 6 8 2
Maternal kin 9 10 15
Neighbour 4 2 0
Other 6 16 4
Other kin of partner 0 0 1
Others in partner’s house 0 0 2
Owner 1 4 9
Parents and children 4 6 4
Paternal kin 4 1 3
Siblings 9 14 16
Partner 4 4 19
Partner of close kin 7 9 19
Partner of kin 2 0 0
Totals 65 83 116
41.5% of relationships were genealogical relatives. In instances where non-
zhubo helped on zhubo farms, 26.5% of relationships were affinal but 37.3% of
relationships were genealogical; the remainder were neighbours and others in
the same village, landowners themselves, or were unclassified relationships.
8.3.5 Accusations of wrongdoing do not strongly predict less
farm work or fewer gifts
The number of gifts received and number of farm help observations for each
household—both measures of in-degree on social networks—were analysed
using Zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) regressions on a set of candidate models (Ta-
ble 8.3; results from the 95% confidence set of models are shown in Table 8.16).
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Table 8.15 shows the model-averaged parameter estimates for the best-fitting
models. For ease of interpretability, below I will discuss the incidence rate ra-
tios (IRRs) for the count (Poisson) portion of the ZIP models and odds ratios
(ORs) for the zero-inflation (logistic) portion along with 95% confidence inter-
vals (CIs). In the zero-inflation model, if OR > 1, the household has higher
odds of not receiving help or gifts (i.e. in-degree is more likely to be zero).
Being a zhubo house was associated with small in-degrees in both models,
i.e. receiving fewer instances of help on their farms (IRR = 0.886, 95% CI [0.631,
1.243]) and fewer gifts (IRR = 0.813, 95% CI [0.545, 1.213]) compared to non-
zhubo households. Note that both parameter estimates were imprecise and the
confidence intervals overlap with zero.
Households headed by Mosuo men had increased odds of receiving no
help on their farms (OR = 1.642, 95% CI [1.099, 2.453]). However, the male-
headed households that did receive help were predicted to receive more in-
stances of help compared to female-headed households (IRR = 1.269, 95% CI
[1.027, 1.567]). Larger households were also associated with more observa-
tions of help on their farms (IRR = 1.049, 95% CI [1.005, 1.094]). In addition,
larger households were more likely to receive any help at all compared to
smaller households (OR = 0.846, 95% CI [0.78, 0.917]; zero-inflation model in
Table 8.15). Household size or having a male head did not predict receiving
more or fewer gifts.
8.3.6 Zhubo households cluster together on social networks
but not spatially
Zhubo houses positively assort on farm help, gift giving, and the presence of
partners and children in other zhubo houses (Table 8.17). Zhubo houses are spa-
tially dispersed throughout villages B and C (p = 0.001 and p 0.001, respec-
tively). In villages A, D and E, zhubo and non-zhubo households are randomly
distributed (i.e. no spatial autocorrelation; p = 0.326, p = 0.352 and p = 0.279
respectively).
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Table 8.15: Model-averaged parameter estimates from the best-fitting Zero-inflated
Poisson (ZIP) regressions predicting in-degree (i.e. number of observa-
tions) for (i) observed farm help and (ii) gifts received by households. Each
ZIP regression fits a Poisson model (‘count model’), as well as a logistic
model predicting whether or not a household has Pr = 0 of in-degree > 0
(‘zero-inflation model’).
Farm help Gifts
Count model: B S.E. B S.E.
Zhubo house (ref: no) -0.121 0.173 -0.207 0.204
Household size 0.047 0.022 0.030 0.029
Wealth rank -0.023 0.044 0.085 0.057
Head’s sex (ref: female) 0.238 0.108 0.039 0.168
Village (ref: B)
Village C 0.202 0.192 -0.312 0.368
Village D 0.365 0.201 -0.552 0.273
Village E 0.816 0.190 0.434 0.236
(Intercept) -0.012 0.281 -0.566 0.360
Zero-inflation model:
Zhubo house (ref: no) -0.116 0.234 -1.464 1.633
Household size -0.167 0.041 -0.033 0.123
Wealth rank -0.014 0.075 -0.339 0.213
Head’s sex (ref: female) 0.496 0.205 1.024 0.716
Village (ref: B)
Village C -0.520 0.373 2.407 8.646
Village D 0.664 0.354 1.942 8.458
Village E 0.008 0.347 2.788 8.529
(Intercept) 1.245 0.466 -2.354 8.759
Table 8.16: 95% confidence set of models for Zero-inflated Poisson regressions on in-
degree for households in the farm labour and gift networks. Columns re-
port number of parameters (K), differences in AICc relative to the mini-
mum in the set (∆AICc), Akaike weights (ωi) and the log-likelihood of each
model (LL). Control model includes household size + wealth rank + sex of
household head + dummy variables for each village (ref: village b).
Model K ∆AICc ωi LL
Farm help Control 14 0.000 0.569 -756.880Control + Zhubo 16 0.555 0.431 -755.060
Gifts Control + Zhubo 16 0.000 0.685 -677.589Control 14 1.553 0.315 -680.463
Table 8.17: Coefficients for assortativity on whether households contain zhubo for the
four social networks.
Social network Assortativity coefficient
Farm help 0.499
Gifts 0.489
Presence of partners 0.602
Presence of children 0.686
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Farm help Gifts
Partners Children
Figure 8.5: Networks of observed farm work, gifts, and partners and children living in
other households for one of the study villages. Circles show households,
coloured by whether it is a house accused of witchcraft (zhubo; red) or not
(blue). Circle size represents the number of people living in the household
at the time of the census. Arrows show links between household for each of
the four networks. Arrow thickness in the partners and children networks
indicates numbers of each living in other households. Instances of farm
help depended on the amount of fieldwork conducted per village and gift-
giving depended on whether households chose to participate in the games.
The absence of either should not be taken as absence of cooperation.
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8.4 Discussion
8.4.1 Reproductive success of people accused of wrongdoing
Female heads of households who had been accused of poisoning food (zhubo)
suffered slightly lower fertility compared to male household heads with poor
reputations, other females and males with poor reputations, and everybody
else (Figure 8.4). Fertility, measured as number of living children, was not af-
fected by poor reputations for other people living in a zhubo household (Fig-
ure 8.4a, c and d). Poor reputation did not decrease or increase age at first birth
for Mosuo females or males compared to non-zhubo (Table 8.7 and Figure 8.3);
one plausible explanation is that people’s standing in their village fell after they
had already given birth for the first time.
These results suggest that the majority of females and males living in zhubo
households might not especially have to buttress themselves against their poor
reputation compared to female household heads. Zhubo households were more
likely to contain neolocal couples than households without a reputation for
food poisoning (Table 8.6).
The analyses of reproductive success (Figure 8.4) used the best-fitting
model structure reported by Ji et al. (2013) in order to control for factors known
to affect reproductive success, including age, numbers of siblings, education,
and measures of wealth. Reputation and partnership type (neolocal, duolo-
cal, matrilocal, patrilocal, or un-partnered) variables appeared in all best-fitting
models, and models including reputation had marginally improved fit com-
pared to models without, as evidenced by the slight decrease in log-likelihoods
(Tables 8.9 to 8.12).
The number of co-resident adult brothers had a positive effect on number
of living offspring for Mosuo males, regardless of their reputational status, al-
though more brothers had a negative effect for older generations (Figure 8.4c).
The number of co-resident adult sisters was associated with higher fertility and
later age at first birth for females, contrary to patterns reported by Ji et al. (2013),
although the parameter estimate for fertility was imprecise and so we cannot
say there is a definite trend in this case. Note that I used a different, larger sam-
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ple of Mosuo people and did not account for size of farmland or the presence
of female/male kin beyond siblings. In addition, I defined ‘types’ of partner-
ship in a more bottom-up way as a property of couples and included neolocal,
duolocal, matrilocal and patrilocal couples along with people not in relation-
ships; Ji et al. (2013) defined residence as a property of households, analysing
only duolocal and ‘mixed’ residence types.
People from zhubo households tended to be in relationships with one an-
other rather than with people living in non-zhubo households. Similarly, non-
zhubo households tended to have partners and children in other non-zhubo
households rather than in zhubo households (Table 8.5a). Households contain-
ing zhubo assorted together in terms of farm labour, gift-giving, affinal relations
and child residence (Tables 8.5, 8.13 and 8.17). There were more female heads
of zhubo houses compared to male heads (63 female, 45 male); the pattern was
reversed in other houses (310 female, 375 male). Head of household in our cen-
sus refers to the person registered with the Chinese government as the head
and might be a younger, more educated person compared to the person who
would fulfil that role in ‘traditional’ domestic arrangements.
Households identified as containing food poisoners did not differ in size
or composition (by age, sex or ethnic groups; Figure 8.1) compared to other
households, and they were no more or less related to one another or themselves
(result not shown). More zhubo households were ranked towards the wealthier
end of the spectrum compared to the wealth distribution of other households,
and proportionally fewer zhubo households were in the bottom wealth rank
compared to other households (Figure 8.2). This form of poor reputation in
Mosuo villages might thus act as a response to inequalities, in a similar manner
to patterns of witchcraft accusations elsewhere (Geschiere 1997; Smith 2001).
8.4.2 Labour investment on the farms of people with poor rep-
utations
The majority of relationships between zhubo helping on non-zhubo farms were
reckoned through genetic kinship and affinal kinship (Table 8.14). The same
pattern held when roles were reversed. If both households contained zhubo,
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the majority of helper relationships were affinal rather than genetic.
A greater proportion of non-zhubo households did not receive any help on
their farms compared to zhubo households, although this pattern might simply
be due to the random sampling of farms via spot observations. Houses contain-
ing zhubo preferred to help other zhubo over and above non-zhubo (Table 8.13).
People believed to poison food can nevertheless obtain food from households
on whose farms they work; the only taboo is against eating in zhubo house-
holds, although I can only speculate whether zhubo observe the taboo them-
selves when in the houses of other people accused of poisoning food.
I fitted a Zero-inflated Poisson model to estimate the factors predicting
two measures of in-degree: instances of observed farm work and number of
gifts received (Table 8.15). Zhubo households received slightly less help on
their farms and slightly fewer gifts, although the parameter estimates were
uncertain. Larger households received more instances of help on their farms.
Households headed by Mosuo men were less likely to receive help on their
farms, although those that did were observed to have more instances of help
compared to female-headed households (Table 8.15).
Despite a taboo against eating where zhubo live, some zhubo households
received help from non-zhubo (Table 8.13a; farm work is rewarded with food
prepared by the household receiving help). Only two of these non-zhubo house-
holds had partners living in three of the zhubo houses. All three of these part-
ners were females who resided with the children of the non-zhubo. Thus, affinal
links alone cannot explain the observed cooperation between zhubo and non-
zhubo households.
Households containing zhubo tended to cluster together (Figure 8.5), al-
though they were not geographically isolated or marginalised within their
villages. Coefficients of assortativity in the networks of farm help and gift-
giving were 0.499 and 0.489 respectively, suggesting that non-zhubo households
tended to work on each other’s farms and give each other gifts rather than
work for or give gifts to zhubo houses; similarly, zhubo households assorted to-
gether rather than with non-zhubo houses. Similarly, zhubo households strongly
assorted in terms of partners and children living in one another’s households
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(Table 8.5 and Table 8.17). These high assortativity coefficients may not only
reflect social norms and reputations but also serve to reinforce them within the
communities (Apicella et al. 2012).
The analyses presented in this chapter suggest that people with poor rep-
utations clustered together to help one another and, although the majority of
zhubo households were isolated in the sense that they did not receive help from
non-zhubo, help was not completely withdrawn from houses with bad reputa-
tions. In addition, instances of help were not entirely due to affinal links or
parenthood. Zhubo-zhubo couples were more likely to live neolocally (i.e. both
partners dispersed from their natal homes; Table 8.6). Perhaps due to these
clustering and residence strategies, the majority of people with poor reputa-
tions did not suffer lower fertility or delayed age at first birth compared to
others (Figure 8.3, Figure 8.4 and Table 8.7).
8.4.3 Limitations and future directions
Much remains unknown about this Mosuo reputation system. We currently
have no ethnographic insights into why certain people come to be accused of
poisoning food, if the reputation is heritable or gendered (although our results
suggest no gender bias; Table 8.4), or how rumours and accusations spread. In
the latter case, it would be interesting to find out whether the fields are as much
a place for cultivating gossip as they are for crops (Gilmore 1978).
This chapter also suffers from a handful of limitations. We only know
whether households contain zhubo or whether heads of households are zhubo,
but not whether particular individuals are considered zhubo (although our
current ethnographic understanding is that everybody living in a household
headed by a zhubo might also be considered a zhubo, or at least affected by the
reputation of their household’s head). The analyses of reproductive success
presented here suggest that poor reputations bring no long-term detrimen-
tal effects on fitness for most people; however, female heads of zhubo house-
holds suffered lower reproductive success compared to other household heads.
Given our data, we cannot currently gain a sense of the dynamics of reputa-
tional accusations or their short-term or long-term effects (e.g. freshly accused
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people might immediately lose out on farm labour while ‘established’ zhubo
might have a chance to build up directly reciprocal relationships over time).
Although there was a bias against zhubo helping on non-zhubo farms,
where this did occur, the non-zhubo households reciprocated approximately
one quarter of the 35 instances of help. These reciprocated instances of help
might also represent cases where zhubo are withholding help from non-zhubo
in order to ally with other accused people. On the other hand, some people
with poor reputations might strategically cooperate with others as an attempt
to shift their reputation or compensate for it, or to start directly reciprocal re-
lationships. This chimes with laboratory evidence that ostracised individuals
cooperate once they are allowed back into the social arena (Feinberg et al. 2014).
Laboratory studies have also shown that when potential social partners have
poor reputations, individuals will decide to help based on their past personal
experiences with the recipient (Molleman et al. 2013).
Thus, future studies of reputation and cooperation in the field should take
into account the effects of direct as well as indirect reciprocity. Similarly, I only
looked at indirect punishment (withholding help), whereas direct punishment
of defectors might also be important (Raihani et al. 2012), even in small-scale
societies (Mathew & Boyd 2011). Future work should investigate whether there
is any costly punishment towards people with poor reputations and whether
this has detrimental effects on their reproductive success, e.g. through in-
creased risk of death.
One major drawback to studying indirect, costless punishment such as
withholding labour in real-world systems is that one cannot easily gather evi-
dence of a deliberate absence of cooperation. Alongside a deeper ethnographic
study, future work could also attempt experiments such as trust games (as em-
ployed by, e.g. Cronk 2007) framed around the local reputation system in order
to gain an understanding of whether or not (or to what extent) reputational
aspersions function as a form of punishment in Mosuo society.
This chapter looked at observations of cooperative behaviour on farms.
The data covered randomly sampled farms over two planting seasons and one
harvest. While this sampling strategy only allowed direct comparison of zhubo
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and non-zhubo households in a quasi-experimental fashion, it does give greater
confidence that the results presented here are unbiased. Future studies might
also account for ecological factors such as the productivity of zhubo farms com-
pared to others. Depending on such factors, indirect punishment such as with-
holding labour might not necessarily have negative long-term effects.
8.5 Conclusion
This is the first evolutionary study to quantify the effects of a poor reputation
based around supernatural beliefs on social behaviour and reproductive suc-
cess, to the best of my knowledge. In this chapter, I have sought a functional
explanation for how witchcraft accusations affect cooperation among Mosuo
farmers. I predicted that those accused of poisoning food (known as zhubo)
might be indirectly punished through the withholding of labour investment on
their farms during planting and harvesting seasons. The analyses presented
here suggest that zhubo are isolated to an extent, although any boundaries be-
tween zhubo and others are permeable.
The high number of zhubo households in the sample (13.7% of all house-
holds) suggests that accusations are not a rare event and many people might
face accusations at some point during their lives. Zhubo clustered together, es-
pecially as regards labour investment. Female zhubo who were heads of house-
holds experienced slightly lower reproductive success compared to other fe-
male heads of households. Poor reputations did not affect the fitness of male
household heads, or females or males more generally. Thus, people with poor
reputations may have developed mechanisms in order to become resilient to
potential damaging effects.
As discussed in Part I, reputational concerns can be important mediators of
cooperation through indirect reciprocity. Ohtsuki & Iwasa (2006) argue that in-
direct reciprocity can maintain cooperation if individuals are, among other at-
tributes, apologetic and forgiving. On the other hand, reputational aspersions
can allow gossip to become weaponised. Future ethnographic work might in-
vestigate how people in this area accuse and respond to being accused over a
longer time period.
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Mosuo lifestyle is changing and, as in other places in the world (e.g. Bleek
1976), the prevalence of reputation systems based on the supernatural might
decline with increased tourism or emigration (e.g. people moving to cities for
work or intermarriage with other groups who do not believe in witchcraft).
However, reputation systems such as witchcraft can also be understood as a re-
actions to inequalities borne of encroaching modernity, especially alongside the
emergence or enforcement of economic reforms (Comaroff & Comaroff 1999;
Geschiere 1997); such institutions may not die out so readily.
Part III
Conclusion
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Chapter 9
Conclusion
This thesis furthers our empirical understanding of how the evolutionary
forces of kin selection (Hamilton 1964), reciprocal altruism (Trivers 1971) and
indirect reciprocity (Nowak & Sigmund 1998) interact to influence patterns of
cooperation. In doing so, I have explored the flexible cooperative strategies
employed by two populations broadly following their traditional ways of life:
Saami reindeer herders in Norway and Mosuo farmers in China.
While the two populations studied in this thesis are very different in terms
of their ecology and environment, their modes of subsistence, social systems,
mobility (or lack thereof), land tenure, histories, etc., they also share much in
common (beyond the fact that both countries border Russia). They are both
marginalised ethnic minorities; both, in part, cater to an ethno-tourism trade
as a means of supplementing their traditional forms of subsistence and income
which, for the Mosuo at least, is changing their social system (Mattison 2010);
and both populations face the collective action problem of adapting their ways
of life to changing political and environmental circumstances.
This concluding chapter will first summarise the main findings from the
research presented in preceding chapters. I will then offer suggestions for how
researchers can better study cooperation in human societies and close by con-
sidering my work’s implications for social evolution research.
9.1 Overview of findings
Part I conducted the first quantitative, experimental study of cooperation
among Saami reindeer herders living in northernmost Norway. In Chapter 4,
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I compared the relative importance of kinship and membership of herding
groups (‘siidas’) in explaining the social relationships revealed through gift-
giving. Belonging to the same siida was the stronger predictor of gift-giving;
relatedness had a positive but weaker effect. This result is likely to reflect the
importance of herding groups in daily subsistence for Saami pastoralists. There
is increasing quantitative evidence for the pivotal role played by reciprocal ex-
change in human cooperation, especially as regards the sharing of food, even
when food is shared with kin (Allen-Arave et al. 2008; Jaeggi & Gurven 2013;
Kasper & Borgerhoff Mulder 2015). My work reflects and extends these find-
ings by marshalling evidence from new field experiments to show the impor-
tance of this interplay in other forms of cooperative network.
Participants gave nearly one third of gifts to non-kin who were members
of other siidas. Most of these gifts were for people who were considered good
herders, suggesting reputational factors were also at play. In addition, partici-
pants gave gifts to newly established herders. It is possible that some of these
patterns can be explained through affinal ties (which I did not measure). Spec-
ulatively, participants may also have wanted to forge future reciprocal relation-
ships or be giving gifts due to normative obligations towards younger, inexpe-
rienced herders. Future investigations into the cooperative dynamics within
and between herding groups should therefore try to tease apart the roles of
reputation, fictive kinship and social duties, alongside the reciprocity and kin
selection explanations studied in this thesis.
In Chapter 5, I showed how cooperativeness towards siidas was contin-
gent on group size, which may affect the perceived marginal returns of donat-
ing to a public goods game (PGG). Smaller groups were more cooperative in
that they contributed more to the public good. This result is consistent with
theoretical expectations, since people in smaller groups could expect a higher
return rate for every unit (in this case, every litre of petrol) they contributed
to the PGG (Ledyard 1995). I described this as ‘perceived’ returns because al-
though information about contributions and group composition was private
(i.e. the PGGs were anonymous), participants knew they would be playing
with fellow siida members and thus knew and had experience of working with
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the pool of potential players. It is possible that herders were not thinking about
marginal returns and instead contributed because of other factors related to
their previous experiences with fellow siida members. Since I was interested in
meaningful social groups, it would have been difficult to experimentally con-
trol expected returns. Future work could, however, attempt to quantify coop-
erative behaviour through observing contributions to a real public good such
as time and effort spent on fence repairs or winter herding activities.
Relatedness to the siida was not associated with PGG contributions, con-
trary to predictions that higher relatedness would favour cooperation. The
sample size for these analyses was small (n = 30) and so may not have had
the statistical power to detect an effect of relatedness. Unfortunately, the bulk
of field experiments using PGGs either do not measure relatedness or simply
control for it. However, I conducted a reanalysis of Waring & Bell’s (2013) study
of public goods provisioning within and across castes in India, and found that
people who were more related to others in their group also contributed more
to the PGG (Figure 2.1). The role of relatedness in social dilemmas remains a
topic for further exploration.
The second part of this thesis looked at the cooperative networks of Mo-
suo farmers in southwest China. In Chapter 7, I investigated the factors pre-
dicting a real-world measure of cooperation: helping on another household’s
farm during planting or harvesting seasons. A household was more likely to
receive help on its farm from people living in the homes of residents’ repro-
ductive partners. This result provides quantitative evidence backing up pre-
vious ethnographic observations that affinal networks are important for coop-
eration between households in Mosuo villages (Shih 2009). Households were
also more likely to help on farms associated with households that contained
children belonging to any residents of the former household. However, help
became less likely if the children lived with other people who were related to
the helping household. (Children, in this case, referred to offspring of any age,
not just people who were under a certain age.) These patterns suggest that
labour investment on farms might double as parental investment in children
who live with fewer relatives.
9.1. Overview of findings 163
Households were more likely to help nearby neighbours as well as house-
holds containing closer relatives. Neighbours also tend to be kin, especially in
small-scale societies, which may underestimate the effect of relatedness when
looking at the effect of distance on cooperation (Ziker & Schnegg 2005). I
accounted for this by including an interaction term between relatedness and
distance; the estimate suggested that people were willing to travel further to
help relatives. Overall, there was moderate reciprocity in observed farm help.
Reciprocity varied considerably between villages, which may have been due to
the random sampling of a subset of households. Anthropological studies con-
ducted elsewhere have similarly highlighted the importance of spatial prox-
imity, relatedness and affinal ties for cooperation in the form of sharing food
(Koster & Leckie 2014; Koster et al. 2015; Ziker & Schnegg 2005).
Analyses of a gift game played with Mosuo participants showed that gifts
were reciprocated more often than farm labour. This suggests that the games
picked up on social relationships based around reciprocity, whereas helping on
farms—especially farms associated with partners and children—was a form of
cooperation not contingent on reciprocal exchange. The presence of children in
another household was more strongly correlated with gift-giving compared to
the presence of reproductive partners. Gifts given between households were
not associated with observations of farm labour, suggesting that the two mea-
sured different kinds of cooperation (see section 9.2.1 for further discussion of
this issue).
Chapter 8 investigated how withholding labour from other households’
farms might function as a form of indirect, costless punishment, a key assump-
tion of indirect reciprocity models of cooperation (Balafoutas et al. 2014; Oht-
suki et al. 2009). I used a measure of poor standing in the community—for
Mosuo people, being thought of as somebody who poisons food—to show
weak detrimental effects on fertility for female heads of households, but not
for males. These people with bad reputations, known locally as zhubo, were
more likely to intermarry and have children together, as well as work on each
other’s farms and give gifts to one another, suggesting a certain resilience to
potential ostracism. Their households were not spatially clustered within vil-
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lages, nor were they banished to the margins.
Zhubo households received less help on their farms and fewer gifts, al-
though these effects were statistically weak and uncertain. Non-zhubo house-
holds did not completely withhold help, however. Overall, zhubo households
tended to be wealthier – a pattern with striking similarities to societies where
accusations of witchcraft act as a response to wealth inequalities and target the
relatively well-off (Geschiere 1997; Smith 2001). The relative wealth of house-
holds was not associated with observations of farm help, suggesting that in this
case wealth was not confounding the effect of poor reputation.
9.2 Furthering the study of cooperation in the real
world
In this section, I consider issues arising from the work presented in this thesis
and suggest future avenues for studying cooperation in the field.
9.2.1 Are economic games fit for purpose in the field?
Chapter 5 found no associations between contributions to a public goods game
and the outcomes of real-world collective actions (measures of herd produc-
tivity), while Chapter 7 found weak links between gift-giving and costly coop-
erative behaviour (labour investment on other households’ farms). Similarly,
evidence is mounting that lab-in-the-field experiments may not correspond to
real-world cooperative behaviours (Bouma et al. 2014; Gurven & Winking 2008;
Hill & Gurven 2004; Voors et al. 2012a).
Despite the poor predictive power of gift-giving on cooperation, gift game
behaviour was selected as a predictor in the best-fitting models (Chapter 7).
Thus, field-based games may have explanatory power, even if they do not di-
rectly map onto the cooperative behaviours or outcomes of interest. While the
games presented in Part I used a relatively meagre stake in terms of purchasing
power in Norway, the Mosuo participants in Part II were able to win a substan-
tial portion of their daily wages. This suggests that endowment size or poten-
tial winnings are not necessarily driving the lack of relationship to real-world
cooperative behaviours observed here, although the effect of endowment size
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might differ from population to population (Raihani et al. 2013).
It is perhaps an inalienable fact of economic games that behaviour will
be guided by existing preferences and beliefs (Ca´rdenas & Ostrom 2004; Hen-
rich et al. 2005). Even when researchers employ devices such as anonymity to
control for factors such as reputations, they still interpret the variance in their
results in terms of these cultural systems (Smith 2005).
Levitt and List (2007) identified five factors that influence decision-making
(other than calculations about payoffs), the first three of which are socio-
cultural: (i) moral and ethical systems; (ii) the ability to observe and appraise a
player’s actions; (iii) the context of a decision; (iv) the subject pool; and (v) the
stakes of a decision. Self-interested decisions can be shaped and constrained
by culturally influenced factors such as reputations and expectations (Chibnik
2005; Gilmore 1978). In the real world, it is not only the outcomes of deci-
sions that matter but the process by which decisions are made (Levitt & List
2007). As we are inherently and inextricably social, cultured creatures, I ar-
gue that experimenters should place less weight on factors such as anonymity
when analysing decision-making. In the words of Cronk and Leech (2013: 43),
“Humans did not evolve in a world of one-shot anonymous interactions and
laboratory experiments.”
Researchers should not assume that all cooperation is equal. Not all com-
munity or communal activities have the same purpose and may not elicit the
same behaviours. In some situations, people might experience motivations or
incentives to collaborate, while in other contexts people might prefer to invest
more selfishly (Bouma et al. 2014). Different social institutions have different
purposes: some might be dedicated to managing, sharing or pooling risk (Ak-
tipis et al. 2011); some will focus on monitoring and governance (Rustagi et al.
2010); and others will tackle neighbourhood security, social services, or de-
veloping or maintaining infrastructure (Muller & Vothknecht 2012). Thus, we
must also bear in mind the purpose of cooperative behaviours in terms of the
social institutions—formal or informal—in which cooperation takes place.
One pattern commonly observed in laboratory-based public goods games
(PGGs) played over repeated rounds is that contributions decline over time
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in the absence of reinforcement mechanisms such as punishment or sanction-
ing (Chaudhuri 2010). Researchers have explained this pattern as evidence of
pro-sociality (Camerer 2013) or mistakes (Burton-Chellew & West 2013; Burton-
Chellew et al. 2015). Another alternative hypothesis—one that to the best of my
knowledge is yet to be explored—is that games involving a single public good
miss the delayed and diversified nature of human cooperation. That is, real-
world cooperative groups may not ‘play’ repeatedly for the same public good
but rather work together to provision many kinds of public good. To take a fea-
sible example from Saami pastoralism, some siida members might spend a few
days making bales of dried hay to feed their herds but sit out when it comes to
repairing fences around their pastures, although everybody will band together
when shepherding reindeer to the corral for earmarking.
Role diversification might mean that individuals play many overlapping
games simultaneously, dealing with delayed reciprocity across many domains
and with many currencies. Thus, researchers could try to design an iterated
PGG in which participants assort into or are assigned into groups with pub-
lic or private information (these could form part of the experimental treatment
or be held constant, depending on the research question) whose composition
remains stable over repeated rounds but where the common project changes
over time. While the logistics of such an experiment would no doubt be diffi-
cult, an ethnographer combining quantitative and qualitative methods might
be uniquely placed to attempt this, given enough time and experience to map
out the games people play in their everyday lives.
To properly test evolutionary hypotheses regarding cooperation, we must
seek disconfirming evidence rather than just analyse correlations. I argue that
this should entail randomised controlled experiments tailored more precisely
to particular contexts in which participants play for meaningful stakes be-
yond money. For example, a study in Liberia conducted a randomised public
goods experiment—in collaboration with a non-governmental organisation—
in which participants in the treatment condition directly contributed to a
community-driven reconstruction programme (Fearon et al. 2009). We might
expect more meaningful insights into social behaviour where experiments have
9.2. Furthering the study of cooperation in the real world 167
meaningful outcomes. Anthropologists might not want to run ‘true’ ran-
domised controlled trials (RCTs) in the field if we are interested in non-random
groups; we might therefore look into the possibility of randomly assigning
groups (that are themselves not randomly formed) into treatment or control
conditions.
This style of experimentation—not quite a ‘true’ experiment but more rig-
orous than a quasi-experiment (Bernard 2006)—might sacrifice ease of cross-
cultural comparability for a more localised game structure. However, an ethno-
graphically informed, RCT-esque approach would not only introduce quantifi-
able measures of risk and cost (and thus provide a more refined measure of co-
operation) and strongly link individual decision-making to social institutions,
but might also have applied value in terms of informing future policy and de-
velopmental interventions.
On the surface, the idea of toying with a community’s future welfare might
seem fraught with ethical quandaries; however, in a world where evidence-
based policy—in essence, applying randomised controlled trials to the domain
of social science—is gaining traction and might become the norm, evolutionary
anthropologists are in a prime position to provide a more nuanced and theory-
driven understanding of human decision-making.
9.2.2 The role of relatedness in kin selection
As I discussed in section 1.4.1.1, the concept of relatedness in Hamilton’s rule
(which states that a social behaviour evolves when the coefficient of related-
ness × indirect fitness benefit > direct fitness cost; Hamilton 1964) has been
generalised beyond shared ancestry (pedigree or genealogical relatedness) to
include all forms of assortment on genotype (Fletcher & Zwick 2006). This
theoretical advance has redefined relatedness as a statistical concept captur-
ing the idea that two individuals might be less or more related to one another
than either is to its local group (Krupp & Taylor 2015) and is not contingent
on shared ancestry. However, there appears to be something ‘special’ about
relatedness through shared ancestry compared to sharing alleles at particular
loci for other reasons because genealogical relatives are equally related across
9.2. Furthering the study of cooperation in the real world 168
the whole genome (more or less), allowing adaptations fuelled by multiple in-
teracting genes to evolve (West & Gardner 2013). In addition, humans recog-
nise extensive networks of non-relatives who are considered family, including
affinal ties (see section 1.4.1.2), as well as people who become ‘cultural kin’
through social learning mechanisms (Allison 1992), which might also change
the calculus of cooperative decisions.
Given the increasing availability and affordability of sequencing equip-
ment, coupled with the relative ease of collecting DNA samples—not to men-
tion the profusion of free online bioinformatics courses—evolutionary anthro-
pologists are in a good position (bar ethical clearance and participants’ in-
formed consent) to empirically test for differences in the explanatory power of
genealogical relatives, genetic relatives without shared ancestry, and cultural
relatives including fictive kin in predicting cooperative behaviour and repro-
ductive success.
9.2.3 Other routes to cooperation
Evolutionary approaches to understanding how natural selection can influence
cooperative behaviours are not limited to kin selection, reciprocal altruism and
indirect reciprocity – the theoretical cornerstones of this thesis. In this section I
will briefly discuss how coordination, partner choice, signalling and biological
markets can also lead to cooperation and how these ideas might inform future
research.
Cronk and Leech (2013) argue that studies of cooperation should inves-
tigate coordination problems alongside the traditional fare of social evolution
research: dilemmas of conflicting interests. One method of achieving coordi-
nation is through sharing knowledge and meta-knowledge (but see Binmore
2008), and researchers are beginning to explore how traditional knowledge
about resources and norms interact with observed behaviours (Ziker et al.
2015). In the Saami case, herders share knowledge about herd movements,
husbandry decisions, weather patterns, earmarks etc. and it would be enlight-
ening to understand the ways in which such knowledge is shared or withheld
from others, and how this cultural transmission affects cooperative behaviour
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and outcomes. Similarly, as discussed in section 8.4, future work investigating
reputation systems should take a longitudinal and ethnographic approach to
understand how gossipy accusations might be weaponised as a form of pun-
ishment, potentially leading to detrimental effects on reproductive success for
the victims of accusations.
The freedom and ability to choose partners has been posited as a major
component of cooperation (Barclay 2013). Partner choice is sometimes con-
trasted with partner control, the latter referring to the management of existing
partners to prevent cheating (Baumard et al. 2013). Both choice and control are
associated with reciprocal cooperation; partners must be chosen in order for
reciprocity to get underway, while control can occur in the sense that individu-
als might sanction uncooperative partners by withholding future investments
or punish defectors at a cost to themselves (Raihani et al. 2012).
Individuals may be chosen based on more than their capacity or willing-
ness to reciprocate cooperative behaviours. Individuals can promote them-
selves as desirable partners (in all senses of the word) by signalling intent to
cooperate (Barclay & Willer 2007). Signals, here, mean behaviours or phys-
iological traits that alter the behaviour of others who respond to the signal
(Davies et al. 2012). Honest and/or costly signals allow discrimination between
individuals’ qualities, and a cooperative temperament might signal facts about
status, skill, prestige, resource-holding potential, or reproductive value. These
characteristics can be thought of as giving individuals some value as potential
partners, where value can vary over the lifetime as well as over ecological and
evolutionary time (Barclay 2013), not to mention from culture to culture. Po-
tential cooperative partners can also distinguish themselves by building good
reputations through high contributions or sacrificing potential earnings in or-
der to increase their probability of being chosen (Barclay & Willer 2007; Stiff &
Van Vugt 2008).
One such form of signalling would be public, prodigal and prodigious gen-
erosity, perhaps in the form of hosting feasts or donating to charity. In such
cases, people might be seen as competing for enhanced social status or repro-
ductive partners (Bliege Bird & Smith 2005; Raihani & Smith 2015). This form of
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competition could potentially lead to coordinated cultural standards by which
to judge signalled quality in order to compare and contrast competitors (Bliege
Bird & Smith 2005). When it comes to choosing partners, an individual’s coop-
erativeness relative to others can lead to a form of ‘price war’ in cooperation
(Schino & Aureli 2010).
Signals need not just be a strategy of individuals. According to Bliege
Bird and Smith (2005), signals such as funerary feasts might present a social
dilemma in that the feast’s scale and extravagance (the ‘intensity’ of the signal)
will be maximised if all group members provision this common or club good,
although individuals may face temptations to defect if the feast will be pro-
vided regardless of their contributions. Theoretical work has shown that costly
signalling through provisioning a public good can be evolutionarily stable even
in the absence of assortment (Gintis et al. 2001). It would be interesting for fu-
ture evolutionary studies of cooperation to investigate the interplay between
individualistic and group-focussed signals, especially for scenarios in which
coordinated signalling might create social dilemmas. One potential method
would be through designing a field-based public goods game where the com-
mon project takes the form of a ritual rather than a pot of money.
Partner choice and signalling can lead to social behaviour being under-
stood as taking place within a biological market (Noe¨ & Hammerstein 1994).
Markets arise when individuals voluntarily exchange goods yet differ in their
preferences and in their state (factors that vary between individuals, such as
wealth, genetic quality, or resource-holding potential). Goods may be ex-
changed in kind (e.g. reciprocal grooming in primates) or not (e.g. aphids
exchanging honeydew with ants in return for protection) (Werner et al. 2014).
More than being just a metaphor, the paradigm of biological markets cen-
tres on trade-like behaviours in which partner choice plays a central role. This
is a burgeoning area of research which is gaining support from animals, plants
and microbes engaging in all manner of inter- and intra-specific market inter-
actions (Barclay 2013; Noe¨ & Hammerstein 1994; Werner et al. 2014)1. To date,
1Ronald Noe¨, one of the architects of biological market theory, maintains a collection of
papers related to the topic: http://www.scoop.it/t/biological-markets
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empirical research using a biological market perspective to investigate human
behaviour has mostly focussed on mating (e.g. Schacht & Borgerhoff Mulder
2015), although there is experimental evidence that partner choice and the
availability of better options elsewhere (‘outside options’) play a role in estab-
lishing fairness norms (Debove et al. 2015).
To the best of my knowledge there is currently no evolutionary anthro-
pology research quantifying the role of partner choice and market forces in
real-world cooperative systems. Future studies adopting biological market the-
ory might investigate cooperation from this angle, looking into the extent part-
ner choice is adaptive and/or constrained in different societies. For example,
partner choice may be more limited for sedentary populations such as farmers
compared to hunter-gatherer societies in which mobility might spur coopera-
tion (Aktipis 2011; Lewis et al. 2014). One approach would be to employ bio-
logical market theory in interpreting systems of marital transfers (bridewealth,
dowry and mahr, or indirect dowry; Goody & Tambiah 1973) in terms of fam-
ilies choosing partners for younger generations, perhaps partly as a kind of
‘lineage partner choice’ that forges affinal bonds with desirable families.
9.3 Concluding remarks
Studying cooperation in the field is fraught with challenges. Abstracted field
experiments have proven useful but researchers must move beyond simply
transplanting experimental economic games into the field. Our cooperative
tendencies and behaviours are flexible, responding to social, historical and eco-
logical factors. Evolutionary anthropologists should consider a more holistic
approach to studying real-world cooperation. Humans are cultured and agen-
tive. We make decisions based on our motivations, beliefs, preferences, emo-
tional states, cultural and familial upbringing, received and adapted norms,
morals, etc., all of which have been shaped by evolutionary forces. Under-
standing the interacting (and perhaps conflicting) nature of these factors re-
quires an explicitly multilevel and flexible approach. Being methodologically
promiscuous and mindful of local ethnographic contexts could prove the most
effective way for anthropologists to gain insights into the collective action prob-
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lems humanity may have to solve now and in the future.
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Appendix A
A dynamic framework for the study
of optimal birth intervals reveals the
importance of sibling competition
and mortality risks
This appendix presents a reprint of Thomas, M. G., Shanley, D. P., Houston,
A. I., McNamara, J. M., Mace, R., & Kirkwood, T. B. L. (2015). A dynamic
framework for the study of optimal birth intervals reveals the importance of
sibling competition and mortality risks. Journal of Evolutionary Biology, 28, 885–
895. doi:10.1111/jeb.12613
Appendix B
Survey and game scripts
This appendix contains the English-language originals of the information sheet,
survey and game scripts used to collect the data in Part I.
Information Sheet for License Owners 
Title of Project: The Dynamics of Cooperation among Saami Reindeer Herders in Finnmark, Norway 
This study has been approved by the UCL Research Ethics Committee (Project ID Number): 4536/001 
Names of Researchers: Matthew Thomas, Marius Warg Næss, Bård-Jørgen Bårdsen, Ruth Mace 
Contact details: 
 
 
 
 
 
Details of Study: 
We are studying how reindeer herders in your siida work together and work with herders in other 
siidas. We want to look at how people herding together in summer and winter pastures cooperate 
and find out under what circumstances herders might leave or join siidas. 
We have selected the license owners in your district, including you. If you agree to take part, we 
would like to ask a few questions about your summer and winter siidas, your family and you. To 
thank you for taking part, we would like to offer you money for 10 litres of gasoline. 
After the questions, we will play a game where you can potentially win a further 15 litres of gasoline. 
The amount you win will depend on how others play the game, but you will not lose any money by 
taking part in this study. 
It will only take about 45 minutes of your time to play the game and answer our questions. 
Everything you tell us is private and we will not share any personal data except with the named 
researchers from London. When the project is finished and results are reported, no individual will be 
identified in any way. You may not get any direct personal gain from this research and you will not 
suffer any cost if you do not take part. 
We are doing this research to understand how you live and work with other people at different 
times of the year. We are interested in why you work with the people you do, and what reasons 
people might have for joining or leaving siidas. 
Please discuss the information above with others if you wish or ask us if there is anything that is not 
clear or if you would like more information. 
It is up to you to decide whether to take part or not; choosing not to take part will not disadvantage 
you in any way. If you do decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at any time and without 
giving a reason. 
 
All data will be collected and stored in accordance with the UK Data Protection Act 1998. 
  
My name is Matthew Thomas and I’m a researcher at University College London in the UK. Because I 
don’t speak Norwegian so well, I’ve asked [name] to be my translator. Jeg vil gjerne snakke med deg 
om [reindeer husbandry and the siida system]. 
Introduction 
We would like to talk about how and why Saami herders work in siidas, how they help each other 
out and why people leave or join siidas. We will play three games and do a quick questionnaire. The 
games and the questions will take about 45 minutes of your time. 
We will give you money for 10 litres of gasoline just for taking part in the study. We will also play 
three games where you can win some more money for gasoline. You will not lose any money by 
taking part in this study. 
We know that Saami herders have experienced trouble in the past from people abusing their written 
statements. Everything you tell us today will be confidential and we will not write down your name 
or anything else that can identify you. 
[ACTION: Hand over information sheet] 
This sheet explains what the study is about and tells you how to contact us if you have any questions 
or want to talk about anything we discuss today. 
You are free to stop us at any time and clarify questions. You don't have to answer a question if you 
don't want to – we can just move on to the next one. 
Before we start, we need you to sign the front of the questionnaire… 
If you don't have any questions, we will start. 
Games 1 & 2 
To begin with, we would like to play two of the three games. By playing you can win some money for 
gasoline. 
We will give you some vouchers for gasoline. In the first game, you will decide how much gasoline to 
share with your district. In the second game, you will decide show much gasoline to share with your 
summer siida. 
Today, you will decide how much gasoline to share with these two groups. Once we have played the 
game with other people in your siida and your district -- and they have made their decisions -- 
Matthew will calculate how much each person gets and give them the money they won. 
The total amount you win will depend on the amount of gasoline you give to your district and to 
your siida, as well as how much other people give. Matthew will add up all the contributions, 
increase them by 50% and split the increased amount equally among all the herders who play these 
games. 
In total, you could earn money for up to 15 more litres of gasoline on top of the 10 litres we’re giving 
you for participating. We will pay you in cash in one month’s time – after everybody has made their 
decisions. I will deliver the cash to your postal address. 
No one in either of the groups will know exactly who they are playing with. All you know is that the 
first group is made of six people – including you – randomly chosen from your district and the 
  
second group is made of up to six people – including you – randomly chosen from your summer 
siida. 
[ACTION: Show vouchers] 
I will give you vouchers for five litres of gasoline, in one litre units, before each of these two games. 
You will decide how much of the five litres to share – first with your district and second with your 
summer siida. Everyone will receive the same amount of gasoline money and will have to make the 
same decision.  
[ACTION: Show diagram of game to participant] 
You can choose to give nothing to the group, or you can give 1, 2, 3, 4 or all 5 litres. The amount that 
you do not share with the group will be yours to keep, once everyone in the group has made their 
decisions. 
The money for the gasoline that you will receive does not belong to me. It has been given to me by 
my university to conduct this research project. It does not matter to the university whether this 
money is spent or not. 
You will make your decision independently from everyone else and no one else will know how much 
you gave to the group. No-one will know how much of the total anybody contributed. Only the 
researchers from London will know how much you shared with your district and with your siida. 
Now I will ask you some questions to check whether you have understood the rules of the game. 
1. How much gasoline does each player have to play with at the beginning of each game? 
2. What decision must each player make about these 5 litres? 
3. What are the two groups you can share gasoline with? 
4. On top of the money for 10 litres of gasoline we will give you for participating, what will your 
total earnings consist of? 
 
[ACTION: If participant answers all questions correctly, continue. 
Otherwise, move on to questionnaire] 
[ACTION: Give participant first set of vouchers and envelopes] 
Here are vouchers for 5 litres of gasoline. You now have to decide how much of these 5 litres of 
gasoline you want to give to your district and how much you want to keep for yourself. Please put 
the amount you want to share with your district into this envelope and put the amount you want to 
keep in this envelope. 
[ACTION: Player makes decision] 
Thank you. Why did you choose to donate that amount of gasoline to your district? 
[ACTION: Write down reason] 
[ACTION: Give participant second set of vouchers and envelopes] 
Here are vouchers for five more litres of gasoline. In this second part of the game, you now have to 
decide how much of these 5 litres of gasoline you want to give to your summer siida and how much 
you want to keep for yourself. Please put the amount you want to share with your summer siida into 
this envelope and put the amount you want to keep in this envelope.  
  
[ACTION: Player makes decision] 
Thank you. Why did you choose to donate that amount of gasoline to your summer siida? 
[ACTION: Write down reason) 
Game 3 
Now for the final game. 
[ACTION: give participant three 5-litre vouchers] 
Here are 3 vouchers, each for 5 litres of gasoline. I would like you to choose one, two or three 
people from this list of other license owners in your district [ACTION: show list] to give these to, as 
gifts. You may not keep any of this gasoline for yourself.  
The person or people you choose will not know that the gift came from you. You may choose to give 
all 3 tokens to just one person, give 2 to one person and 1 to another, or 1 token to three different 
people. 
Please read out the ID numbers for 1, 2 or 3 people from this list who you would like to give a gift to 
and how much you would like to give them. Only the researchers from London will know who you 
give gifts to. 
[ACTION: Write down herder ID numbers and amounts given to each] 
Thank you. Why did you make that decision? 
[ACTION: Write down reason]    
That's the end of the game. Please do not discuss the game with other people who haven’t yet 
played. We would now like to ask a few simple questions about working in siidas. 
[ACTION: Go to questionnaire] 
  
Living and Working in Siidas 
Official Title of Project: 
The Dynamics of Cooperation among Saami Reindeer Herders in Finnmark, Norway 
This study has been approved by the UCL Research Ethics Committee (Project ID Number): 4536/001 
 
 
 
We would like to ask about how and why Saami herders work in siidas, how they help each other out 
and why people leave or join siidas. The answers you give will form part of Matthew Thomas's PhD 
project and may be used in future scientific publications. 
 
It is up to you to decide whether to take part or not; choosing not to take part will not disadvantage 
you in any way. If you do decide to take part, you are still free to withdraw at any time and without 
giving a reason. 
 
By continuing, you are giving us your consent that the information you provide will only be used for 
the purposes of this project and not transferred to an organisation outside of UCL. The information 
will be treated as strictly confidential and handled in accordance with the provisions of the UK Data 
Protection Act 1998. 
 
 
 
Signature:        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interviewer's signature:        
 
Date:     
 
  
Person ID:  Date:  
 
 
Interview Coding 
Location of interview (person's home etc.):       
Town:       
 
Game 1 
Reason for size of donation: 
 
 
 
 
 
Game 2 
Reason for size of donation: 
 
 
 
 
 
Game 3 
Recipient 1 (enter ID number):    Amount given:     
 
Recipient 2 (enter ID number):    Amount given:     
 
Recipient 3 (enter ID number):    Amount given:     
 
Reason for decisions: 
  
Person ID:  Date:  
 
 
About you 
We’d like to begin with a couple of simple questions about you. 
1. What town were you born in?  ________________ 
 
2. What year were you born? ________________ 
Working in a siida 
We would now like to ask about how you schedule and share work in your siida. 
3. Over the last year, how often did you take part in ________ in your own siida? Please 
choose one option from this card [Show card 1] 
 Activity 
Never      Every day 
DK NA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
A Herding activities          
B Finding lost/wandering reindeer          
C Taking animals to slaughterhouse          
D Repairing vehicles          
E Repairing fences/corrals/cabins          
F Other (specify) 
 
 
         
 
4. Over the last year, how often did you do ________ for a siida you don’t belong to? Please 
choose one option from this card [Show card 1] 
 Activity 
Never      Every day 
DK NA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
A Herding activities          
B Finding lost/wandering reindeer          
C Taking animals to slaughterhouse          
D Repairing vehicles          
E Repairing fences/corrals/cabins          
F Other (specify) 
 
 
         
 
  
Person ID:  Date:  
 
 
Siida history 
This next set of questions is about the summer and winter siidas you have belonged to over the last 
eight years. We want to understand how often herders change siida and their reasons for leaving one 
and joining another. 
5. Are you part of your summer siida's leadership board? 
☐ Yes  ☐ No  ☐ Don’t know  ☐ No answer 
 
6. In 2005, our records say you were a member of ______ summer siida. Please can you tell us 
which summer siidas you have been a part of from 2005 until now? 
INTERVIEWER: If interviewee has moved between summer siidas, ask Q7, otherwise skip to Q8. 
7. Could you please tell us why you left each siida when you moved, and why you moved to the 
siida you joined? 
Year Reason for joining new siida Summer siida Reason for leaving siida 
2005    
2006    
2007    
2008    
2009    
2010    
2011    
2012    
2013    
 
8. Now I’d like to ask the same question but about your winter siida. In 2005, our records say you 
were a member of ______ winter siida. Please can you tell us which winter siidas you have been 
a part of from 2005 until now? 
INTERVIEWER: If interviewee has moved between winter siidas, ask Q9, otherwise skip to Q10. 
9. Could you please tell us why you left each siida when you moved, and why you moved to the 
siida you joined? 
Year Reason for joining new siida Winter siida Reason for leaving siida 
2005    
2006    
2007    
2008    
2009    
2010    
2011    
2012    
2013    
 
Person ID:  Date:  
 
 
About your household 
We would now like to ask about your household’s sources of income as well as what tools and 
technologies you use. 
10. [Show card 2] Please look at this list of items. Which of these were sources of income for 
your household in the last year? 
(Tick all relevant ) 
11. Which one brought in the most money to your household in the last year? (Tick one) 
 10 11 
Reindeer sold alive   
Reindeer meat   
Other bits of deer (milk, hide, antlers, bone)   
Fishing   
Tourism (selling handicrafts etc.)   
Labouring, construction   
Transport   
Working in shops, petrol stations, …    
Welfare   
Government subsidies (compensation for losses, 
pasture loss) 
  
Other (specify) 
 
  
 
12. [Show card 3] Roughly how many reindeer does your household own? 
(Circle one) 
0-100 101-200 201-300 301-400 401-500 501-600 601-700 700+ DK NA 
 
 
13. [Show card 4] Which of these items did you own, 
rent or borrow in the last year? 
(Write O, R or B) 
14. In the last year, did you share the item 
with other members of your _____ siida? 
(Tick all applicable) 
Summer Winter 
Snowmobile    
All-Terrain Vehicle (ATV)    
Helicopter    
Other vehicle (specify) 
 
   
Smartphone (iPhone, Android etc.)    
Satellite Phone    
GPS    
Walkie talkie    
Computer    
Internet    
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About you: family 
We would now like to ask a couple of questions about whether you are married and if you have any 
children.  
15. [Show card 5] What is your marital status? 
a. Never married 
b. Married 
c. Cohabiting but unmarried 
d. Widowed 
e. Separated/divorced 
f. Other (specify) 
INTERVIEWER: If respondent answered  ‘Married’, continue, otherwise  skip to Q17. 
 
16. After you got married, where did you live? 
a. Your parents’ household 
b. Spouse's parents’ household 
c. With both sets of parents 
d. Moved into own household 
e. Other (specify) 
17. [Ask for each parent] Is your father/mother still alive? 
a. Do they live in your household/summer siida/winter siida? 
 
18. [Ask for each sibling/child] How many brothers/sisters/sons/daughters do you have?  
a. Do they live in your household/summer siida/winter siida? 
 
 Living? 
(enter number) 
Same household? 
(tick) 
Same summer siida? 
(tick) 
Same winter siida? 
(tick) 
Father     
Mother     
Brother (full)     
Sister (full)     
Son     
Daughter     
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About you: education 
Finally, we would like to finish with a couple of questions about your education. 
19. [Show card 6] What is your highest level of education? 
a. Primary school / secondary school (norsk: Grunnskole) 
b. Upper secondary school (norsk: VG skole) 
c. University or similar (norsk: Høyskole/Universitet) 
 
20. What age were you when you left school/university?  ________ 
Thank you for taking the time to speak with us and answer our questions. Is there anything you 
would like to add to what you have already told us? 
 [Additional comments: ] 
 
 
 
 
You will be paid in cash within a month from now. We first need everybody to play the game you 
played earlier so we can work out how much money you won from the game. This will be added to 
the money you receive for taking part in our study, as well as the amount that you chose to keep 
instead of donating. I will deliver the cash to your postal address. 
That’s the end of the interview. Thank you again for taking part in my study.  
 
END OF INTERVIEW 
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